alkblobs/tasks/ops-json-ops.md

---
id: ops-json-ops
name: the JSON control plane — blobs/stat, blobs/have (+ the token-renewal form), blobs/delete
status: pending
depends_on: [ops-foundation, ops-call-harness]
scope: moderate
risk: medium
impact: component
level: implementation
tags: [wave-7, ops, json, acl, tokens]
---

## Description

The three JSON control ops (ops-surface.md §Op family), each exported
as a spec/handler pair the embedder assembles — riding alkcall's
`OperationSpec` + JSON Schema validation (alkcall ADR-016) and its ACL
machinery at op entry (convention 6: this module never re-implements
an authorization check):

- **`blobs/stat`** `{namespace, digest}` → `{len}` — Query; the
  **read** action; the handler calls `Store::stat` (the fall-through
  general rule, ADR-012 §6.1); a miss is the typed missing-error
  schema (not a `{len: null}`).
- **`blobs/have`** `{namespace, digests[], token?}` → `{present[]}` —
  Query; **read-gated** (an existence probe over arbitrary digests is
  a discovery surface — gated exactly like fetch, not public);
  `present[]` corresponds to `digests[]` by index; content never
  traverses this op (hashes only). **The renewal form** (ADR-012 §2):
  when `token` is present, exactly one digest accompanies it — the
  handler verifies the token maps to that digest's pin row (the
  foundation's token layer), calls the crate-internal `pin_renew(key,
  owner)` via the foundation's store-core access, and answers
  `present[]` as usual; an expired or foreign row answers
  `present: false` and no renewal occurs — the putter's backstop is
  re-put. Without `token`, the pure existence probe (ADR-008's `has`
  discipline) over the facade's `has`. **The non-fleet renewal form**:
  the token is the held guard's handle — the probe answers present
  from the custody (nothing expires; ADR-012 §2's generalization);
  the custody/conversion lifecycle is the foundation's.
- **`blobs/delete`** `{namespace, digests[]}` — Mutation;
  **`Visibility::Internal`**, evaluated under the internal authority
  context per alkcall ADR-017 (internal calls switch authority
  context, never skip ACL): requires the embedder's operator/admin
  authority context, **not a namespace grant**; the `namespace` field
  exists for audit/triage scoping, not gating. The handler calls
  `Store::delete` (the arbitration-then-delete path; a `GcRefuse`
  refusal surfaces as the typed error schema). External discovery of
  an Internal op returns NOT_FOUND (alkcall ADR-017's visibility
  discipline).
- **The ACL mapping** (ops-surface.md §ACL mapping; OQ-09's
  resolution): **namespace = resource** — `resource_type:
  "blob-namespace"`, `resource_id_path` selecting the payload's
  `namespace` field; stat/have = the **read** action; **unlisted
  namespaces deny by default** (closed-by-default: no ACL entry ⇒ no
  read, no write — a grant per namespace is the deferred cost,
  deliberately paid over accidental exposure).
- **Schemas** (alkcall ADR-016): input/output JSON Schema per op +
  typed error schemas; the namespace field's syntax (non-empty UTF-8
  string, embedder-validated — the minting of namespaces is the
  embedder's act); the digest wire form is **hex** (the canonical
  digest hex — the same form `blobs/put`'s response returns; parsed
  via the key layer's hex ingress, malformed → the typed invalid
  error, rejects-never-guesses).
- **Tests through the harness** (`ops-call-harness`): stat round-trip
  + the miss shape; have's index correspondence (present/absent
  mixed); the renewal form's three answers (live row renews →
  present: true; expired row → present: false, no renewal; foreign
  token → present: false); delete under the internal authority
  context (an external caller gets NOT_FOUND; an internal
  operator-context call deletes); the closed-by-default ACL matrix
  (an unlisted namespace denies read; a granted identity reads).

## Acceptance Criteria

- [ ] Three spec/handler pairs exported (stat, have, delete); input/
      output schemas + typed error schemas per alkcall ADR-016
- [ ] The ACL mapping: namespace-as-resource with the
      resource_id_path; the read action on stat/have;
      closed-by-default verified by test (unlisted namespace denies)
- [ ] delete: `Visibility::Internal`, the internal-authority-context
      requirement (not namespace-gated), external discovery NOT_FOUND
- [ ] have's renewal form: one digest + token; verify-mapping →
      `pin_renew`; expired/foreign → `present: false` with no
      renewal; the non-fleet form answers from the held custody
- [ ] The handlers touch only the store facade + the foundation's
      crate-internal renewal access (no backend side-door — the
      ADR-001 §4 rule)
- [ ] Harness tests green; `cargo test` (default) green;
      `cargo test --features ops` green; clippy/fmt green on both
      shapes; `cargo doc --no-deps` clean

## References

- docs/architecture/ops-surface.md (§Op family — the three JSON ops;
  §ACL mapping)
- docs/architecture/decisions/001-substrate-posture-and-ops-placement.md
  §2/§4
- docs/architecture/decisions/012-pre-decomposition-consistency-rulings.md
  §2 (the have payload shape + the renewal form's three-step handler
  duty)
- docs/architecture/decisions/008-trait-size-probe-fleet-gc-and-large-engines.md
  (the `has` discipline the non-token form preserves)
- docs/architecture/open-questions.md OQ-09 (closed-by-default, the
  risk-asymmetry rationale)
- alkcall (upstream checkout): ADR-016 (operation error schemas),
  ADR-017 (the privilege model — internal switches context, never
  skips ACL), `src/registry/spec.rs` (`AccessControl`,
  `resource_id_path`)
- tasks/ops-foundation.md (the token layer + the renewal access the
  have handler rides), tasks/ops-call-harness.md (the harness)

## Notes

> To be filled by implementation agent

## Summary

> To be filled on completion