chore: release alkhttp 0.6.0

The fuzzing adoption waves (commits 5971c0a..a16dee7) plus the alkcall
0.8.1 patch pickup, released as a minor bump:

- Added: fuzz/ infra (5 nightly targets, stable-toolchain corpus-replay
  gate), public SSE parse types (SseParser/SseEvent/SseParseError/
  SSE_EVENT_BUFFER_CAP), the WriteChunkWalk/Walk chunk-walk API, and
  the fuzzing re-export hubs.
- Fixed: FWD-20 (SSE dribble drain quadratic -> linear), FWD-21
  (WriteChunkWalk failure arms carry the pre-failure pieces), FWD-22
  (harness re-frame guard-CR; no crate change).
- Changed: alkcall 0.8.1 (duplicate adopt/open collision fix).
- Doc: fixed broken intra-doc link surfaced by SSE_EVENT_BUFFER_CAP
  going public.

Verified: cargo test (457 passed), cargo test --all-features (590),
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings, cargo fmt --check,
cargo doc --no-deps (0 warnings), fuzz corpus replay (21 passed),
cargo publish --dry-run --allow-dirty.

.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
 target/
 node_modules/
 .worktrees/
+
+fuzz/target/
+fuzz/artifacts/
+fuzz/coverage/
+# Grown corpora: the hash-named files the campaigns drop into
+# fuzz/corpus/<target>/ are gitignored (the quinn/h2 policy); the
+# committed seeds are the seed-* files, kept via the per-dir
+# .gitignore un-ignores.
+fuzz/corpus/*/[0-9a-f][0-9a-f]*

AGENTS.md

@@ -176,12 +176,22 @@ cargo test                                    # full suite
 cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
 cargo fmt --check
 cargo doc --no-deps                           # if docs changed
+cargo test --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml   # fuzz corpus replay (the fuzz gate)
 cargo publish --dry-run --allow-dirty         # before a release
 ```
 
 If feature flags are added, also run `cargo test --all-features` and
 `cargo clippy --all-features --all-targets -- -D warnings`.
 
+The corpus replay is the standing fuzz gate (the alkcall
+`docs/research/fuzzing.md` §7.9 posture): it replays every committed
+seed through the same invariant functions the fuzz targets run, on
+stable, without nightly. Campaigns (nightly, cargo-fuzz) run manually
+via `fuzz/run-detached.sh` — never as a foreground child of an agent
+session — after touching the SSE parser, the WS byte adapter, or the
+import adapters, and before releases. See `docs/plans/fuzzing.md` and
+`fuzz/README.md`.
+
 ## Architecture Context
 
 - `docs/architecture/` — the authoritative spec. Read it before

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,7 +4,114 @@ All notable changes to this crate are documented here. The format is
 based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and
 this crate adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/).
 
-## [Unreleased]
+## [0.6.0] — 2026-09-29
+
+### Added
+
+- **Fuzzing infrastructure adopted** (the sibling-crate pattern:
+  alkcall, alktty, alktunnels, alksocks). The `fuzz/` subtree holds
+  five nightly targets (`sse_parser`, `ws_chunk_framing`,
+  `spec_import`, `ws_session_opseq`, `retry_throttle`), a stable
+  toolchain shared crate replaying every committed seed (80 + 42 + 16
+  committed) through the identical invariant functions as plain
+  `cargo test` — the standing fuzz gate,
+  `cargo test --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml` — plus a
+  detached campaign runner and a deterministic seed generator. `fuzz/`
+  is excluded from publish; nightly stays confined to the subtree
+  (MSRV 1.88 unchanged).
+- **New public API for the tested parse surfaces.** The incremental
+  SSE parser widens `pub(crate)` → `pub` (`SseParser`, `SseEvent`,
+  `SseParseError`, `SSE_EVENT_BUFFER_CAP`, `sse_event_envelope`) and
+  the WS write pump's chunk walk is extracted as public API
+  (`WriteChunkWalk`, `Walk`) — both direct-drive test targets. Five
+  `fuzzing` re-export hubs (`adapters::forward::fuzzing`,
+  `adapters::openapi_spec::fuzzing`, `adapters::input_validation::fuzzing`
+  with the opaque `FuzzCompiledValidator`, `adapters::from_mcp::fuzzing`
+  (\`mcp\`), `client::fuzzing` + `websocket::byte_adapter::fuzzing`
+  with the mock-socket pump drive) gather the harness access surface
+  at one named path each; the underlying crate-internal items keep
+  their visibility.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **SSE dribble drain was quadratic in the dribbled bytes (FWD-20).**
+  `SseParser::feed` re-walked the whole reassembly buffer per feed, so
+  a subscription drip-feeding one giant unterminated line paid O(n²)
+  (64 KiB ≈ 12.5 s CPU per connection; 1 MiB ran to minutes) with no
+  per-stream total-CPU bound. Line assembly now walks only the
+  arriving chunk — the reassembly buffer holds just the current line —
+  measured linear (1 MiB dribble: 21 ms). Regression test:
+  `sse_parser_dribble_feeds_do_not_rescan_the_buffer`.
+- **`WriteChunkWalk` failure arms discarded the already-drained pieces
+  (FWD-21).** One feed that drained complete chunks and then hit an
+  oversize header (or the pending cap) returned
+  `Walk::Oversize`/`PendingOverCap` empty, dropping bytes the mux had
+  already counted as written (the walk's consumption-accounting
+  contract was violated; production could not reach the shape, but
+  `WriteChunkWalk` is public API and the silent drop broke it). The
+  failure variants now carry the pre-failure pieces (`Vec<Vec<u8>>`)
+  and the write pump emits them before failing the stream (1011
+  close). Regression seeds cover the drain-then-fail shape in both
+  chunk harnesses.
+- **FWD-22 (harness-assert fix):** the fuzz harness's SSE re-frame
+  round-trip probe is now total over anything JSON-encodable
+  (`frame_event` emits a guard CR as the line terminator; the
+  terminal-CR skip is dropped). No crate change.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`alkcall` dependency consumed at 0.8.1** (patch pickup): the
+  duplicate adopt/open collision fix found by alkcall's
+  `manager_routing` fuzz campaign — a duplicate adopt/open no longer
+  replaces the live channel's state. This crate reaches the fixed
+  paths via the shared `ChannelManager`; no alkcall API surface used
+  here changed.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`alkcall` dependency bumped to 0.8.0** (review 008's remediation
+  wave: the graduation upstream asks + the in-tree channel relay). No
+  code change in this crate — alkcall 0.8.0 is additive on the
+  call-plane JSON and the registry seams, and none of its new surfaces
+  are constructed here: this crate builds no `Establishment` reply
+  fields (the WS ferry passes `Option<OpenEstablisher>` through
+  unchanged; reply-field projection is an establisher-supplier
+  feature), imports no marked specs through `from_call` (the
+  `from_wss` operation filter excludes the protocol-session ops; any
+  domain op the remote serves imports as a forwarding bundle exactly
+  as before), and consumes neither `ChannelRelay` nor
+  `HubLegImports`/`HubLegTemplate` (hub-leg assembly remains the
+  consumer's concern at the assembly layer). One ride-through visible
+  on this crate's discovery surface: for a deployment's
+  `with_ws_openable_alpns` open-op specs whose names are not standard
+  `channels/<seg>/(sub|pub)` shapes, the served `services/list` /
+  `services/schema` output now carries an explicit
+  `channel_open_alpn` string alongside the boolean marker (alkcall
+  0.8.0's U-1, ADR-047 amendment 3) — so hubs relaying through a
+  `from_call` import of those ops reconstruct the marker instead of
+  seeing plain forwarding stubs. Standard-shape open-op names stay
+  byte-stable. Minor bump per the dep-wave convention (0.3.0 rode
+  alkcall 0.6.0; 0.4.0 rode 0.7.0).
+
+## [0.4.1] — 2026-09-10
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`rust-version` floor raised 1.85 → 1.88** (patch bump, no API change).
+  The 1.85 claim was already false at the dependency level: the resolved
+  lockfile pulls `icu_*` 2.x (MSRV 1.86 via `jsonschema` → `idna`) and —
+  since alkcall 0.7.1 — alkcall itself declares 1.88, so 1.85 toolchains
+  cannot build the tree regardless of what Cargo.toml declared. Raising
+  the floor to 1.88 aligns with the ecosystem MSRV decision (noq QUIC
+  path; recorded for alktls in OQ-TLS-08) and breaks no downstream that
+  could build the crate before. Verified: 1.88 toolchain `cargo test
+  --locked` + clippy `--all-targets -D warnings` clean; one 1.88 clippy
+  lint fixed (`uninlined_format_args` in a `forward.rs` test).
+
+- **`alkcall` dependency consumed at 0.7.1** (lockfile bump; the
+  `version = "0.7"` requirement already covered it). No code change
+  forced — alkcall 0.7.1's changes are its own MSRV-floor raise plus the
+  cf-006/cf-007 feature work already consumed in the 0.7.0 wave.
 
 ## [0.4.0] — 2026-09-07
 

Cargo.lock

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "alkcall"
-version = "0.7.0"
+version = "0.8.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5162a10144df65b03b887e30f77eb30d956ca1ca460a3f81b409128cbcae3199"
+checksum = "bf6af1e4af1460480849adf959c972d65deeafc36f4101064ced1ce6d1adfd5b"
 dependencies = [
  "async-trait",
  "bytes",
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "alkhttp"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.6.0"
 dependencies = [
  "alkcall",
  "arc-swap",

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
 [package]
 name = "alkhttp"
-version = "0.4.0"
+version = "0.6.0"
 edition = "2021"
-rust-version = "1.85"
+rust-version = "1.88"
 license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
 description = "HTTP interface for the alk stack: serves HTTP/1.1 + HTTP/2 on standard ALPNs (with WebSocket upgrade carrying the channels protocol) and hosts the HTTP-backed call-protocol adapters"
 readme = "README.md"
 repository = "https://git.alk.dev/alkdev/alkhttp"
 keywords = ["http", "websocket", "rpc", "openapi", "mcp"]
 categories = ["network-programming", "web-programming", "asynchronous"]
-exclude = [".opencode/", "AGENTS.md", "docs/", "tasks/", "scripts/"]
+exclude = [".opencode/", "AGENTS.md", "docs/", "tasks/", "scripts/", "fuzz/"]
 
 [lib]
 name = "alkhttp"
 
+[workspace]
+members = ["."]
+exclude = ["fuzz"]
+
 [features]
 default = ["server", "client", "h2", "http1"]
 # Producer side: the axum `Router` host (gateway routes, /healthz,
@@ -42,7 +46,7 @@ h2 = ["server", "dep:hyper", "hyper-util/http2", "hyper/http2"]
 http1 = ["server", "dep:hyper", "hyper-util/http1", "hyper/http1"]
 
 [dependencies]
-alkcall = { version = "0.7", features = ["gateway"] }
+alkcall = { version = "0.8.1", features = ["gateway"] }
 arc-swap = { version = "1", optional = true }
 axum = { version = "0.8", optional = true, features = ["ws"] }
 bytes = "1"

README.md

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ A lean single-side build takes `default-features = false` plus the side
 it needs:
 
 ```toml
-alkhttp = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["server"] }
+alkhttp = { version = "0.5.0", default-features = false, features = ["server"] }
 ```
 
 ## Security posture

docs/plans/fuzzing.md

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+# Plan: alkhttp fuzzing
+
+Adopted from alkcall's `docs/research/fuzzing.md` (the pattern is
+operational in four sibling crates: alkcall, alktty, alktunnels,
+alksocks — each with the same `fuzz/` layout, the detached runner, and
+the corpus-replay-as-plain-test gate). This document is the working
+plan for alkhttp; the sibling docs are the reference for rationale
+(alkcall's doc is the deep version: tool landscape, comparable-crate
+survey, CI tiers) — this plan stays focused on what alkhttp fuzzes and
+in what order.
+
+**Status:** targets 1–3 implemented and verified (1–2 on 2026-09-29,
+wave 1; 3 on 2026-09-29, wave 2); target 4 implemented (2026-09-29,
+wave 3: `ws_session_opseq` + `retry_throttle`; campaign results in
+§5); the only crash found so far (FWD-21, the `WriteChunkWalk`
+failure-carry drop) was a crate contract fix, not a harness
+misassert.
+
+Progress log:
+
+- **2026-09-29 — targets 1–2 + infra landed (commit 5971c0a).** The
+  `fuzz/` workspace, 80 committed seeds (52 + 28), the detached
+  runner, the corpus-replay gate (AGENTS.md verification checklist
+  gains the line), nightly pinned subtree, explicit root `[workspace]`
+  exclusion. One crate finding on the way (below). `cargo fuzz build`
+  clean; corpus replay 80/80 green; campaigns pending at commit time.
+- **2026-09-29 — FWD-20, the SSE dribble-drain quadratic (fixed in
+  the same commit).** Found by driving the new `sse_parser` harness's
+  split-feed invariants: `SseParser::feed` re-walked the whole
+  reassembly buffer per feed — a subscription dribble-fed one giant
+  unterminated line (the attacker can hold `data: <n MiB>` open
+  forever without sending `\n`) paid O(n²) in the dribbled bytes:
+  64 KiB dribble ≈ 12.5 s CPU, 1 MiB would run to minutes per
+  connection, with no per-stream total-CPU bound (the alkcall
+  research §6.2-3 shape, in this crate). The fix: line assembly walks
+  only the arriving chunk — the reassembly buffer holds just the
+  current line, so the scan never revisits drained bytes; measured
+  1 MiB dribble now 21 ms (linear, 4× data = ~4× time). Regression
+  test `sse_parser_dribble_feeds_do_not_rescan_the_buffer`. Also
+  fixed by corpus replay pre-campaign: the harness's own re-frame
+  round-trip was wrong for data ending in `\r` (un-re-encodable under
+  WHATWG CR-stripping — the serde_json key-order class; the harness
+  skips that documented-lossy shape).
+- **2026-09-29 — target 3 (`spec_import`) implemented (wave 2).**
+  Harness + 42 seeds + the three `fuzzing` hubs; no crate findings in
+  the initial corpus replay (11 shared tests green, main crate 457
+  default / 590 all-features). Smoke campaign clean: 2.34M execs /
+  10 min, zero crash/OOM/timeout, coverage still growing at budget
+  end (see §5). One harness-assert fix on the way (the quoted-`""`
+  YAML key noted above).
+- **2026-09-29 — target 4 (`ws_session_opseq` + `retry_throttle`)
+  implemented (wave 3).** Two stateful harnesses + 16 seeds + the
+  `byte_adapter::fuzzing` drive hub (generic pump bodies over a mock
+  socket flavor) + the `client::fuzzing` throttle hub. One crate
+  finding on the way: FWD-21 (above) — fixed same commit.
+- **2026-09-29 — FWD-21, the `WriteChunkWalk` failure-carry drop.**
+  Found minutes into the first `ws_session_opseq` campaign: one feed
+  that drains a complete chunk and then hits an oversize header (or
+  the pending cap) in the same call returned
+  `Walk::Oversize`/`PendingOverCap` and **discarded the already
+  drained pieces** — the walk's own consumption-accounting contract
+  ("every parsed byte is either emitted or retained", wave-1
+  invariant 6) was violated by the crate, not the harness. Production
+  could not reach the shape (the mux's per-write invariant caps
+  `pending` at one chunk + header), so impact was nil, but
+  `WriteChunkWalk` is public API and the wave-1 `split_walk` equality
+  check was silently skipped on exactly this path. Fix (user-approved
+  semver-relevant API change): `Walk::Oversize(Vec<Vec<u8>>)` /
+  `Walk::PendingOverCap(Vec<Vec<u8>>)` carry the pre-failure pieces;
+  the write pump emits them before `fail_write_pump`, so a 1011
+  close never swallows a legal chunk the mux already counted as
+  written. Regression seeds cover the drain-then-fail shape in both
+  chunk harnesses.
+- **2026-09-29 — FWD-22, the round-trip guard-CR (harness-assert
+  fix; wave 4).** Found ~32 min into the first long `sse_parser`
+  campaign: the re-frame round-trip probe's `frame_event` emitted
+  `data: <line>` unguarded, so a JSON payload carrying an *interior*
+  CR (multi-line data `"\r\n…"` — the payload line is `"\r"`) had
+  its payload CR consumed by `strip_cr` at re-parse time and the
+  round-trip lost it (wave-1 had skipped only the *terminal*-CR
+  case). The parser was never wrong — the shape is representable on
+  input (`data: x\r\r\n` → value `x\r`) and both drives agreed — the
+  re-encode was weak: one CR in the wire form is ambiguous between
+  "payload CR" and "line-terminator CR". Fix: `frame_event` emits
+  `data: <line>\r` for every data line (the guard CR is the
+  terminator, `strip_cr` removes exactly it, the payload CR
+  survives), and the terminal-CR skip is dropped — the round trip is
+  now total over anything JSON-encodable (JSON never encodes a raw
+  CR, so the residual asymmetry stays the serde_json non-preserved
+  key-order class). No crate API change. Regression seeds + unit
+  cases cover the interior-CR JSON shape (`{"k": "a\\rb"}`, two-line
+  `{…}\r\r\n{…}`).
+
+---
+
+## 1. Why alkhttp fuzzes (the if)
+
+Same three converging arguments as every sibling crate, with one
+stronger premise:
+
+1. **This is the outermost shell.** alkcall's peers are authenticated
+   by construction; alkhttp's HTTP surface faces anonymous callers —
+   gateway routes accept bytes on the wire before any identity is
+   resolved, `/healthz` and the stealth decoy are fully public, and the
+   `from_*` adapters parse responses from remote HTTP servers nobody
+   in this repo controls. The quinn-CVE class (RUSTSEC-2026-0037: a
+   panic on attacker wire bytes is a remote DoS) applies here at its
+   most direct. A remote crash in this crate does not need a peer
+   trust step to reach.
+2. **Real hand-rolled byte parsing on untrusted streams.** The HTTP
+   framing itself is hyper/axum/reqwest (upstream-fuzzed, not our job),
+   but the crate owns an incremental SSE frame parser, the
+   WS↔byte-stream chunk parser on both directions, a YAML→JSON
+   conversion pass with its own number/key/pointer semantics, and
+   bounded-schema compilation over arbitrary input values. These are
+   the exact shapes (incremental, splitting-sensitive,
+   cap-check-ordered) where example tests miss off-by-one bugs. No
+   `unsafe` exists (grep-verified), so the expected yield is the
+   alkcall profile: panics, arithmetic, allocation, and state-growth
+   bugs — not memory corruption.
+3. **The integration seam is untested from this side.** alkhttp sits
+   downstream of the alkcall 0.8.1 fix (duplicate adopt/open
+   destroying the live channel — found by alkcall's `manager_routing`
+   campaign minutes into its first run). alkhttp's WS path hands raw
+   bytes to alkcall's demux; `fuzz/shared` depending on alkcall means
+   corpus replay exercises the alkcall surface from the integration
+   crate, a direction alkcall's own harness does not cover.
+
+Also the standing empirical argument: the 0.8.1 bug was a stateful
+interleaving invisible to example-based tests, and it cost a patch
+release across every sibling. The infrastructure is already proven and
+cheap to replicate; the marginal cost here is only the target logic.
+
+## 2. Infrastructure (identical to the siblings)
+
+Layout (copy of alksocks/alktty/alktunnels/alkcall):
+
+```
+fuzz/
+├── Cargo.toml            alkhttp-fuzz (nightly-only bins; own [workspace])
+├── rust-toolchain.toml   pins nightly + llvm-tools for this subtree only
+├── fuzz_targets/         thin fuzz_target! wrappers (3 lines each)
+├── shared/               alkhttp-fuzz-shared — STABLE-toolchain library:
+│                         invariant logic + corpus-replay tests
+├── corpus/<target>/      committed seeds (generated by gen_fuzz_seeds.py)
+├── artifacts/            gitignored crash/oom/timeout artifacts + logs
+├── gen_fuzz_seeds.py     deterministic seed generator (quiche pattern)
+├── json.dict             JSON token dictionary (spec_import)
+├── run-detached.sh       detached campaign runner (copied from the siblings)
+└── README.md             operational cheat-sheet
+```
+
+Load-bearing details (all four siblings hit these):
+
+- **Invariant logic lives in `fuzz/shared/`**, not the target binaries.
+  The stable-toolchain shared crate replays every committed seed
+  through the identical invariant functions as plain `cargo test` —
+  the standing fuzz gate (alkcall research §7.9 tier-3 deliverable,
+  this repo has no hosted CI by policy) — and the `fuzz_target!`
+  binaries are thin wrappers.
+- **Root `Cargo.toml` needs an explicit `[workspace]` table**
+  (`members = ["."]`, `exclude = ["fuzz"]`); without it auto-discovery
+  pulls `fuzz/shared/` into the main workspace and the stable
+  toolchain builds nightly-consumed dev-deps. alkcall hit this trap.
+- **`fuzz/rust-toolchain.toml` pins nightly** so `cargo fuzz build`
+  works from any CWD; nightly stays confined to `fuzz/`, MSRV 1.88
+  untouched. `fuzz/` joins the publish `exclude` list.
+- **`.gitignore` additions**: `fuzz/artifacts/`, grown-corpus dirs
+  (committed seeds stay).
+- **Detached runner (non-negotiable operating rule).** Campaigns never
+  run as a foreground child of an agent session (an OOM in a target
+  can take down the session host's process tree). Runner pins
+  `-fork=1 -rss_limit_mb=2048 -malloc_limit_mb=2048 -timeout=25` and
+  detaches via `setsid` + `nohup` + log redirect; the agent polls the
+  log and artifact directory, never waits. Copied from alksocks
+  (§`fuzz/run-detached.sh`).
+
+**Verification-gate change:** `cargo test --manifest-path
+fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml` (corpus replay) joins AGENTS.md's verification
+checklist, as the siblings did.
+
+## 3. Target inventory (all 4)
+
+| # | Target | Drives | Input style | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | `sse_parser` | `SseParser::feed` + `sse_event_envelope` mapping (`src/adapters/forward.rs`) | chunk-split sequence × eof flag | implemented 2026-09-29 |
+| 2 | `ws_chunk_framing` | the WS↔byte-adapter chunk parsers (`WriteChunkWalk`, the write pump's extracted chunk walk) (`src/websocket/byte_adapter.rs`) | byte sequences + message-split boundaries | implemented 2026-09-29 |
+| 3 | `spec_import` | `OpenAPISpec::from_str`/`from_yaml`/`from_json`, `CompiledInputSchema`/`harden_closed_by_default`/`validate`, `FromMCP::build_spec` (`src/adapters/openapi_spec.rs`, `from_jsonschema.rs`, `from_mcp/mod.rs`) | attacker-shaped OpenAPI/JSON/YAML docs + schemas | implemented 2026-09-29 |
+| 4 | `ws_session_opseq` / `retry_throttle` | stateful op sequences over the WS byte-adapter pumps (write/read pump interleavings, close timing, oversize frames); `RetryAfterMiddleware` throttle-map growth | `#[derive(Arbitrary)]` op enums | implemented 2026-09-29 |
+
+### Target 1 — `sse_parser` (the chunk_header-class target)
+
+The crate's most direct untrusted-byte parser: any subscription over
+`from_openapi`/`from_jsonschema` pipes remote HTTP bytes through
+`SseParser::feed`.
+
+- **Drives:** incremental `feed` with the fuzzer choosing the chunk
+  split boundaries; also the full-input single feed, and the
+  `sse_event_envelope` mapping (FWD-17: JSON payload surfaces as
+  itself, non-JSON as the `{"data","event"}` wrapper, empty →
+  `Null`).
+- **Invariants:**
+  - no-panic on any byte sequence, any split, any eof timing;
+  - splitting transparency: whole-feed and every-slice-split feed
+    produce identical event streams (the alksocks `datagram_codec`
+    pattern);
+  - the buffer-cap check runs *before* the buffer grows
+    (FWD-14): the reassembly buffer can never exceed
+    `SSE_EVENT_BUFFER_CAP`; overflow surfaces as `BufferOverflow`,
+    never a panic or unbounded growth;
+  - dispatch discipline: an event is dispatched only on a blank line
+    (or EOF for a pending event with data); `data:` lines join with
+    `\n`; last `event:` before the blank line wins; `id:`/`retry:`/
+    comment lines (`:` prefix) never dispatch or alter state;
+  - shape partition: `BufferOverflow` only when a fed chunk would push
+    the reassembly buffer over the cap; a cap-sized-and-under input
+    can never trigger it — never allocate beyond the cap;
+  - UTF-8 discipline: a multi-byte character split at a chunk boundary
+    is not corrupted (decode happens once a complete line/EOF bounds
+    the window); invalid raw UTF-8 lines are skipped silently (WHATWG
+    tolerance), never panic;
+  - envelope mapping (FWD-17): every `feed`-produced event maps to a
+    success `ResponseEnvelope`; the JSON-ness branch agrees with
+    `serde_json::from_str` on the joined data; the JSON branch never
+    carries the `event` binding.
+  - round-trip-ish probe: re-serializing a parsed event as
+    `data:`/`event:` lines re-parses to an equal event for
+    JSON-encodable payloads (catches field-name and joining drift;
+    structural equality only).
+- **Exposure:** `SseParser`/`SseEvent`/`sse_event_envelope` are
+  `pub(crate)`. Shared/invariant access via quinn/rustls-style
+  exposure if the pure functions can't be reached — alkcall's
+  campaign never needed `#[cfg(fuzzing)]` after making parse helpers
+  `pub(crate)` + re-export; the first choice here is the same: a
+  minimal `#[cfg(fuzzing)] pub mod fuzzing` re-export in
+  `src/adapters/forward.rs` (nightly-fuzz-only builds see it; stable
+  builds don't).
+
+### Target 2 — `ws_chunk_framing`
+
+The WS↔byte adapter parses 8-byte chunk headers on the write
+(outbound byte→WS-message) side and validates against
+`MAX_CHUNK_LEN`; the inbound side reassembles WS messages into the
+byte stream that alkcall's demux parses. The hand-rolled pieces are
+the chunk-walk loop and the pending accumulator.
+
+- **Drives:** the write-pump parse loop driven directly with the
+  same logic `run_write_pump` executes on each `WriteMsg::Bytes`
+  (header scan → `MAX_CHUNK_LEN` gate → drain → 1 MiB message-piece
+  split → pending cap), and the read-pump inbound path's
+  message→header reassembly, driven as a byte-sequence target with
+  the fuzzer controlling both the byte stream and the message split
+  boundaries.
+- **Invariants:**
+  - no-panic on any byte sequence at any message-split boundary;
+  - a header claiming `> MAX_CHUNK_LEN` fails the stream loudly
+    (WS-04/HY-09) at exactly the point the pump reaches the header —
+    never a silent wait and never an allocate-before-reject;
+  - the pending accumulator never exceeds `PENDING_BUFFER_CAP` =
+    `MAX_CHUNK_LEN + 8` (WS-14): bound asserted after every op; a
+    single write above the cap is rejected in `poll_write` before
+    queueing, so the cap is invariantly satisfied;
+  - message-splitting transparency: a chunk split across N
+    WS-message feeds parses exactly like the whole-buffer feed
+    (receiver's boundary is the header, not the message —
+    WS-06); pieces split at any offset ≤ `WS_MESSAGE_CAP`
+    reassemble losslessly;
+  - consumption accounting: every parsed byte is either emitted as a
+    chunk piece or retained in the pending buffer — nothing lost or
+    duplicated across the walk;
+  - the over-cap write rejection (`poll_write` > `PENDING_BUFFER_CAP`
+    → `InvalidData` before queueing) is exact: no partial state, no
+    silent truncation.
+- **Exposure:** the pure parse helpers are extracted/testable; the
+  pump functions are `pub(crate)` async — drives via a
+  `#[cfg(fuzzing)]` re-export and a current-thread runtime with a
+  mock sink (the alkcall `envelope_frame` Cursor pattern).
+
+### Target 3 — `spec_import` (implemented 2026-09-29)
+
+- **Drives:** raw bytes (and `json.dict`) → `serde_json`/`yaml_serde`
+  → `OpenAPISpec::from_str` (JSON-first, YAML-fallback, ADR-051) and
+  the typed helpers: `yaml_to_json_value` boundary, number/key
+  conversion; plus `CompiledInputSchema::compile` +
+  `harden_closed_by_default` + `validate` over attacker-shaped
+  schemas and input values; plus `FromMCP::build_spec` over arbitrary
+  `Tool`-shaped JSON.
+- **Invariants:** no-panic; parse failures are always clean
+  `AdapterError::SchemaParse` naming a pointer (never a panic/silent
+  null); the YAML normalization rejects loudly what
+  `serde_json::Number` cannot represent (non-finite floats,
+  non-string keys); `$ref` resolution errors on cycles instead of
+  unbounded recursion; the compiled validator rejects/accepts
+  consistently w.r.t. the schema; closed-by-default hardening pins
+  `additionalProperties: false`; registry-compile shape parity with
+  alkcall's `spec_parse` invariants (bounded compile, always
+  `Result`).
+- **Implemented shape:** the harness drives one attacker string
+  through all four lanes — the three spec constructors (str/json,
+  yaml under `openapi`), the direct YAML→JSON normalization boundary
+  (merge keys applied; a value the boundary accepted can't contain
+  non-finite numbers — serde_json-invariant, asserted recursively),
+  the compile/harden/validate lane against the whole doc (hardening
+  partition: injected iff absent and the input is an object;
+  validate determinism probe with an unknown-key input; deterministic
+  two-call agreement), the MCP tool-shape lane (the doc and a
+  `{name, inputSchema}` wrapper through `serde_json`→`Tool`→
+  `build_spec`; success pins the namespace prefix), and the `$ref`
+  lane (`resolve_refs_recursive` over the raw doc + declared
+  component schemas when the doc parses). Exposure via
+  `fuzzing` hubs alongside the wave-1 one:
+  `openapi_spec::fuzzing`, `input_validation::fuzzing`
+  (an opaque `FuzzCompiledValidator` newtype so the `pub(crate)`
+  validator never leaks), `from_mcp::fuzzing` (`mcp` feature).
+  The shared crate gates `openapi`/`mcp` (both on by default, riding
+  the main crate's default build); corpus replay passes both with and
+  without.
+- **Note:** yaml_serde (ADR-051: YAML 1.2 + merge keys) is the
+  deepest third-party parse we own — the campaign should also encode
+  the already-documented boundaries (`apply_merge` error path,
+  duplicate-key rejection with line/column) as corpus expectations.
+  42 committed seeds cover the menu below.
+
+### Target 4 — stateful wave (implemented 2026-09-29)
+
+- **`ws_session_opseq`:** `#[derive(Arbitrary)]` op sequences over
+  the WS byte adapter driven end-to-end (like alktty's
+  `session_opseq` / alkcall's `manager_routing`): write-side ops
+  (well-formed chunks, oversize headers, the pending shape),
+  read-side ops (binary deliveries, dribble, text, inbound read
+  error, peer close), a lane-healthy requested close, shutdown vs
+  close ordering, backpressure scaled 1..=8 read slots. Asserts:
+  lossless inbound forwarding (forwarded == delivered exactly after
+  the teardown joins, prefix mid-sequence), the WS-01 walk's
+  completed-chunk count vs the declared frame count, the loud-gate
+  close mapping (1002/1011/verbatim-requested + a per-cause reason,
+  WS-15), lossless write framing (outbound concat == the declared
+  chunk stream incl. the FWD-21 failure-carry), lane-failure
+  isolation (the alkcall 0.8.1 class), and pump termination within
+  the harness bound. Exposure: `byte_adapter::fuzzing`
+  (`FuzzMockSocket` flavor, `FuzzChannels`/`FuzzWriteSide` channel
+  bundle, pump spawn funnels, `FuzzInboundChunkProgress`).
+- **`retry_throttle`:** bounded-map growth of the inlined
+  `RetryAfterMiddleware`: capacity bound (exact, distinct-URL
+  observable partition), expired-first + Farthest-future eviction
+  policy, ceiling clamp (deadline never grows past the ceiling of
+  the record moment), refresh contraction (a higher `Retry-After`
+  never extends the first-seen deadline; the missing-header refresh
+  is a documented no-op), `Retry-After` parse partition
+  (non-negative seconds ∪ future HTTP dates, post-clamp), and the
+  jitter bounds (≤ 25% of a short wait, capped at 2 s). Op sequences
+  of records/refreshes/queries/rebuilds with seconds, huge-seconds,
+  HTTP-date, past-date, garbage, and no-header shapes. Exposure:
+  `client::fuzzing` (constructor, synthetic throttled response,
+  record/deadline/parse/jitter funnels — the middleware map never
+  leaks).
+- Sequenced after 1–3 stabilize, per the sibling pattern.
+
+## 4. Corpus policy
+
+Committed hand-made seeds per target, generated by
+`fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py` (deterministic, in-tree, quiche pattern);
+grown corpora and artifacts gitignored. Seed menus:
+
+- `sse_parser`: a minimal valid event; every framing edge (`data:`
+  multi-line joins, `event:` override, comment, `id:`, `retry:`,
+  BOM, CRLF/LF, field with no colon, `data` with no space);
+  truncation at every structural prefix; split at a UTF-8 multibyte
+  boundary; cap-boundary event (`SSE_EVENT_BUFFER_CAP - 1`,
+  exactly at cap, one over); an over-cap trailing line; EOF with
+  pending data / pending no-data; empty stream; pure whitespace.
+- `ws_chunk_framing`: a minimal valid chunk (`[id:u32 BE][len:u32
+  BE][payload]`); `len = 0`, `len = MAX_CHUNK_LEN`,
+  `len = MAX_CHUNK_LEN + 1`, `len = u32::MAX`; truncation at every
+  prefix length (1–8 bytes); chunk split across a message boundary
+  at every offset; channel-id 0 (the control channel); a header
+  claiming big length whose payload never arrives (the pump-wait
+  shape); the >cap single write (`poll_write` rejection).
+- `spec_import` (when built): a minimal valid OpenAPI doc (JSON);
+  the same doc as YAML; missing `info`/`paths`; a deep-nesting
+  probe; duplicate-key YAML; `<<: *anchor` merge; `.inf`/`.nan`
+  scalars; non-string map keys; a `$ref` cycle; an unreachable
+  `$ref`; `additionalProperties` absent (hardening probe) and
+  present both ways.
+- Stateful seeds (target 4): the semantic fixtures the campaign must
+  always replay — a write/echo flow, the oversize loud-gate after a
+  clean chunk, the text-rejection + surviving write lane, an inbound
+  read error, a peer close mid-flight + shutdown drain, a requested
+  close, the throttle-map fill/evict cycle at capacity, the
+  missing-header refresh no-op, hostile-seconds clamping, refresh
+  contraction, and a mid-sequence rebuild (16 total; the
+  `ws_session_opseq`/`retry_throttle` blocks in
+  `fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`, hand-encoded against the `arbitrary`
+  1.4.x derive layout with ceiling-division tags and per-element
+  keep-going bytes, pinned by seed-decode tests).
+
+## 5. Campaign + gate policy
+
+Identical to the siblings (alkcall §7.9 posture; no hosted CI in this
+repo):
+
+- **Corpus replay is the standing fuzz gate:** `cargo test
+  --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml` — in AGENTS.md's
+  verification checklist.
+- **Campaigns run detached** via `fuzz/run-detached.sh` (never a
+  foreground child of an agent session); budget 10 min per target for
+  a smoke campaign, 30+ min before a release or after touching the
+  SSE parser, the WS adapter, or the import adapters.
+- **Grown corpora stay gitignored**: the hash-named files a campaign
+  drops into `fuzz/corpus/<target>/` after run-detached runs are
+  ignored via a hash-pattern (the committed `seed-*` files stay);
+  merge worthy entries into seeds only deliberately.
+
+Wave-1 smoke campaign results (2026-09-29, 10 min per target, both
+exited 0, artifact dirs empty — no crash/hang/OOM/leak):
+
+- `sse_parser` — 18.9k execs at ~30/s (each exec replays the
+  whole-feed + 3-byte-split + cap-probe + envelope-mapping +
+  round-trip chain, so per-exec work is heavy), coverage 1100 edges /
+  9510 features / 807 in-memory corpus entries, still discovering when
+  the budget ended — longer campaigns keep paying.
+- `ws_chunk_framing` — 4.8M execs at ~9k/s, coverage saturated at 245
+  edges / 1071 features / 136 corpus entries.
+- **Seeds regenerate deterministically:** `python3
+  fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`.
+- Toolchain notes live in `fuzz/README.md`; nightly stays confined to
+  `fuzz/`.
+
+Wave-2 (`spec_import`) smoke campaign (2026-09-29, 10 min, exited 0,
+artifact dirs empty):
+
+- `spec_import` — 2.34M execs at ~4k/s (each exec replays the three
+  spec constructors + the YAML boundary + compile/harden/validate +
+  the MCP tool lane + `$ref` resolution, so per-exec work is heavy),
+  coverage still growing at budget end: 14.1k edges / 36.9k features
+  / 3046 in-memory corpus entries. One early abort in the *first*
+  launch, a harness assert too strong for the documented boundary
+  (an explicitly-quoted `""` YAML mapping key is legal — JSON
+  has the same key; the nullish-key rejection covers the implicit
+  null key, not a quoted empty string), fixed before the counted run;
+  no crate finding.
+- **Seeds regenerate deterministically:** `python3
+  fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`.
+- Toolchain notes live in `fuzz/README.md`; nightly stays confined to
+  `fuzz/`.
+
+Wave-3 stateful smoke campaigns (2026-09-29, 10 min per target, both
+exited 0, artifact dirs empty — no crash/hang/OOM/leak; the first
+`ws_session_opseq` launch aborted at 17 s on FWD-21, fixed before
+the counted run):
+
+- `ws_session_opseq` — 206k execs at ~340/s (each exec interleaves up
+  to 64 two-lane ops with yield quiesce points per exec, so per-exec
+  work is heavy), coverage 2251 edges / 5831 features / 232 in-memory
+  corpus entries — coverage still growing at budget end.
+- `retry_throttle` — 897k execs at ~1.4k/s, coverage saturated at
+  1154 edges / 6925 features / 324 corpus entries.
+- **Seeds regenerate deterministically:** `python3
+  fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`.
+- Toolchain notes live in `fuzz/README.md`; nightly stays confined to
+  `fuzz/`.
+
+Wave-4 release-budget campaigns (2026-09-29, 45 min per target,
+launched concurrently, five of five):
+
+- `ws_chunk_framing` — exited 0: 13.7M execs at ~5k/s, coverage
+  saturated (297 edges / 1216 features / 139 corpus).
+- `spec_import` — exited 0: 6.85M execs at ~3.2k/s, coverage growing
+  to budget end (14.9k edges / 43.4k features / 3946 corpus).
+- `ws_session_opseq` — exited 0: 715k execs at ~253/s, coverage
+  growing to budget end (2251 edges / 6337 features / 260 corpus).
+- `retry_throttle` — exited 0: 3.3M execs at ~1.3k/s, coverage
+  saturated (1154 edges / 7071 features / 352 corpus).
+- `sse_parser` — aborted at 1913 s on FWD-22 (above; the
+  interior-CR round-trip loss, a harness fix); before the abort it
+  had 57k execs at ~35/s (1269 edges / 5584 features / 509 corpus),
+  still growing. 45-min rerun post-fix exited 0: 96k execs at ~33/s,
+  coverage still growing at budget end (1378 edges / 6655 features /
+  734 corpus) — zero findings.
+- A stale crash artifact from the wave-2 morning session (quoted-`""`
+  YAML key, predating that fix) was still present in
+  `fuzz/artifacts/spec_import/` at campaign start — not produced by
+  wave 4 (the wave-4 `spec_import` log has zero findings).
+- **Seeds regenerate deterministically:** `python3
+  fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`.
+- Toolchain notes live in `fuzz/README.md`; nightly stays confined to
+  `fuzz/`.
+
+1. ✅ **Done (2026-09-29, commit 5971c0a)** — infra (workspace
+   exclude, toolchain pin, runner, seed generator, README) + targets
+   1–2 + corpora + corpus replay + AGENTS.md gate + smoke campaigns
+   (clean, see §5). Includes the FWD-20 SSE dribble quadratic fix.
+2. ✅ **Done (2026-09-29, commit e6491e3)** — target 3
+   (`spec_import`): harness + invariants
+   (`fuzz/shared/src/spec_import.rs`), 42 seeds, `json.dict` extended
+   with the OpenAPI-token set, fuzzing hubs in the three driven
+   modules. Smoke campaign clean (see §5).
+3. ✅ **Done (2026-09-29, wave 4)** — long (45 min) release-budget
+   campaigns, all five targets, all exited 0 (see §5; the one
+   finding, FWD-22, was a harness-assert fix, fixed + re-run clean in
+   the same wave). Corpus merges remain deliberately deferred (grown
+   corpora stay gitignored; nothing campaign-dropped has been curated
+   into seeds).
+4. ✅ **Done (2026-09-29, wave 3)** — target 4 stateful
+   (`ws_session_opseq` + `retry_throttle`): two harnesses + 16 seeds
+   + the `byte_adapter::fuzzing` / `client::fuzzing` hubs + FWD-21
+   (the `WriteChunkWalk` failure-carry drop — a crate contract fix;
+   user-approved semver-relevant API change). Smoke campaigns clean
+   (see §5).
+
+Status updates land in §3's table and §6's list as work completes.

fuzz/Cargo.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+[package]
+name = "alkhttp-fuzz"
+version = "0.0.0"
+publish = false
+edition = "2021"
+
+[package.metadata]
+cargo-fuzz = true
+
+[dependencies]
+libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
+alkhttp-fuzz-shared = { path = "shared" }
+
+[dependencies.alkhttp]
+path = ".."
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "sse_parser"
+path = "fuzz_targets/sse_parser.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "ws_chunk_framing"
+path = "fuzz_targets/ws_chunk_framing.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "spec_import"
+path = "fuzz_targets/spec_import.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "ws_session_opseq"
+path = "fuzz_targets/ws_session_opseq.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false
+
+[[bin]]
+name = "retry_throttle"
+path = "fuzz_targets/retry_throttle.rs"
+test = false
+doc = false
+bench = false
+
+[workspace]

fuzz/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# alkhttp fuzzing
+
+cargo-fuzz targets for the HTTP surface's hand-rolled parse paths. The
+design and operating rules live in `docs/plans/fuzzing.md` (adopted
+from alkcall's `docs/research/fuzzing.md`); this README is the
+operational cheat-sheet.
+
+## Layout
+
+- `fuzz_targets/` — nightly-only `fuzz_target!` binaries (thin wrappers).
+- `shared/` — stable-toolchain library holding the invariant logic; the
+  corpus replay tests run here on plain `cargo test`.
+- `corpus/<target>/` — committed seeds (regenerate with
+  `python3 fuzz/gen_fuzz_seeds.py`).
+- `artifacts/` — gitignored crash/oom/timeout artifacts + campaign logs.
+
+## Targets
+
+| Target | Drives |
+|---|---|
+| `sse_parser` | `SseParser::feed` + the FWD-17 envelope mapping (`src/adapters/forward.rs`) — the SSE frame parser every subscription forwards through |
+| `ws_chunk_framing` | `WriteChunkWalk` (the write pump's chunk walk) (`src/websocket/byte_adapter.rs`) |
+| `spec_import` | `OpenAPISpec::from_str`/`from_yaml`/`from_json`, the YAML normalization boundary, `CompiledInputSchema` compile/harden/validate, `FromMCP::build_spec` (`src/adapters/openapi_spec.rs`, `input_validation.rs`, `from_mcp/mod.rs`) |
+| `ws_session_opseq` | stateful op sequences over the WS byte adapter's generic pumps (`run_read_pump`/`run_write_pump` over the mock socket flavor) — interleavings, close timing, loud-gate mapping, backpressure |
+| `retry_throttle` | the inlined `RetryAfterMiddleware`'s throttle map: capacity bound, eviction policy, ceiling clamp, refresh contraction, `Retry-After` parse partition |
+
+## Running a campaign — always detached
+
+Agent sessions must never run fuzzing in the foreground (an OOM in a
+target can take down the session host; see docs/plans/fuzzing.md §2).
+Use the detached runner:
+
+```bash
+fuzz/run-detached.sh sse_parser
+# poll:
+tail -n 50 fuzz/artifacts/sse_parser-*.log
+ls fuzz/artifacts/sse_parser/
+pgrep -f "cargo fuzz run sse_parser"
+```
+
+`FUZZ_RUNTIME_SECS=1800 fuzz/run-detached.sh sse_parser` for a longer
+campaign. The runner pins `-fork=1 -rss_limit_mb=2048
+-malloc_limit_mb=2048 -timeout=25` and detaches via `setsid` + `nohup`.
+
+## Corpus replay (the standing fuzz gate)
+
+```bash
+cargo test --manifest-path fuzz/shared/Cargo.toml
+```
+
+Replays every committed seed through the same invariant functions the
+fuzzer runs, on stable, no nightly needed. Part of the release
+verification checklist (AGENTS.md).
+
+## Toolchain notes
+
+`rust-toolchain.toml` pins nightly for this subtree only (llvm-tools
+required by cargo-fuzz); the crate itself stays on stable at MSRV 1.88.
+`cargo fuzz build` must be run with the fuzz dir as CWD or trust the
+toolchain file (rustup resolves per directory).
+
+Run campaigns before releases and after touching `src/adapters/forward.rs`
+(the SSE parser), `src/websocket/byte_adapter.rs` (the WS chunk walk),
+or the import adapters (`src/adapters/openapi_spec.rs`,
+`input_validation.rs`, `from_mcp/`).

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-000

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"openapi":"3.0.0","info":{"title":"t","version":"1.0.0"},"paths":{"/x":{"get":{"operationId":"x_get","responses":{}}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-001

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+openapi: 3.0.0
+info:
+  title: t
+  version: 1.0.0
+paths:
+  /x:
+    get:
+      operationId: x_get
+      responses: {}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-002

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"openapi":"3.0.0","info":{"title":"t","version":"1"},"paths":{"/items/{id}":{"get":{"operationId":"get_item","parameters":[{"name":"id","in":"path","required":true,"schema":{"type":"string"}}],"requestBody":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/Widget"}}}},"responses":{"200":{"content":{"application/json":{"schema":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/Widget"}}}}}}}},"components":{"schemas":{"Widget":{"type":"object","properties":{"id":{"type":"string"},"n":{"minimum":1}}}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-003

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"paths":{}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-004

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"info":{"title":"t"}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-005

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-006

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+null

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-007

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+42

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-008

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"a string"

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-009

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-010

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+}{

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-011

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+not a document

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-014

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"openapi":3.0}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-015

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+a: 1
+a: 2

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-016

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+base: &b
+  x: 1
+child:
+  <<: *b
+  y: 2

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-017

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+maximum: .inf

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-018

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+minimum: -.inf

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-019

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+value: .nan

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-020

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+~: v

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-021

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+? [1, 2]
+: v

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-022

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+responses:
+  200: {}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-023

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+a: yes
+b: no

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-024

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+a: !!unknown b

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-025

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+a: !!str 200

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-026

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+paths:
+  /x:
+    get:
+      responses:
+        200: {}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-027

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"components":{"schemas":{"A":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/A"}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-028

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"components":{"schemas":{"A":{"type":"object","properties":{"n":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/B"}}},"B":{"type":"object","properties":{"n":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/A"}}}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-029

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"components":{"schemas":{"A":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/Missing"}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-030

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"components":{"schemas":{"A":{"$ref":"https://other/file.json"}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-031

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"components":{"schemas":{"S0":{"type":"object"},"S1":{"type":"object","properties":{"a":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/S0"},"b":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/S0"}}},"S2":{"type":"object","properties":{"a":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/S1"},"b":{"$ref":"#/components/schemas/S1"}}}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-032

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"required": "n"}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-033

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"not an object"

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-034

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"type":"object","properties":{"q":{"type":"string"}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-035

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"type":"object","properties":{"q":{"type":"string"}},"additionalProperties":true}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-036

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"type":"object","properties":{"level":{"enum":["low","high"]},"n":{"minimum":1},"s":{"maxLength":3}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-037

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name":"ok_tool","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"q":{"type":"string"}}}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-038

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name":"ns/ok_tool","inputSchema":{"type":"object"}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-039

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name":"has space","inputSchema":{"type":"object"}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-040

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name":"","inputSchema":{"type":"object"}}

fuzz/corpus/spec_import/seed-041

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name":"ok_tool"}

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-000

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: hello
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-001

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: {"k": 1}
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-002

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+event: named
+data: x
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-003

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: 42
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-004

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data:
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-005

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+event: ping
+data: heartbeat
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-006

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+data: a
+data: b
+data: c
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-007

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: x
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-008

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+data: x␍␍

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-009

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: bom-first
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-010

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+:comment only
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-011

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:c
+data: after-comment
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-012

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+event: e1
+event: e2
+data: last-wins
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-013

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+id: 7
+retry: 100
+data: ignored-fields
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-014

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-015

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data:only
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-016

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+event
+
+data: after-bare-event
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-017

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
+
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-018

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+   
+  

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-019

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+random text line
+another
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-020

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+data: v

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-021

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+data: no-eof-dispatch

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-023

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: héllo
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-024

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+data: ÿþý
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-025

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+event: é
+data: utf8-name
+

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-026

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+e

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-027

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ev

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-028

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+eve

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-029

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+even

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-030

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+event

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-031

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+event:

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-032

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+event: 

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-033

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+event: e

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-034

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+event: e

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-035

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+d

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-036

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+da

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-037

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+dat

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-038

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+data

fuzz/corpus/sse_parser/seed-039

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+event: e
+data: