glm-5.2
6e9414bc81
The vault uses SLIP-0010 HD derivation from the BIP39 seed for the AES-256-GCM encryption key, not PBKDF2. This replaces the TypeScript predecessor's (@alkdev/storage/src/graphs/crypto.ts) PBKDF2-based approach. Key decisions: - HD derivation at m/74'/2'/0'/0' produces the encryption key - PBKDF2 is not implemented in the vault; no password-based derivation - salt field is unused in v2 (wire-format compat only) - key_version=1 reserved for TS PBKDF2 data; key_version=2 for vault HD - TS-encrypted data requires one-time migration to v2 - CURRENT_KEY_VERSION changes from 1 to 2 (source drift flagged) OQ-20 resolved: the encryption key derivation method is locked. OQ-22 (key rotation workflow) remains open but does not block implementation.
132 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
132 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
---
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status: draft
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last_updated: 2026-06-19
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---
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# alknet-vault
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Local key vault: BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key
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derivation, BIP-0032 secp256k1 derivation (feature-gated), and AES-256-GCM
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encryption. Holds the master seed — the root of trust for all derived keys
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and encrypted credentials in the alknet system.
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## What This Crate Is
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alknet-vault is a **standalone crate** with zero alknet crate dependencies
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(ADR-018). It provides the cryptographic primitives and runtime API for
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managing the root of trust. The CLI binary (the `alknet` crate) is the sole
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component that talks to the vault directly (ADR-019) — handlers receive
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derived/decrypted material through capabilities, never through a vault
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reference.
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The vault is **not a network service**. It has no ALPN, no
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`ProtocolHandler` implementation, and no operations registered in the call
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protocol (ADR-008, ADR-014). The master seed and derived private keys never
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cross the network.
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## Documents
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| Document | Status | Description |
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|----------|--------|-------------|
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| [mnemonic-derivation.md](mnemonic-derivation.md) | draft | BIP39, SLIP-0010, BIP-0032, derivation paths, key types |
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| [encryption.md](encryption.md) | draft | AES-256-GCM, EncryptedData, key versioning, HD derivation (ADR-020) |
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| [service.md](service.md) | draft | VaultServiceHandle lifecycle, actor dispatch, cache, error model |
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| [protocol.md](protocol.md) | draft | VaultProtocol irpc messages, DerivedKey redaction, serialization |
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## Applicable ADRs
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| ADR | Title | Relevance |
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|-----|-------|-----------|
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| [003](../../decisions/003-crate-decomposition.md) | Crate Decomposition | alknet-vault's standalone position |
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| [005](../../decisions/005-irpc-as-call-protocol-foundation.md) | irpc as Call Protocol Foundation | VaultProtocol uses irpc directly |
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| [008](../../decisions/008-secret-service-integration.md) | Vault Integration Point | CLI-embedded, capability source |
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| [014](../../decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md) | Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection | Capabilities carry vault-derived material |
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| [018](../../decisions/018-vault-standalone-crate.md) | Vault as Standalone Crate | Zero alknet crate dependencies |
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| [019](../../decisions/019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md) | Vault Assembly-Layer-Only Access | The assembly layer is the sole caller |
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| [020](../../decisions/020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md) | HD Derivation for Encryption Keys | SLIP-0010 derivation, not PBKDF2; salt unused in v2 |
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## Relevant Open Questions
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| OQ | Title | Status | Relevance |
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|----|-------|--------|-----------|
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| OQ-20 | Encryption key derivation | resolved (ADR-020) | HD derivation from seed; salt field unused in v2 |
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| OQ-21 | Remote vault administration | deferred | Network unlock not supported; needs ADR if ever needed |
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| OQ-22 | Key rotation mechanism | open | Key versioning is in place; rotation workflow is not specced |
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## Key Design Principles
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1. **Standalone**: The vault depends on no alknet crate. It defines its own
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types, errors, and protocol. External crates depend on the vault; the
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vault depends on nothing in alknet.
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2. **Assembly-layer only**: The vault's API is consumed by the CLI binary,
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not by handlers. Handlers receive material through capabilities
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(ADR-014). The vault is not on the wire.
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3. **Zeroize everything sensitive**: The mnemonic, seed, derived private
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keys, encryption keys, and cached keys all implement `Zeroize` and
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`ZeroizeOnDrop`. Secret material does not linger in freed heap memory.
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4. **Deterministic derivation**: The same mnemonic + passphrase + path
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always produces the same key. Derivation is reproducible across runs
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and across nodes.
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5. **OsRng for nonces**: AES-GCM IVs and any cryptographic nonces use
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`OsRng` (or equivalent CSPRNG), never `rand::random()`. IV reuse under
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the same key is catastrophic for GCM.
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6. **No `unwrap()` or `expect()` outside tests**: vault operations
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propagate errors. A poisoned lock is recovered with
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`unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())`, not `unwrap()`. A panic in one
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vault operation must not brick the vault for all other operations.
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## Security Constraints
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These are security-critical implementation requirements, not architectural
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decisions (the architecture is locked by the ADRs above). They are
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documented here so implementation agents don't miss them. See
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[service.md → Security Constraints](service.md#security-constraints) for
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the full list.
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- **OsRng for IVs**: AES-GCM IVs must use `OsRng`, not `rand::random()`. The
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current source uses `rand::random()` — this is a known drift from the
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spec and must be corrected during implementation sync.
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- **Zeroized drop**: `Seed`, `Mnemonic`, `ExtendedPrivKey`,
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`Secp256k1ExtendedPrivKey`, `EncryptionKey`, `CachedKey`, and
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`DerivedKey` all derive `Zeroize` and `ZeroizeOnDrop`. The cache must
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clear on drop, not just on explicit `lock()`.
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- **No `unwrap()` outside tests**: poisoned lock recovery uses
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`unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())` or explicit error propagation. The
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current source uses `unwrap()` in `VaultServiceHandle` methods — this
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is a known drift and must be corrected.
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- **DerivedKey redaction in JSON**: `DerivedKey` serializes the
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`private_key` as `"[REDACTED]"` in human-readable formats (JSON) and as
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raw bytes in binary formats (postcard). The redaction is a defense-in-
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depth measure, not the primary control — the primary control is that
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`DerivedKey` never crosses the call protocol wire (ADR-014).
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## Public API
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The vault re-exports its primary types from the crate root:
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```rust
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// Mnemonic and seed
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pub use mnemonic::{Language, Mnemonic, Seed};
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// Derivation
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pub use derivation::{DerivationError, ExtendedPrivKey, PATHS};
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// Encryption
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pub use encryption::{EncryptedData, EncryptionError};
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// Protocol (irpc messages)
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pub use protocol::{DerivedKey, KeyType, VaultMessage, VaultProtocol};
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// Service (runtime)
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pub use service::{VaultService, VaultServiceActor, VaultServiceError, VaultServiceHandle};
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// Cache
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pub use cache::CacheConfig;
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```
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The `secp256k1` feature flag gates Ethereum (BIP-0032) derivation:
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```rust
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#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
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pub mod ethereum;
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``` |