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glm-5.2 5941280bca fix(agents): break the hedging-at-the-root pattern — deferred(unclear), impacts field, reviewer detection

Address the root cause of rework-causing hedging: the architect was
put in a logical bind where it couldn't express justified uncertainty
('the pieces exist but the shape isn't clear yet'). The only options
were 'decide now' (premature) or 'deferred(scope)' (false — the
information isn't missing, it's un-synthesized). The agent picked
deferred(scope) with a circular blocking condition (OQ-64 blocked on
OQ-55, OQ-55 needs OQ-64) because there was no honest way to say 'I
can see the pieces but I can't see the shape.'

Changes to the architect role spec:
- Add deferred(unclear) state: the pieces exist but the composition
  isn't clear; resolution requires investigation (work through
  examples, POC), not waiting. Has an investigation target and an
  impacts field.
- Add 'Impacts' field to the OQ format: what does this block
  downstream? Be specific ('blocks the first hub deployment because
  the hub dials workers' not 'blocks the hub crate'). The triage
  signal that makes deferral urgency visible — the field that would
  have made the AlknetClient circular hedge visible.
- Add circular-reasoning guard to self-review: 'check that your
  blocking condition isn't a prerequisite of the thing you're
  deferring.'
- Trim anti-patterns #9-#11 (hedging synonyms catalog, ~40 lines):
  detection belongs in the reviewer, not the architect's self-review.
  The architect is too close to its own reasoning to see its own
  circular hedges.
- Trim door-types section (30→10 lines): keep the one-paragraph
  summary, cut the elaboration.

Changes to the architecture-reviewer role spec:
- Add Decision Quality (F) category: false-deferral check
  distinguishing three cases — (1) hedging on a resolved decision, (2)
  false deferral / circular hedge (the blocking condition is a
  prerequisite of the thing being deferred), (3) legitimate deferral.
- Add Impacts Field Coverage (G) category: check that unresolved OQs
  have specific impacts fields.
- Note: the Decision Quality category is often the highest-value
  check on poorly-defined projects — the architect cannot self-review
  it (circular reasoning is invisible from inside the circle).

Retrofit existing OQs:
- Add Impacts field to all 16 unresolved OQs (10 deferred, 6 open).
- Update OQ-63 (TlsError shape) to reflect ADR-087's client-side
  addition — the error type now covers both server and client
  variants.
- Move OQ-65 (WebSocket carrying channels) to alknet-http theme
  (done in prior commit; this commit adds its impacts field).
- Verified: no circular reasoning found in existing deferrals. The
  AlknetClient hedge (OQ-64) was the circular one; it's already
  resolved by ADR-087.

2026-07-15 07:35:55 +00:00

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OQ-38: WebTransport Standalone Relay Service Scope

Origin: ADR-034 §5, webtransport.md
Status: open (scope, not deferral)
Door type: One-way (crate boundary), two-way (mechanism)
Priority: low
Impacts: None — the browser path uses WebSocket (ADR-044). Would impact a browser-to-P2P-peer relay use case if one arises.
Resolution: There are two distinct "WebTransport proxy" concepts that must not be conflated:
1. In-process ALPN-stream-proxy (resolved, in alknet-http). The h3 handler hands a WebTransport stream to another ALPN handler (SshAdapter, GitAdapter, etc.) as a Connection, so a browser with a WASM parser can reach any ALPN service via WebTransport. This is resolved by ADR-040 and lives in alknet-http's h3 handler. Not this OQ.
2. Standalone relay service (this OQ). A full relay — a fork of iroh-relay — that provides NAT traversal infrastructure with WebTransport-based proxy as a fallback alongside WebSocket. This is a separate service, not a mode of the h3 handler: it terminates the browser's WebTransport connection and forwards encrypted traffic to a P2P hub's Ed25519 endpoint (so the hub need not expose its own public X.509 cert). ADR-034 §5 recorded it in the h3/WebTransport bucket; ADR-038 brought h3/WebTransport into scope (later superseded by ADR-044, which deferred h3/WebTransport as a scope decision — the browser bidirectional path uses WebSocket); ADR-040 resolved the in-process proxy (now parked per ADR-044). This OQ is the remaining scope question: does the standalone relay live in a future alknet-relay crate (a fork of iroh-relay with WebTransport proxy fallback) or is it out of scope for the current alknet work?
This is a genuine scope question, not a deferral. The relay use case is not yet concrete enough to commit the crate boundary — no deployment has asked for a standalone relay with WebTransport fallback yet, and the design (transport-only proxy, no auth-model change per ADR-034 §5) is clear but the home is not. The decision is made when the browser-to-P2P-peer relay use case becomes concrete; until then it is tracked here, not deferred with "v1/later" language. The relay does not change the auth model (bearer token + PeerEntry.auth_token_hash; relay is transport-only), so it does not block any other ADR.
Cross-references: ADR-027, ADR-030, ADR-034, ADR-038 (superseded), ADR-040 (parked), ADR-044, webtransport.md

2.8 KiB Raw Blame History

OQ-38: WebTransport Standalone Relay Service Scope

2.8 KiB

Raw Blame History