alknet/tasks/vault/osrng-iv-generation.md

id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level

id	name	status	depends_on	scope	risk	impact	level
vault/osrng-iv-generation	Replace rand::random() IV generation with OsRng in AES-GCM encryption	pending		single	medium	isolated	implementation

Description

Fix drift item #1: the AES-256-GCM IV (nonce) generation in encryption.rs currently uses rand::random(), which uses the thread-local RNG and may not be a CSPRNG on all platforms. Replace with OsRng (or equivalent CSPRNG).

This is a security-critical fix. IV reuse under the same AES-GCM key is catastrophic — it breaks authenticity and creates a two-time-pad on the plaintext. OsRng reads from the operating system's entropy source and is the correct choice for cryptographic nonces.

Current state

encryption.rs line ~133: IV generation uses rand::random() to produce the 12-byte GCM nonce.

Target state

Use rand::rngs::OsRng (from the rand crate, which is already a dependency) to generate the 12-byte IV. The aes-gcm crate's Aes256Gcm encrypt path takes a Nonce — construct it from OsRng-generated bytes.

use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rand::RngCore;

let mut iv_bytes = [0u8; 12];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut iv_bytes);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&iv_bytes);

The IV is generated fresh for each encrypt() call. The salt (32 bytes, unused in v2 for key derivation but kept for wire-format compat) should also use OsRng for consistency — it's stored in the EncryptedData blob and doesn't need to be deterministic.

Scope

This task touches only encryption.rs. It does not depend on the irpc removal (drift #4) because encryption.rs is a separate file from service.rs / protocol.rs. It can run in parallel with drift #4.

Acceptance Criteria

• encryption::encrypt() uses OsRng for IV generation, not rand::random()
• Salt generation uses OsRng (or equivalent CSPRNG)
• No rand::random() calls remain in encryption.rs
• IV is 12 bytes (standard GCM nonce size)
• Salt is 32 bytes (wire-format compat, unused in key derivation)
• Unit test: verify IV is fresh on each encrypt call (encrypt twice, different IVs)
• Unit test: verify decrypt round-trip still works after the change
• cargo test succeeds
• cargo clippy succeeds with no warnings

References

• docs/architecture/crates/vault/README.md — Known Source Drift table item #1
• docs/architecture/crates/vault/encryption.md — Security Constraints: OsRng for IVs
• docs/architecture/crates/vault/service.md — Security Constraints: OsRng for IVs
• docs/architecture/decisions/020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md — ADR-020

Notes

This is a security-critical fix. IV reuse under the same AES-GCM key breaks authenticity and creates a two-time-pad on the plaintext. rand::random() uses the thread-local RNG which may not be a CSPRNG on all platforms; OsRng reads from the operating system's entropy source. This task touches only encryption.rs and can run in parallel with the irpc removal task (drift #4).

Summary

To be filled on completion