glm-5.2 34e3be2801 docs(arch): resolve OQ-67 — iroh proxy force-relay-only + HTTP-to-SOCKS5 bridge (ADR-090 §5 amended)
The iroh-proxy POC (/workspace/iroh-proxy-poc, 5/5 runs clean) settled
OQ-67: iroh does NOT expose a socket-injection hook for the IP/direct
transport (noq_endpoint() is pub(crate), the IP transport binds its own
netwatch::UdpSocket, CustomTransport operates on a separate CustomAddr
address space iroh's hole-punching doesn't route through). The quinn
POC's Socks5UdpSocket does not transfer to iroh. The decision: force
relay-only when a proxy is configured, via three stable public iroh
Builder knobs — clear_ip_transports() + addr_filter(relay_only) +
proxy_url. The peer sees the relay's IP; the relay sees the proxy's IP;
the client's real IP is hidden on both surfaces. No iroh fork required.

Because iroh's proxy_url expects an HTTP CONNECT proxy (not SOCKS5),
the integration runs a tiny local HTTP-to-SOCKS5 bridge (~80 lines) so
a single Socks5ProxyConfig covers all three dials uniformly: UDP
ASSOCIATE for dial_quic, CONNECT for dial_tcp_tls, force-relay-only +
HTTP-to-SOCKS5 bridge for dial_iroh.

The POC also corrected a factual error: iroh's proxy_url proxies the
relay WebSocket only, not pkarr/DoH (those use pkarr/hickory-resolver
directly). Acceptable for the force-relay-only config (QAD disabled);
spec text corrected.

Force relay-only forgoes iroh's direct-path latency advantage (negligible
for the hub deployment, which runs its own relay) and makes relay
availability a hard dependency — the intended privacy/availability
tradeoff; a caller that prefers availability over privacy for the iroh
path simply does not set the proxy.

- ADR-090 §5 amended: iroh force-relay-only decision + proxy_url
  coverage correction + HTTP-to-SOCKS5 bridge
- OQ-67: resolved (force relay-only)
- client README: iroh proxy row, bridge, limitations, ADR/OQ entries
- README/open-questions: OQ-67 resolved, Current State amendment
2026-07-16 09:18:56 +00:00

Alknet

Status: Pre-alpha — This project is undergoing a major architectural pivot to an ALPN-as-service model. The previous implementation has been archived and a greenfield rebuild is in progress.

A self-hostable networking toolkit built on QUIC+TLS with ALPN-based protocol dispatch. Each protocol handler (SSH, SFTP, Git, HTTP, DNS, messaging, call protocol) registers an ALPN string on a shared endpoint. The ALPN negotiation during the TLS/QUIC handshake routes connections to the correct handler before any application bytes are read.

Core Insight

A service IS an ALPN. One endpoint, one port, many protocols — dispatched by the TLS handshake, not by application-level peeking or separate listeners.

Crates

Crate Status Description
alknet-vault stable Local key vault: BIP39/SLIP-0010/AES-GCM key derivation and encryption
alknet-core planned ProtocolHandler trait, ALPN router, auth/identity, config
alknet-ssh planned SSH handler (russh), SOCKS5, port forwarding
alknet-call planned JSON-RPC call protocol (EventEnvelope framing)
alknet-fs planned Content-addressed file storage (iroh-blobs backend)
alknet-sftp planned SFTP handler (russh-sftp protocol core)
alknet-git planned Git smart protocol handler (gix)
alknet-http planned HTTP handler (axum, REST API, MCP)
alknet-dns planned DNS handler (hickory-proto, pkarr)
alknet-msg planned E2E encrypted messaging, mixnet support
alknet planned CLI binary (assembles and registers handlers)

Documentation

Reference implementation (previous architecture) is preserved at /workspace/@alkdev/alknet-main/.

License

Licensed under either of

at your option.

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in this work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

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