Files
alkcall/docs/architecture/decisions/006-authcontext-structure.md
glm-5.2 cc470a363a docs: port architecture specs + 45 ADRs from alknet, renumbered
Port the call + channels architecture documentation from the alknet
mono-repo into docs/architecture/, renumbered as alkcall ADR-001..045.

Renumbering map (alknet -> alkcall):
  Core:        001,002,004,006,007,011,065,070,092,014,050,091 -> 001-012
  Call:        005,064,012,023,015,022,024,016,049,017,028,029,030,032,066,069,067,068 -> 013-030
  Shared:      003,009,013 -> 031-033
  Channels:    071,093,072,073,074,075,076,094,079,080,081,089 -> 034-045

3 superseded/reversed ADRs kept for historical trail:
  - ADR-013 (irpc foundation, superseded by ADR-014)
  - ADR-023 (peer-scoped filtering, superseded by ADR-024)
  - ADR-077 (TTY inside channels, reversed by ADR-035 — not ported, TTY-only)

Ported docs (11 spec files + README + open-questions):
  - call-README.md, call-protocol.md, operation-registry.md, client-and-adapters.md
  - channels-README.md, channels-overview.md, channels-wire.md, channels-connection.md, channels-adapter.md, channel-operations.md, channel-client.md
  - README.md (index with doc table, ADR table grouped by category, key principles)
  - open-questions.md (lean — 30 OQs, renumbered OQ-01..030; includes new OQ-22 for the pub/sub gap)

Cross-reference rewriting:
  - All ADR-NNN references rewritten single-pass (no chaining bug)
  - Markdown link paths fixed
  - Title lines aligned with filenames
  - Non-ported ADR refs (052, 082, 086, etc.) left as-is with README note

The open-questions.md includes OQ-22 (new): the call protocol pub/sub
gap — subscribe exists but pub does not, needed for channels
channel/resources/subscribe fan-out. This is the next ADR to write
(alkcall ADR-046).
2026-08-12 07:06:57 +00:00

156 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown

# ADR-006: AuthContext Structure and Resolution Flow
## Status
Accepted
## Context
ADR-003 establishes the hybrid auth model: the endpoint resolves what it can (TLS client certificate fingerprint), handlers resolve what they must (AuthToken in the first frame, Bearer header, SSH key fingerprint). The `AuthContext` passed to `handle()` may be partial.
The reference implementation's `Identity` struct is:
```rust
pub struct Identity {
pub id: String,
pub scopes: Vec<String>,
pub resources: HashMap<String, Vec<String>>,
}
```
And `ConfigIdentityProvider` resolves fingerprints and API keys to `Identity`. This works well and carries forward.
But the reference implementation has no `AuthContext` type — auth resolution happens inside the SSH handler before calling `IdentityProvider`. The new model needs a type that represents "what the endpoint knows about this connection's identity before the handler starts," plus a way for handlers to enrich it.
This is a one-way door: once handlers depend on `AuthContext`'s structure, changing it affects every handler. The structure must be right.
### Design considerations
1. **Handlers need identity information to make authorization decisions.** A handler that requires authentication needs to know: is the peer authenticated? Who are they? What scopes do they have?
2. **The endpoint may have zero, partial, or complete identity information.** A plain QUIC connection with no TLS client cert gives the endpoint nothing. A TLS connection with a client cert gives the endpoint a fingerprint that may resolve to an Identity. A handler that extracts an AuthToken from the first frame can complete the resolution.
3. **AuthContext must not be SSH-specific.** The reference implementation's auth types are tangled with russh (SSH key fingerprints, certificate authorities). The new model needs to be ALPN-agnostic.
4. **AuthContext is constructed by the endpoint and enriched by handlers.** The endpoint creates it from TLS-level information. The handler mutates or replaces it with protocol-level information.
5. **AuthContext must be cheap to construct.** Every incoming connection gets one, even if authentication ultimately fails.
## Decision
### AuthContext is a struct with optional fields
```rust
pub struct AuthContext {
/// The peer's authenticated identity, if resolved.
/// None means the endpoint has no identity information for this connection.
/// Some(Identity) means the endpoint resolved the peer's identity.
pub identity: Option<Identity>,
/// The negotiated ALPN for this connection.
/// Always present — the endpoint sets this from the TLS handshake.
pub alpn: Vec<u8>,
/// The peer's remote address, if available.
pub remote_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
/// TLS client certificate fingerprint, if the client presented a certificate.
/// Set by the endpoint during TLS handshake. Handlers may use this for
/// SSH host key verification or other fingerprint-based auth.
pub tls_client_fingerprint: Option<String>,
}
```
Key design points:
- `identity: Option<Identity>` — not `Identity` with optional fields, not a separate `PartialAuthContext`. The endpoint sets it to `None` if it has no identity information, or `Some(identity)` if it resolved one. Handlers that need to complete auth call `IdentityProvider` themselves and store the resolved identity in a local variable — they do NOT mutate AuthContext (see immutability section below).
- `alpn` is always present — every connection has a negotiated ALPN.
- `remote_addr` is informational. It's available from the QUIC connection and useful for logging and rate limiting, but it's not authoritative (clients can be behind NATs/proxies).
- `tls_client_fingerprint` captures the TLS-level credential. If present, it's the SHA-256 fingerprint of the client's TLS certificate. This is separate from `identity` because a handler might need the fingerprint even when `IdentityProvider::resolve_from_fingerprint()` returns `None` (e.g., unknown cert, but the handler wants to log it).
### AuthContext is Clone
`AuthContext` derives `Clone`. Handlers can clone it for per-stream or per-channel contexts within a connection. The `Identity` inside is also `Clone`.
### Handler-level auth enrichment pattern
Handlers that need to complete authentication do so inside `handle()`:
```rust
async fn handle(&self, connection: Connection, auth: &AuthContext) -> Result<(), HandlerError> {
let identity = if let Some(id) = &auth.identity {
id.clone() // Endpoint already resolved identity
} else {
// Extract credentials from the protocol, resolve via IdentityProvider
let token = self.extract_auth_token(&connection).await?;
self.identity_provider.resolve_from_token(&token)
.ok_or(HandlerError::AuthRequired)?
};
// ... proceed with authenticated identity
}
```
Handlers that don't need authentication (e.g., DNS resolver, health check) can ignore `auth.identity` entirely.
### Identity carries over from reference implementation
```rust
pub struct Identity {
pub id: String,
pub scopes: Vec<String>,
pub resources: HashMap<String, Vec<String>>,
}
```
This is the same structure from the reference implementation, minus the russh dependency. It's ALPN-agnostic:
- `id`: A unique identifier string. For SSH key auth, this is the SHA-256 fingerprint. For API key auth, this is the key prefix. For certificate auth, this is the principal name.
- `scopes`: Authorization scopes. `["relay:connect", "secrets:derive"]` etc.
- `resources`: Named resource lists. `{"service": ["gitea", "registry"]}` etc.
### AuthToken carries raw bytes
```rust
pub struct AuthToken {
pub raw: Vec<u8>,
}
```
Unchanged from the reference implementation. Opaque bytes — the handler that extracted it knows its encoding.
### IdentityProvider carries over with minor adaptation
```rust
pub trait IdentityProvider: Send + Sync + 'static {
fn resolve_from_fingerprint(&self, fingerprint: &str) -> Option<Identity>;
fn resolve_from_token(&self, token: &AuthToken) -> Option<Identity>;
}
```
The implementation (`ConfigIdentityProvider`) changes from the reference: it no longer depends on russh types for key storage. Instead, it stores fingerprint strings and API key entries, drawing from `DynamicConfig` via `ArcSwap`.
### AuthContext is NOT mutable inside handle()
The `handle()` signature passes `&AuthContext` (immutable reference). Handlers that resolve identity create a local variable with the resolved identity — they don't mutate the AuthContext. This prevents accidental cross-contamination between streams on the same connection.
## Consequences
**Positive:**
- `AuthContext` is a value type — cheap to construct, clone, and pass around
- Handlers that don't need auth can ignore it entirely
- The endpoint provides what it can for free (TLS client cert fingerprint), handlers complete what they need
- No russh dependency in AuthContext — it's ALPN-agnostic
- `Option<Identity>` is explicit — there's no "partially authenticated" state that handlers have to interpret
- Handlers that need to enrich auth create local variables, not mutation — clean data flow
**Negative:**
- Handlers that need auth must call `IdentityProvider` themselves — this is intentional (ADR-003 hybrid model) but means each handler has its own auth extraction logic
- `tls_client_fingerprint` is separate from `identity` — a handler might wonder "why do I have a fingerprint but no identity?" This happens when the client presents a cert that's not in the authorized keys. The handler can log the fingerprint for debugging.
- `AuthContext` doesn't carry protocol-specific auth state (e.g., SSH auth method, HTTP auth scheme). This is by design — protocol-specific details belong inside the handler, not in the shared auth context.
## References
- ADR-002: ProtocolHandler trait
- ADR-003: Auth as shared core (IdentityProvider, hybrid auth model)
- ADR-005: BiStream type definition (Connection parameter)
- ADR-010: ALPN router and endpoint (where AuthContext is created)
- Reference implementation: `alknet-main/crates/alknet-core/src/auth/identity.rs`