NapiServerHandler was bypassing IdentityProvider, calling config.auth.authenticate_publickey() directly, which meant no Identity was stored on the session and per-identity forwarding rules could not match. It also skipped ForwardingPolicy::check() entirely, defeating forwarding access control for NAPI-served tunnels. Both are now consistent with ServerHandler and SshHandler behavior.
50 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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id: cleanup/napi-identity-provider-wiring
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name: Fix NapiServerHandler to use IdentityProvider and ForwardingPolicy
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status: completed
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depends_on:
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- review/phase1-core-modifications
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scope: moderate
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risk: medium
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impact: component
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level: implementation
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---
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## Description
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The `NapiServerHandler` in `crates/alknet-napi/src/serve.rs` bypasses the `IdentityProvider` trait contract, calling `config.auth.authenticate_publickey()` directly instead of `IdentityProvider::resolve_from_fingerprint()`. This creates two problems:
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1. **No Identity stored on session**: Without resolving through `IdentityProvider`, no `Identity` struct is attached to the connection. Per-identity forwarding rules (`principals` field in `ForwardingRule`) cannot match because there's no identity to match against.
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2. **No forwarding policy check**: The NAPI handler's `channel_open_direct_tcpip()` doesn't evaluate `ForwardingPolicy::check()` at all. It only handles `alknet-` prefixed channels and rejects everything else. This means NAPI-served tunnels have no forwarding access control, defeating the purpose of ADR-031.
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The core `ServerHandler` and `SshHandler` both correctly use `IdentityProvider` and `ForwardingPolicy`. The NAPI handler should be consistent.
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**Fix**:
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- `NapiServerHandler` should hold `Arc<dyn IdentityProvider>` and use it in `auth_publickey()`
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- `NapiServerHandler.auth_publickey()` should call `identity_provider.resolve_from_fingerprint()` and store the resulting `Identity`
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- `NapiServerHandler.channel_open_direct_tcpip()` should evaluate `ForwardingPolicy::check()` with the identity before proxying, matching `ServerHandler` and `SshHandler` behavior
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## Acceptance Criteria
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- [ ] `NapiServerHandler` holds `Arc<dyn IdentityProvider>` and `Arc<ArcSwap<DynamicConfig>>`
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- [ ] `auth_publickey()` delegates through `IdentityProvider::resolve_from_fingerprint()` and stores `Identity` on the session
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- [ ] `channel_open_direct_tcpip()` evaluates `ForwardingPolicy::check()` before proxying
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- [ ] Per-identity forwarding rules work correctly through NAPI
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- [ ] Existing NAPI tests pass
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- [ ] New test: forwarding policy deny blocks channel open via NAPI handler
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## References
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- crates/alknet-napi/src/serve.rs — NapiServerHandler to be fixed
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- crates/alknet-core/src/server/handler.rs — correct pattern to follow
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- docs/architecture/identity.md — IdentityProvider contract
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- docs/architecture/decisions/031-forwarding-policy.md — ForwardingPolicy
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## Notes
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> Identified during Phase 1 review (W1)
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## Summary
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> NapiServerHandler now uses ConfigIdentityProvider for auth (resolving Identity via fingerprint) and evaluates ForwardingPolicy::check() in channel_open_direct_tcpip() with the authenticated identity and transport kind, consistent with ServerHandler and SshHandler. TransportKind is properly tracked per connection instead of using a string. |