glm-5.3-flash
e2c255d40c
Decomposition of docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md per its 5-unit remediation plan: - Unit 1 (security-critical): gw15-publish-body-cap, prj16-schema-via-call (CF-004 filed alkcall-side), fwd13-dot-segments, fwd16-missing-capability, oai11-ref-memoization - Unit 2 (timeout/terminality): ws13-idle-progress, fwd15-stream-timeout, cli01-retry-after-budget, con17-mcp-pagination, con18-wss-sweep-exit - Unit 3 (projection/docs): projection-truthfulness, mcp-batch-cap, gw16-status-drift - Unit 4 (spec-import): yaml-normalization, oai13-path-item-wildcards, import-loudness-cluster, js01-placeholder-check, fwd17-19-contract-decisions - Unit 5 (WS polish + tests): con18b-ws-polish, client-policy-wire-tests, cov-deployment-knobs, cov13-dead-code, srv11-srv12-router-ordering - review-002-bracketed-followup: tentatively planned post-bulk pass (stale-check, OQA-18 enforcement decision, CON-08/09 close() lever, cross-crate re-checks) — deliberately not serialized against the bulk Also: review-002 numbering repair (CON-14 was double-booked; MCP pagination now CON-14, from_wss monitor renumbered CON-18, missing CON-14 section added). taskgraph: 66 valid, no cycles; 24 pending (all review-002); gen-1/gen-2 parallel waves identified; workflow-cost hotspots are prj16 (12.8) and ws13 (11.1), both carrying the reviewed slicing guidance in their Notes.
76 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: review-002-prj16-schema-via-call
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name: Block Internal-op schema disclosure via services/schema over /call (PRJ-16, cross-crate CF-004)
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status: pending
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depends_on: []
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scope: moderate
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risk: medium
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impact: project
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level: implementation
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tags: [gateway, security, review-002, cross-crate]
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---
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## Description
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Review 002 PRJ-16 [major, security]. Internal/ACL-restricted op specs
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are readable through the *op* path even though the GET `/schema` route
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was fixed in review-001 (SRV-02):
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- `call_handler` (`src/gateway/routes.rs:120-133`) pre-checks only the
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**outer** op name — `services/schema` is External with default ACL,
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so the pre-check passes.
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- `registry.invoke` dispatches to alkcall's `services_schema_handler`
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(`alkcall src/registry/discovery.rs:327-343`), which does a bare
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`registry.registration(name)` → `spec_to_json` with **no visibility
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and no AccessControl check**.
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`POST /call {"operation":"services/schema","input":{"name":"secret/op"}}`
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→ the full spec (input/output/error schemas + required_scopes) of any
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Internal op, unauthenticated. Same hole via the MCP `call` tool. The
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regenerated to_openapi doc asserts "Internal (hidden from HTTP
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discovery, GW-02)" — currently false at runtime. The alkcall-side
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instance is filed as **CF-004** in
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`alkcall/docs/reviews/consumer-findings-ledger.md` (the handler-level
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fix there is the complete one; this task is the alkhttp-local layer).
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## Acceptance Criteria
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- [ ] alkhttp-side guard: before dispatch, when the requested
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operation resolves to a `services/schema`-family handler, apply
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the same is_internal_op + access_check_for_op pre-checks to the
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**inner `name` input** as GET `/schema` does (404 for Internal,
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403 for ACL denial, mirroring routes.rs:151-156)
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- [ ] Implementer's choice on mechanism (options: a dispatch-path hook
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in `call_handler`/`batch_handler`/`subscribe_handler`; an
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alkhttp-side wrapper around the registry that intercepts
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`services/schema` inputs; a GatewayDispatch-level check) — the
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invariant is transport-level: **no alkhttp transport may fetch a
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spec the GET `/schema` route would deny for the same identity**
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- [ ] Test matrix mirroring the GET /schema tests: `/call` on
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services/schema{internal-op} → 404; unauthorized identity →
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403; MCP `call` tool with the same input → same result
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(feature-gated `mcp` test)
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- [ ] A comment/ADR-note recording that the complete fix is
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alkcall-side (CF-004) and this task is the local layer — when
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CF-004 lands, the alkhttp guard becomes defense-in-depth (do NOT
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remove it; the per-transport check stays)
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- [ ] `cargo test`, `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings`,
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`cargo fmt --check` pass (plus `--all-features` if the mcp test lands)
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## References
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- docs/reviews/002-post-remediation-review.md (Part F', PRJ-16)
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- alkcall/docs/reviews/consumer-findings-ledger.md (CF-004, filed 2026-08-30)
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- alkcall/src/registry/discovery.rs:327-343 (the unchecked handler)
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- src/gateway/routes.rs:120-133 (outer-name-only pre-check), 151-156 (the correct GET /schema checks to mirror)
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- docs/architecture/decisions/015-privilege-model-and-authority-context.md
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## Notes
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The three gateway invoke routes (`/call`, `/batch`, `/subscribe`) all
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dispatch through the same spine, so a single interception point (if
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found) covers all three + MCP; if the mechanism is route-local, mirror
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it in all three pre-check sites. Do not block on the alkcall fix —
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this task is shippable independently and the alkcall lead time is
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unknown. If CF-004 lands first, re-scope this task to defense-in-depth
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assertions only. |