Untangles the conflation of three distinct remote roles under 'X.509 endpoint': (1) public X.509 endpoint — a remote HTTPS/call-over-TLS server the local node is a client of (no PeerEntry, no PeerId, not in the peer graph; CA verification + bearer token); (2) transport relay — iroh's DERP-equivalent, infrastructure, not an alknet peer; (3) hub / hosting node — an alknet peer that also exposes a public domain + X.509 for browsers (mixed-fingerprint PeerEntry, already supported by ADR-030). The load-bearing one-way door is the client-side verifier selection rule: known peer (PeerEntry present) → fingerprint pin; unknown X.509 remote → CA verification (WebPkiServerVerifier); unknown Ed25519 remote → fails closed. This closes the AcceptAnyServerCertVerifier security hole OQ-29 flagged, with the peer-model criterion (PeerEntry presence) made explicit. The 'make PeerEntry symmetric' instinct is rejected — pure-client connections to public APIs have no stable logical identity to pin. Documents that CallCredentials.remote_identity: None is load-bearing (None = public X.509 endpoint → CA path, not a missing field; Some = known peer → fingerprint pin), closing a subtle gap where an implementer could have defaulted to a placeholder or treated None as skip-verify. Records WebTransport relay-as-proxy (deferred with h3/WebTransport, new OQ-HTTP-07) and on-chain/smart-contract peer discovery (fits the OQ-36 repo/adapter pattern, no auth-model change) so they aren't lost. Amends auth.md and client-and-adapters.md with the three-role naming, the verifier selection rule, and the Option semantics; updates OQ-37 to resolved in open-questions.md, README.md, and both crate READMEs.
Alknet
Status: Pre-alpha — This project is undergoing a major architectural pivot to an ALPN-as-service model. The previous implementation has been archived and a greenfield rebuild is in progress.
A self-hostable networking toolkit built on QUIC+TLS with ALPN-based protocol dispatch. Each protocol handler (SSH, SFTP, Git, HTTP, DNS, messaging, call protocol) registers an ALPN string on a shared endpoint. The ALPN negotiation during the TLS/QUIC handshake routes connections to the correct handler before any application bytes are read.
Core Insight
A service IS an ALPN. One endpoint, one port, many protocols — dispatched by the TLS handshake, not by application-level peeking or separate listeners.
Crates
| Crate | Status | Description |
|---|---|---|
alknet-vault |
stable | Local key vault: BIP39/SLIP-0010/AES-GCM key derivation and encryption |
alknet-core |
planned | ProtocolHandler trait, ALPN router, auth/identity, config |
alknet-ssh |
planned | SSH handler (russh), SOCKS5, port forwarding |
alknet-call |
planned | JSON-RPC call protocol (EventEnvelope framing) |
alknet-fs |
planned | Content-addressed file storage (iroh-blobs backend) |
alknet-sftp |
planned | SFTP handler (russh-sftp protocol core) |
alknet-git |
planned | Git smart protocol handler (gix) |
alknet-http |
planned | HTTP handler (axum, REST API, MCP) |
alknet-dns |
planned | DNS handler (hickory-proto, pkarr) |
alknet-msg |
planned | E2E encrypted messaging, mixnet support |
alknet |
planned | CLI binary (assembles and registers handlers) |
Documentation
- ALPN-as-service architecture — pivot proposal
- Cleanup plan — greenfield transition plan
- SDD process — spec-driven development process
- Research references — iroh, russh, russh-sftp deep dives
Reference implementation (previous architecture) is preserved at /workspace/@alkdev/alknet-main/.
License
Licensed under either of
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
- MIT license (LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
at your option.
Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in this work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.