Replace AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier (a security hole for X.509) with
verifier selection by PeerEntry presence (ADR-034 §3, OQ-29):
- build_client_auth presents the Ed25519 key as an RFC 7250 raw public
key client cert (replaces with_no_client_auth), activating the
PeerEntry fingerprint -> peer_id resolution path on quinn.
- select_server_verifier: Some(fingerprint) -> FingerprintPinVerifier
(fingerprint match for known peers); None -> WebPkiServerVerifier
(CA verification for public X.509 endpoints). None + Ed25519 raw key
fails closed at handshake (no CA to fall back to).
- FingerprintPinVerifier matches ed25519:<hex> (raw key extraction) and
SHA256:<hex> (DER hash); verifies handshake signatures via
verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key / verify_tls12/13_signature.
- Extract shared fingerprint logic into alknet_core::fingerprint (pub
module) reused by endpoint (server-side) and call_client (client-side).
- remote_identity: None is load-bearing (not defaulted to placeholder).
- Integration tests updated to pin the self-signed server cert
fingerprint (the known-peer path).
Amend ADR-030 with three changes from the auth-type analysis:
1. PeerEntry is now multi-credential: fingerprints: Vec<String> (Ed25519
and/or X.509) + auth_token_hash: Option<String> (bearer token). All
resolve to the same peer_id. A peer that authenticates via Ed25519
today and via auth_token tomorrow gets the same PeerId. The 'peer
bearer vs auth bearer' distinction was wrong — the correct framing is
the three credential types (Ed25519, X.509, bearer token) and whether
the token needs a stable logical id across rotation (PeerEntry) or not
(ApiKeyEntry).
2. Fingerprint normalization (§6): quinn extracts the raw Ed25519 public
key from the SPKI cert and formats as ed25519:<hex>, matching iroh.
The same key has the same fingerprint regardless of transport. X.509
fingerprints stay as SHA256:<hex of DER>. This also simplifies the
coming WebTransport relay work.
3. The 'API keys' section is replaced with 'Bearer tokens' — correctly
framing the three auth types and the two bearer-token paths
(PeerEntry.auth_token_hash vs ApiKeyEntry).
Resolve OQ-29 (CallClient TLS client-auth): wire quinn client-auth (present
Ed25519 key as raw public key client cert — the server-side extraction
already works); key-type-aware server cert verification (raw key =
fingerprint match, X.509 = CA verification via WebPkiServerVerifier —
AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier is only safe for raw keys); fingerprint
normalization. The iroh path already works (RFC 7250 raw keys, both sides
exchange automatically); the gap was quinn-only.
Dissolve OQ-35: the 'API key asymmetry' framing was wrong. PeerEntry
supports multiple credential paths; ApiKeyEntry is for tokens that ARE the
identity.
Add OQ-37: X.509 outgoing-only case — the three auth types and how X.509
server identity fits the peer model. Not blocking the ADR-029 migration;
downstream (HTTP crate phase).
Update auth.md, config.md, client-and-adapters.md, call/README.md,
core/README.md, open-questions.md, README.md, and call_client.rs source
comment.
Workspace green: 326 tests pass, build clean.
Resolve the call-crate open questions where the decision is made —
OQ-27 (auto-re-import), OQ-28 (same-peer collision = error), OQ-30
(PeerRef::Any insertion-order first-match), OQ-31 (services/list-peers
opt-in). These were previously marked 'open' with 'v1' hedging language
despite having a decided default. What remains (refresh(), richer routing,
services/list-peers the op) is genuine feature addition, not unmade
architecture.
Reframe OQ-32 (multi-hop) as a feature extension rather than a 'v1'
deferral — the one-hop model is the architectural commitment; extending
to multi-hop doesn't break downstream.
Promote OQ-29 (CallClient TLS client-auth) from medium to high priority
and surface its real interaction with ADR-030. Previously framed as
'additive — two-way-door remainder,' but ADR-030's PeerEntry fingerprint
→ peer_id resolution requires the client to present a TLS client cert.
With with_no_client_auth(), no fingerprint is extracted, the PeerEntry
path is dormant, and PeerCompositeEnv keys on None or the API-key prefix
instead of the stable peer_id. This is the activation path for ADR-030's
primary use case, not an additive feature. Three options laid out: (a)
wire client-auth with the ADR-029 migration, (b) ship token-only and
switch later (the 'compounds into a mess' path), (c) extend PeerEntry
to cover auth_token-based identity. Requires a decision before the
migration lands.
Clarify OQ-36 (concrete adapter shapes): the trait shapes and in-memory
adapters ship with core — the deferral is only for the persistence
adapters (SQLite, etc.). The in-memory adapters are real implementations
of a full repo pattern, not stubs.
Update call_client.rs source comment to reference OQ-29 instead of the
'v1' / 'two-way-door remainder' framing.
Workspace green: 326 tests pass, build clean.
The #2 gap in alknet-call: discovers the remote peer's External operations
via services/list + services/schema and registers them in the connection's
Layer 2 overlay as FromCall-provenance leaves with forwarding handlers. The
discovery mechanism was already implemented in registry/discovery.rs;
from_call is the client-side consumer of that API.
src/client/from_call.rs:
- from_call(connection, FromCallConfig) -> Result<Vec<HandlerRegistration>,
AdapterError>. Calls services/list then services/schema for each op,
rebuilds OperationSpec from the schema JSON (parsing op_type, visibility,
error_schemas, access_control), constructs a forwarding handler that calls
the remote op via CallConnection::call(), and returns FromCall-provenance
bundles (composition_authority: None, scoped_env: None, empty capabilities,
remote_safe: false per ADR-028 §4).
- FromCallConfig { namespace_prefix: Option<String>, operation_filter:
Option<HashSet<String>> } with builder methods.
- v1 defaults (two-way doors recorded in client-and-adapters.md):
- error-on-collision (DC-3/OQ-28): applying the (possibly empty) prefix
produces a name already seen -> AdapterError::Conflict, not silent
overwrite.
- auto-on-reconnect (DC-2/OQ-27): the overlay is per-connection (Layer 2,
ADR-024), so re-import on reconnect is naturally scoped; the assembly
layer calls from_call immediately after connect().
- Forwarding handler captures an Arc<CallConnection> and, on invocation,
calls the remote op and returns its ResponseEnvelope. The
parent_request_id participates in the cross-node abort cascade
(ADR-016 §6) — if the parent is aborted, the cascade reaches this handler
which sends call.aborted to the remote node; cross-node abort is
transparent.
- Trust is transitive (recorded in spec): a from_call-imported op executes
the remote node's code; scoped_env bounds which ops are reachable, not
what they do.
OperationContext.internal is now pub (was pub(crate)) so downstream
consumers (assembly layer, integration tests) can construct contexts for
overlay-env dispatch.
Tests (207 lib + 2 integration):
- Unit: rebuild_spec name/prefix/op_type/visibility/error_schemas/acl;
unknown op_type -> SchemaParse; missing op_type -> SchemaParse;
FromCallConfig builder; from_call against a mock connection returns
DiscoveryFailed (no transport); FromCall provenance + leaf fields + remote_safe false.
- Integration (tests/two_node_call.rs): from_call over a real QUIC loopback
— CallClient connects, from_call discovers server/echo, registers the
bundle in the overlay, and the forwarding handler round-trips an input
through the overlay env to the remote op and back.
clippy + fmt + test all green.
Refs: tasks/call/client/from-call.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/017-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md §3, §6
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md §from_call
The #1 gap in alknet-call: the outbound connection opener. Every downstream
consumer (runner, container service, bilateral exchange, NAPI, agent
cross-node dispatch) is blocked on it.
Shared dispatch loop (ADR-017 §1 — the architectural commitment that keeps
CallClient from becoming a parallel protocol implementation):
- Extracts the accept-path dispatch (sweeper, accept_bi loop, handle_stream,
dispatch_requested, build_root_context, compose_root_env, fail_all on
close) out of CallAdapter into a new protocol/dispatch.rs Dispatcher struct.
Both CallAdapter::handle and CallClient::connect produce a CallConnection
and hand it to Dispatcher::run_loop — the loop is genuinely shared
(refactored, not duplicated).
- CallAdapter keeps its public API and test-facing wrappers (pub(crate),
#[cfg(test)]-gated) that delegate to the Dispatcher.
Peer-scoped default-deny (ADR-028 — the one-way-door security dimension):
- RemoteFilter { trusted_peer: bool } on the Dispatcher. In default-deny
mode (CallClient::new), an incoming call to an op with remote_safe: false
returns NOT_FOUND *before* any capability material reaches the handler —
a remote peer's call must not populate OperationContext.capabilities from
the local registration bundle unless the op is explicitly remote-safe
(ADR-028 Context). Trusted-peer mode (CallClient::trusted_peer, explicit
opt-in) bypasses the filter.
- The accept path (CallAdapter) uses RemoteFilter::trusted() by convention: a
direct QUIC client is not a filtered CallClient peer in the ADR-028 sense.
- OperationRegistry::list_operations_peer_scoped(trusted_peer) +
services_list_handler_peer_scoped for the CallClient's services/list
serving path (ADR-028 Assumption 2: a peer should not see ops it cannot
call, so discovery and dispatch filters agree).
CallClient (src/client/call_client.rs):
- CallClient { registry, identity_provider, trusted_peer: bool }.
- new() default-deny; trusted_peer() explicit opt-in (ADR-028 §3).
- connect(addr, CallCredentials) dials QUIC on ALPN alknet/call (quinn
feature), spawns Dispatcher::run_loop, returns a live CallConnection.
- spawn_dispatch(connection) shared path for connect + tests.
- CallCredentials { tls_identity, auth_token, remote_identity } — all from
Capabilities (ADR-014), never env vars (no-env-vars invariant). v1
connects without client-auth TLS identity (server uses
AcceptAnyCertVerifier); RawKey client-auth is a two-way-door remainder.
- RemoteIdentity { fingerprint } — concrete shape is a two-way door (OQ-25
remainder); the one-way constraint is it comes from Capabilities.
- ClientError { Transport, TlsSetup, ConnectionClosed }.
- CallConnection is now Clone (shares the inner Arcs) so connect can hand
the caller a live clone while the dispatcher task keeps its clone.
Tests (199 lib + 1 integration):
- Unit: default-deny NOT_FOUND for non-remote-safe; remote_safe dispatches;
trusted-peer dispatches all External; default-deny does NOT populate
capabilities (the load-bearing security assertion — verified by a handler
that inspects context.capabilities and the fact that the handler is never
reached for non-remote-safe ops); remote_safe op populates capabilities;
services/list peer-scoped hide/trusted variants; CallClient constructors;
CallCredentials builder; Send+Sync.
- Integration (tests/two_node_call.rs): real QUIC loopback — CallAdapter
server (self-signed cert via rcgen) accepts, CallClient connects,
client.call() round-trips to server/echo. Proves the connect path +
shared dispatch loop work end-to-end.
clippy + fmt + test all green.
Refs: tasks/call/client/call-client.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/017-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md §1, §2, §7
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/028-callclient-peer-scoped-registry-filtering.md
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md
Pre-existing fmt drift in two files touched during the call-completion
batch (remote_safe field, dispatch helpers). Brings cargo fmt --check
clean for the review gate.
Adds the v1 data shape for peer-scoped default-deny registry filtering,
the one-way-door piece of the call-completion batch (ADR-028):
- HandlerRegistration gains pub remote_safe: bool, defaulting false across
all provenance (Local, Session, FromOpenAPI, FromMCP, FromCall,
FromJsonSchema) per ADR-028 §4. HandlerRegistration::new() keeps its
existing 6-arg signature (defaults remote_safe: false), so all current
call sites compile unchanged.
- Chainable HandlerRegistration::remote_safe(bool) setter + a
OperationRegistryBuilder::remote_safe() helper that marks the
most-recently-registered op (tracked via last_name, not HashMap
iteration order which is unspecified).
- Field is data-only here — the filtering behavior (dispatch path +
services/list hide) is wired in call/client/call-client, not this task.
services/list is unchanged.
- Tests: default false, setter flips field, all six provenance variants
default false, builder setter marks last op, existing call sites
unchanged. 178 tests pass, clippy clean.
Refs: tasks/call/registry/remote-safe-marking.md
Refs: docs/architecture/decisions/028-callclient-peer-scoped-registry-filtering.md
Three tasks implementing ADR-027:
1. core/rawkey-decouple-from-iroh: TlsIdentity::RawKey now uses
Ed25519SecretKey (alknet-core-owned wrapper over ed25519_dalek)
instead of iroh::SecretKey. RawKeyCertResolver and Ed25519SigningKey
un-gated from #[cfg(all(quinn, iroh))] to #[cfg(quinn)] only.
Quinn-only builds (default) now support RFC 7250 raw-key identity.
iroh transport converts via iroh::SecretKey::from_bytes.
2. core/endpoint-request-client-cert: replaced with_no_client_auth()
with AcceptAnyCertVerifier — a custom ClientCertVerifier that
requests client certs but doesn't require them or verify against
a CA. alknet's identity model is fingerprint-based (the
authorized_fingerprints set is the trust anchor), not PKI-based.
Peer certs are extracted at the TLS layer for fingerprinting;
peers without certs connect normally.
3. core/acme-integration: TlsIdentity::Acme variant (domains,
cache_dir, directory, contact) + AcmeDirectory enum. TlsSetup
two-phase construction: synchronous for X509/RawKey/SelfSigned,
async for Acme (spawns AcmeState event loop, builds ServerConfig
with ResolvesServerCertAcme). acme-tls/1 ALPN added when ACME is
active; dispatch_quinn guard closes challenge connections
gracefully (challenge is TLS-layer-handled). acme feature gate
keeps rustls-acme out of non-ACME builds.
Workspace: build/test/clippy green across all 3 feature configs
(quinn-only, quinn+iroh, quinn+acme, all-features). 331 tests, 0
failures, 0 warnings.
W1 (call/protocol/abort-cascade-wiring): wire AbortCascade into
CallAdapter handle_stream for EVENT_ABORTED. Cascades with
AbortPolicy::AbortDependents, aborts root, no descendant frames on
wire (ADR-016 Decision 2). Two integration tests added.
W2 (core/endpoint-client-fingerprint): extract TLS client cert
fingerprint in dispatch_quinn (SHA256:<hex> of leaf cert DER via
peer_identity) and dispatch_iroh (ed25519:<hex> of peer NodeId).
Fingerprint format documented in auth.md. Server config change
(with_no_client_auth → request-but-don't-require) deferred to new
follow-up task core/endpoint-request-client-cert.
W3 (vault/mnemonic-debug-redaction): replace Mnemonic derive(Debug)
with manual redacting impl (phrase: "[REDACTED]"). Seed confirmed
no Debug impl. Redaction test added.
W4 (core/auth-apikey-resources): Option B — drop entry.resources from
spec. External identities (token/fingerprint) grant scopes only;
resource-scoped ACLs are composition-internal (ADR-015/022). auth.md
corrected + limitation documented. Two tests confirm empty resources.
review-post-impl-fixes: all 4 verified, workspace green (326 tests,
0 failures, 0 clippy warnings). Review #004 status → resolved.
Graph: 34 tasks, 12 gens.
- PendingEntry stores parent_request_id (Call and Subscribe) and started flag
for abort-cascade tree indexing
- register_call/register_subscribe accept optional parent_request_id
- AbortCascade::cascade_abort walks the call tree by parent_request_id and
aborts descendants per AbortPolicy (AbortDependents: all; ContinueRunning:
unstarted only). Returns sorted list of aborted request IDs
- call.aborted for unknown request_id silently discarded (empty result)
- Composed child request_ids stay internal (not sent as call.requested)
- mark_started() tracks dispatch state for ContinueRunning decisions
- 20 unit tests covering AbortDependents/ContinueRunning, depth-3 tree,
unknown root, mixed Call/Subscribe, determinism
The RawKeyCertResolver, Ed25519SigningKey, and std::path::Path imports
were gated on #[cfg(feature = "iroh")] but are only used in the quinn
TLS server-config path (build_rustls_server_config RawKey arm). With
iroh-only builds (--no-default-features --features iroh), these became
dead code and triggered clippy -D warnings failures.
Re-gated to #[cfg(all(feature = "quinn", feature = "iroh"))] so they
only compile when both features are active (the combination that
actually uses raw-key TLS via quinn). std::path::Path is now
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")] since it is only used by quinn's
load_cert_chain/load_private_key helpers.
Verified: cargo clippy passes with -D warnings across all four feature
combinations (none, quinn, iroh, quinn+iroh). cargo test --all-features
passes 55 tests. cargo fmt --check clean.
Implement CallConnection in protocol/connection.rs with Layer 2 imported-ops
overlay (Arc<RwLock<HashMap>>), register_imported/register_imported_all,
overlay_env() returning an OperationEnv that dispatches to imported ops,
and call()/subscribe()/abort() methods that open a stream, send call.requested,
register in PendingRequestMap, spawn a stream reader, and correlate responses
by ID. Connection drop drops the overlay. Exposed MockConnection +
Connection::from_mock in alknet-core for cross-crate testing. 9 new connection
tests (102 total in alknet-call).
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/call-protocol.md
Implements: ADR-012, ADR-017, ADR-024
Implements CallConnection in src/protocol/connection.rs representing an
established alknet/call connection (either direction). Holds the Layer 2
imported-ops overlay (ADR-024) as Arc<RwLock<HashMap>>.
- register_imported / register_imported_all add to the connection overlay
- overlay_env returns an OperationEnv dispatching to imported ops; contains()
returns true only for ops in the overlay
- call() opens a stream, sends call.requested, registers in PendingRequestMap,
spawns a stream reader, resolves on first call.responded
- subscribe() sends call.requested and yields call.responded until
call.completed/call.aborted via a SubscriptionStream wrapping the mpsc receiver
- abort() sends call.aborted for the request ID and removes the pending entry
- connection drop drops the overlay (no explicit deregistration needed)
Exposes MockConnection trait and Connection::from_mock in alknet-core so
cross-crate tests can construct mock connections without real QUIC. Removes
two unused test helpers in env.rs that triggered dead-code warnings under
-D warnings. Adds parking_lot dep for the overlay RwLock and pending Mutex.
9 new connection tests (102 total in alknet-call). Clippy clean.
Implement the ALPN router and endpoint in endpoint.rs: AlknetEndpoint with
quinn+iroh accept loops (both feature-gated, both Option), HandlerRegistry
(new/register/get/alpn_strings with panic-on-duplicate), dispatch via
tokio::spawn by ALPN, AuthContext construction from connection
(alpn/remote_addr/fingerprint/identity), TLS identity modes (RawKey RFC 7250
via on-the-fly cert resolver, X509 from files, SelfSigned via rcgen),
EndpointError enum, graceful shutdown with drain timeout + force close.
ACME deferred as TODO per task spec. 55 tests (--all-features), 52 (default),
47 (no-default); clippy clean across all 3 feature combos.
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/core/endpoint.md
Implements: ADR-010
Implement services/list and services/schema in registry/discovery.rs: spec
constructors, factory handlers taking Arc<OperationRegistry>, JSON serialization
of OperationSpec (incl. error_schemas per ADR-023), leading-slash normalization
for services/schema, NOT_FOUND for unknown ops, INVALID_INPUT for missing name.
Both registered as Local provenance with empty authority/env/caps and empty
AccessControl.
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/call/operation-registry.md
Implements: ADR-023
Expand the minimal OperationEnv trait from the operation-context task with
concrete dispatch implementations per ADR-024:
- LocalOperationEnv (Layer 0): wraps Arc<OperationRegistry>. invoke_with_policy
runs the scoped_env reachability check (ADR-015/022), looks up the
registration, then constructs a child OperationContext with internal: true,
identity = parent.handler_identity.as_identity() (the ADR-015 authority
switch), fresh metadata (HashMap::new() — ADR-014 security constraint, no
parent metadata propagation), inherited deadline (parent.deadline, not a
fresh 30s), inherited env (parent.env.clone() — Arc::clone per ADR-024), and
the child's own composition_authority + scoped_env from its registration.
contains() uses the default impl (returns true — curated registry contains
everything it can dispatch).
- CompositeOperationEnv (per-call, ADR-024): composes session (Layer 1),
connection (Layer 2), and base (Layer 0) trait objects. invoke_with_policy
runs the same reachability check, then probes overlays in order via
contains() (the overlay-dispatch contract from review #003 C9), dispatching
to the first overlay that contains the op. contains() aggregates all layers.
The trait-object design is load-bearing: making OperationEnv concrete would
close the session-overlay and connection-overlay patterns. Same integration-
point pattern as IdentityProvider (ADR-004).
Tests cover: allowed/disallowed reachability, internal-flag propagation,
authority switch (child identity = parent handler_identity), fresh metadata,
inherited deadline, composite session-overlay dispatch, composite fall-through
to base, composite connection-overlay dispatch when session lacks op, and
composite contains aggregation.
Implements the operation context types in registry/context.rs (ADR-015,
ADR-022, ADR-024): OperationContext with all 10 fields (internal is
pub(crate) for writes, read via is_internal()), AbortPolicy enum with
AbortDependents default, CompositionAuthority with synthetic Identity
projection for ACL, ScopedOperationEnv reachability set, and
generate_request_id() (UUID v4). Adds a minimal OperationEnv trait
forward-declaration in registry/env.rs so the context env field compiles;
the operation-env task will expand it.
Correlates call.responded events back to call.requested by request ID
(stream-agnostic per ADR-012). Manages Call (oneshot) and Subscribe
(mpsc) entries with timeout-based eviction and fail_all on connection
close. Unknown request IDs are silently discarded.
Review of vault crate against all architecture specs. Fixed 5 deviations:
1. EncryptionKey: removed Clone (now move-only per spec), added redacting Debug
2. EncryptionKey::new made private (cfg(test)), added pub(crate) key_bytes()
3. encrypt/decrypt made pub(crate) per encryption.md, low-level crypto tests
moved from integration to unit tests
4. CachedKey refactored to wrap DerivedKey with cached_at/last_accessed fields
per service.md, with key_type()/private_key()/public_key() accessors
5. Mnemonic::to_seed() unwrap() eliminated by storing validated Bip39Mnemonic
(enabled bip39 zeroize feature for proper zeroization)
All 10 drift items verified resolved. 105 tests pass; clippy clean.
Refs: docs/architecture/crates/vault/README.md (review checklist)
- EncryptionKey: remove Clone (move-only per spec), add custom redacting
Debug impl, make new() private (cfg(test)), add pub(crate) key_bytes()
accessor, make encrypt/decrypt pub(crate) module-internal helpers
- CachedKey: refactor to wrap DerivedKey (per service.md) with cached_at
and last_accessed fields; add key_type()/private_key()/public_key()
accessors
- Mnemonic: store validated Bip39Mnemonic to eliminate unwrap() in
to_seed(); enable bip39 zeroize feature so inner is zeroized on drop
- Fix clippy: remove unused import in drop_tracker tests, use struct
init syntax instead of field reassignment with Default
- Move low-level EncryptionKey round-trip/wrong-key tests from
integration tests to unit tests (encrypt/decrypt now pub(crate))
