Files
alknet/crates/alknet-call/src/client/call_client.rs
glm-5.2 9c81129f24 feat(call): introduce StreamingHandler, HandlerKind, ResponseStream + INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE (ADR-049)
Add the foundational types for ADR-049 streaming handlers:
- StreamingHandler, ResponseStream type aliases and HandlerKind enum
  (Once | Stream) in registration.rs, with make_streaming_handler() helper
- CallError::invalid_operation_type() in wire.rs (sixth protocol code,
  retryable: false)
- HandlerRegistration.handler flipped from Handler to HandlerKind;
  HandlerRegistration::new() now takes HandlerKind
- OperationRegistryBuilder absorbs wrapping: with_local/with_leaf/
  with_leaf_provenance wrap raw Handler in HandlerKind::Once for
  Query/Mutation; new with_local_streaming/with_leaf_streaming take a
  StreamingHandler and wrap in HandlerKind::Stream for Subscription.
  Builder validates kind matches spec.op_type (mismatch = startup error)
- OperationRegistry::register() returns Result<(), String> with a clear
  mismatch message; all call sites updated to handle the Result
- invoke() matches on HandlerKind: Once -> existing path; Stream ->
  INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE error envelope (guards against silent
  truncation; invoke_streaming() added in a downstream task)
- OverlayOperationEnv::invoke_with_policy matches on HandlerKind:
  Once -> dispatch; Stream -> INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE (composition is
  request/response-only)
- Migrated every HandlerRegistration::new() construction site (~95)
  to wrap raw Handler in HandlerKind::Once(handler); the builder sites
  are handled by the builder-absorbs-wrapping change
- Updated two websocket subscription tests that relied on Subscription
  ops dispatching via invoke() to expect INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE
- Added unit tests for invoke/register validation and
  make_streaming_handler
2026-07-02 09:28:05 +00:00

948 lines
35 KiB
Rust

//! `CallClient`: the outbound connection opener (ADR-017 §1).
//!
//! Opens a QUIC connection to a remote node on ALPN `alknet/call`, performs
//! credential setup, and produces a [`CallConnection`] running the shared
//! dispatch loop (delegated to [`crate::protocol::dispatch::Dispatcher`]).
//! `CallClient` is the connection-establishment half; `CallAdapter`'s accept
//! path is the inbound half; both produce a `CallConnection` and hand it to
//! the same `Dispatcher::run_loop` (ADR-017 §1).
//!
//! After establishment the connection is symmetric (ADR-017 §2): both sides
//! can send and receive `call.requested`. The `CallClient` is both a caller
//! (initiates outgoing calls via `CallConnection::call()`/`subscribe()`/
//! `abort()`) and a callee (dispatches incoming calls against its registry).
//!
//! See `docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md` for the spec.
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use alknet_core::auth::IdentityProvider;
use alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity;
use alknet_core::types::Connection;
use crate::protocol::connection::CallConnection;
use crate::protocol::dispatch::Dispatcher;
use crate::registry::registration::OperationRegistry;
/// Expected identity of the remote node (ADR-017 §7, extended by ADR-034 §2).
/// Carries a fingerprint string the assembly layer derives from `Capabilities`
/// when the local node has a `PeerEntry` for the remote (the known-peer case →
/// fingerprint pin).
///
/// `remote_identity: None` is the **public X.509 endpoint** case: the local
/// node has no `PeerEntry` for the remote, so there is no fingerprint to pin.
/// Combined with an X.509 transport, `None` selects CA verification
/// (`WebPkiServerVerifier`) per the verifier-selection rule in ADR-034 §3.
/// Combined with an Ed25519 raw-key transport, `None` fails closed (raw-key
/// remotes are always known peers — no CA to fall back to).
///
/// The `Option` is therefore load-bearing, not cosmetic: `Some(fingerprint)`
/// means "pin this" (known peer), `None` means "trust the CA or fail"
/// (unknown remote). An implementer must not default `remote_identity` to a
/// placeholder value to "satisfy" the field — `None` is a real state that
/// drives verifier selection.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RemoteIdentity {
pub fingerprint: String,
}
/// Credentials for an outbound `alknet/call` connection (ADR-017 §7). All
/// three dimensions come from `Capabilities` (ADR-014), never from environment
/// variables — see the No-Env-Vars Invariant in
/// `docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct CallCredentials {
/// The local node's TLS identity (RFC 7250 raw key or X.509), derived
/// from the vault at startup.
pub tls_identity: Option<TlsIdentity>,
/// Opaque call-protocol-level auth token, decrypted from the vault.
pub auth_token: Option<alknet_core::auth::AuthToken>,
/// Expected fingerprint/cert of the remote node, stored as a capability.
/// `Some` → fingerprint pin (known peer with a `PeerEntry`); `None` → CA
/// verification for X.509 remotes, fail-closed for Ed25519 raw-key remotes
/// (ADR-034 §2/§3). `None` is the public-X.509-endpoint state, not a
/// missing field — must not be defaulted to a placeholder.
pub remote_identity: Option<RemoteIdentity>,
}
impl CallCredentials {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::default()
}
pub fn with_tls_identity(mut self, tls_identity: TlsIdentity) -> Self {
self.tls_identity = Some(tls_identity);
self
}
pub fn with_auth_token(mut self, token: alknet_core::auth::AuthToken) -> Self {
self.auth_token = Some(token);
self
}
pub fn with_remote_identity(mut self, remote: RemoteIdentity) -> Self {
self.remote_identity = Some(remote);
self
}
}
/// Errors produced by [`CallClient::connect`].
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
#[non_exhaustive]
pub enum ClientError {
#[error("transport error: {message}")]
Transport { message: String },
#[error("tls setup error: {message}")]
TlsSetup { message: String },
#[error("connection closed")]
ConnectionClosed,
}
/// Outbound `alknet/call` connection opener (the #1 gap, ADR-017 §1).
///
/// Peer authorization flows through the existing `AccessControl::check` gate
/// in `OperationRegistry::invoke` (ADR-029 §3) — no parallel `remote_safe`/
/// `trusted_peer` gate.
pub struct CallClient {
registry: Arc<OperationRegistry>,
identity_provider: Arc<dyn IdentityProvider>,
}
impl CallClient {
pub fn new(
registry: Arc<OperationRegistry>,
identity_provider: Arc<dyn IdentityProvider>,
) -> Self {
Self {
registry,
identity_provider,
}
}
pub fn registry(&self) -> &Arc<OperationRegistry> {
&self.registry
}
pub fn identity_provider(&self) -> &Arc<dyn IdentityProvider> {
&self.identity_provider
}
/// Open a QUIC connection to `addr` on ALPN `alknet/call`, perform
/// credential handshake, and return a `CallConnection` running the shared
/// dispatch loop. Credentials come from `Capabilities` (ADR-014), not env
/// vars — the no-env-vars invariant.
///
/// The dispatch loop runs on a spawned task; the returned `CallConnection`
/// is live until the remote closes the connection or the caller drops it.
/// The caller can immediately use `call()`/`subscribe()`/`abort()` on the
/// returned connection, and the remote peer can call back into this
/// `CallClient`'s registry (connection symmetry, ADR-017 §2).
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
pub async fn connect(
&self,
addr: SocketAddr,
credentials: CallCredentials,
) -> Result<CallConnection, ClientError> {
let alpn = b"alknet/call".to_vec();
let client_config = build_quinn_client_config(&credentials, &alpn)
.map_err(|e| ClientError::TlsSetup { message: e })?;
let bind_addr: SocketAddr = "0.0.0.0:0".parse().expect("valid bind addr");
let endpoint = quinn::Endpoint::client(bind_addr).map_err(|e| ClientError::Transport {
message: e.to_string(),
})?;
let connection = endpoint
.connect_with(client_config, addr, "alknet")
.map_err(|e| ClientError::Transport {
message: e.to_string(),
})?
.await
.map_err(|e| ClientError::Transport {
message: e.to_string(),
})?;
let connection = Connection::from_quinn_with_alpn(connection, alpn);
Ok(self.spawn_dispatch(connection))
}
/// Run the shared dispatch loop over a pre-established `Connection`. The
/// `CallClient` spawns the dispatcher task and returns a live
/// `CallConnection` the caller can use immediately. Used by `connect()`
/// (after the QUIC dial completes) and by integration tests that wire a
/// mock/loopback `Connection` directly.
pub fn spawn_dispatch(&self, connection: Connection) -> CallConnection {
let call_connection = Arc::new(CallConnection::new(connection));
let dispatcher = Dispatcher::new(
Arc::clone(&self.registry),
Arc::clone(&self.identity_provider),
);
let run_conn = Arc::clone(&call_connection);
tokio::spawn(async move {
dispatcher.run_loop(run_conn).await;
});
(*call_connection).clone()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn build_quinn_client_config(
credentials: &CallCredentials,
alpn: &[u8],
) -> Result<quinn::ClientConfig, String> {
let provider = Arc::new(rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider());
let client_auth = build_client_auth(&provider, &credentials.tls_identity)?;
let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &credentials.remote_identity)?;
let mut config = rustls::ClientConfig::builder_with_provider(provider)
.with_safe_default_protocol_versions()
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
.dangerous()
.with_custom_certificate_verifier(verifier)
.with_client_cert_resolver(client_auth);
config.alpn_protocols = vec![alpn.to_vec()];
config.enable_early_data = true;
Ok(quinn::ClientConfig::new(Arc::new(
quinn::crypto::rustls::QuicClientConfig::try_from(config).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?,
)))
}
/// Build the client-auth cert resolver that presents the local node's TLS
/// identity. For `TlsIdentity::RawKey` the Ed25519 key is presented as an RFC
/// 7250 raw public key client cert (`only_raw_public_keys() == true`) — the
/// client-side equivalent of the server's `RawKeyCertResolver`. For X.509 the
/// cert chain + key are loaded from disk. `None` (no `tls_identity` configured)
/// resolves to no client cert (the server gets nothing to fingerprint).
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn build_client_auth(
provider: &Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider>,
tls_identity: &Option<TlsIdentity>,
) -> Result<Arc<dyn rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert>, String> {
match tls_identity {
Some(TlsIdentity::RawKey(secret_key)) => {
let signing_key = Arc::new(Ed25519SigningKey::new(secret_key.clone()));
let spki = signing_key.spki_public_key();
let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki.to_vec());
let certified_key = Arc::new(rustls::sign::CertifiedKey::new(vec![cert], signing_key));
Ok(Arc::new(RawKeyClientCertResolver::new(certified_key)))
}
Some(TlsIdentity::X509 { cert, key }) => {
let cert_chain = load_cert_chain(cert).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let key_der = load_private_key(key).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let certified_key = rustls::sign::CertifiedKey::from_der(cert_chain, key_der, provider)
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
Ok(Arc::new(RawKeyClientCertResolver::new(Arc::new(
certified_key,
))))
}
Some(TlsIdentity::SelfSigned) | None => Ok(Arc::new(NoClientCertResolver)),
Some(TlsIdentity::Acme { .. }) => {
Err("ACME TLS identity is server-only; cannot be used for client auth".to_string())
}
}
}
/// Select the server cert verifier by `remote_identity` presence (ADR-034 §3).
///
/// - `Some(fingerprint)` → known peer → `FingerprintPinVerifier` (fingerprint
/// match). The fingerprint IS the trust anchor.
/// - `None` → no `PeerEntry` for the remote → `WebPkiServerVerifier` (CA
/// verification) for X.509 remotes. For Ed25519 raw-key remotes the
/// `WebPkiServerVerifier` fails closed at handshake time (raw-key remotes
/// have no CA to fall back to — ADR-034 §2 assumption 1). `None` is the
/// public-X.509-endpoint state, not "skip verification."
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn select_server_verifier(
provider: &Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider>,
remote_identity: &Option<RemoteIdentity>,
) -> Result<Arc<dyn rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier>, String> {
match remote_identity {
Some(ri) => Ok(Arc::new(FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
ri.fingerprint.clone(),
provider.signature_verification_algorithms,
))),
None => {
let roots = load_platform_root_cert_store()?;
let verifier = rustls::client::WebPkiServerVerifier::builder_with_provider(
Arc::new(roots),
Arc::clone(provider),
)
.build()
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
Ok(verifier)
}
}
}
/// Load the platform's trusted root certificates into a `RootCertStore` for
/// `WebPkiServerVerifier` (the `None` + X.509 CA-verification path). Falls back
/// to the aws-lc-rs built-in `webpki-roots` if the platform store is empty
/// (e.g. in a container with no system CA bundle).
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn load_platform_root_cert_store() -> Result<rustls::RootCertStore, String> {
let mut roots = rustls::RootCertStore::empty();
let result = rustls_native_certs::load_native_certs();
for err in &result.errors {
tracing::warn!(error = ?err, "failed to load a native root cert");
}
for cert in &result.certs {
roots
.add(cert.clone())
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to add native root cert: {e}"))?;
}
Ok(roots)
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn load_cert_chain(
path: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<Vec<rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>>, String> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let mut reader = std::io::BufReader::new(bytes.as_slice());
rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut reader)
.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn load_private_key(
path: &std::path::Path,
) -> Result<rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static>, String> {
let bytes = std::fs::read(path).map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
let mut reader = std::io::BufReader::new(bytes.as_slice());
match rustls_pemfile::private_key(&mut reader) {
Ok(Some(key)) => Ok(key),
Ok(None) => Err("no private key found in file".to_string()),
Err(e) => Err(e.to_string()),
}
}
/// Client cert resolver that presents a single RFC 7250 raw public key (or
/// X.509 cert chain). For raw keys `only_raw_public_keys()` returns `true` so
/// rustls negotiates the RFC 7250 ClientCertificateType extension.
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
struct RawKeyClientCertResolver {
key: Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>,
raw_public_keys: bool,
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl RawKeyClientCertResolver {
fn new(key: Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>) -> Self {
let raw_public_keys = key.cert.len() == 1 && is_ed25519_spki(&key.cert[0]);
Self {
key,
raw_public_keys,
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn is_ed25519_spki(cert_der: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>) -> bool {
alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert_der.as_ref()).is_some()
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl std::fmt::Debug for RawKeyClientCertResolver {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("RawKeyClientCertResolver")
.field("raw_public_keys", &self.raw_public_keys)
.finish()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert for RawKeyClientCertResolver {
fn resolve(
&self,
_root_hint_subjects: &[&[u8]],
_sigschemes: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
) -> Option<Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>> {
Some(Arc::clone(&self.key))
}
fn only_raw_public_keys(&self) -> bool {
self.raw_public_keys
}
fn has_certs(&self) -> bool {
true
}
}
/// Client cert resolver that presents no client cert (the `tls_identity: None`
/// or `SelfSigned` path). The server gets nothing to fingerprint — the
/// `PeerEntry` fingerprint → `peer_id` resolution path is not activated for
/// this connection.
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
struct NoClientCertResolver;
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl std::fmt::Debug for NoClientCertResolver {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("NoClientCertResolver").finish()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl rustls::client::ResolvesClientCert for NoClientCertResolver {
fn resolve(
&self,
_root_hint_subjects: &[&[u8]],
_sigschemes: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
) -> Option<Arc<rustls::sign::CertifiedKey>> {
None
}
fn has_certs(&self) -> bool {
false
}
}
/// `ServerCertVerifier` that pins a specific fingerprint (ADR-034 §3, the
/// known-peer path). For `ed25519:<hex>` remotes the raw Ed25519 pub key is
/// extracted from the presented cert and matched against the pinned
/// fingerprint; for `SHA256:<hex>` remotes the cert DER is hashed and matched
/// against the pinned fingerprint. No match → verification failure (the
/// connection is rejected). The fingerprint IS the trust anchor — there is no
/// CA verification and no name verification, only the fingerprint pin.
///
/// Handshake signatures are still verified (using the aws-lc-rs default
/// signature verification algorithms) so that a stolen-but-stale fingerprint
/// can't be replayed with a forged signature: the presenter must prove
/// possession of the private key corresponding to the pinned public key.
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
struct FingerprintPinVerifier {
fingerprint: String,
supported: rustls::crypto::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms,
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl FingerprintPinVerifier {
fn new(fingerprint: String, supported: rustls::crypto::WebPkiSupportedAlgorithms) -> Self {
Self {
fingerprint,
supported,
}
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl std::fmt::Debug for FingerprintPinVerifier {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("FingerprintPinVerifier")
.field("fingerprint", &self.fingerprint)
.finish()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier for FingerprintPinVerifier {
fn verify_server_cert(
&self,
end_entity: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
_intermediates: &[rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>],
_server_name: &rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'_>,
_ocsp_response: &[u8],
_now: rustls::pki_types::UnixTime,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
let presented = alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(end_entity.as_ref())
.ok_or(rustls::Error::General(
"fingerprint pin: failed to compute fingerprint from presented cert".to_string(),
))?;
if presented == self.fingerprint {
Ok(rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified::assertion())
} else {
Err(rustls::Error::General(format!(
"fingerprint pin mismatch: expected {} got {}",
self.fingerprint, presented
)))
}
}
fn verify_tls12_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
if alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert.as_ref()).is_some() {
let spki = rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer::from(cert.as_ref().to_vec());
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key(
message,
&spki,
dss,
&self.supported,
)
} else {
rustls::crypto::verify_tls12_signature(message, cert, dss, &self.supported)
}
}
fn verify_tls13_signature(
&self,
message: &[u8],
cert: &rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
dss: &rustls::DigitallySignedStruct,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::HandshakeSignatureValid, rustls::Error> {
if alknet_core::fingerprint::extract_ed25519_raw_key_from_spki(cert.as_ref()).is_some() {
let spki = rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer::from(cert.as_ref().to_vec());
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature_with_raw_key(
message,
&spki,
dss,
&self.supported,
)
} else {
rustls::crypto::verify_tls13_signature(message, cert, dss, &self.supported)
}
}
fn supported_verify_schemes(&self) -> Vec<rustls::SignatureScheme> {
self.supported.supported_schemes()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[derive(Clone)]
struct Ed25519SigningKey {
key: alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey,
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl Ed25519SigningKey {
fn new(key: alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey) -> Self {
Self { key }
}
fn spki_public_key(&self) -> rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'static> {
rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(
&rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519,
self.key.public().as_bytes(),
)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl std::fmt::Debug for Ed25519SigningKey {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Ed25519SigningKey").finish()
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl rustls::sign::SigningKey for Ed25519SigningKey {
fn choose_scheme(
&self,
offered: &[rustls::SignatureScheme],
) -> Option<Box<dyn rustls::sign::Signer>> {
if offered.contains(&rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519) {
Some(Box::new(self.clone()))
} else {
None
}
}
fn algorithm(&self) -> rustls::SignatureAlgorithm {
rustls::SignatureAlgorithm::ED25519
}
fn public_key(&self) -> Option<rustls::pki_types::SubjectPublicKeyInfoDer<'_>> {
Some(self.spki_public_key())
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
impl rustls::sign::Signer for Ed25519SigningKey {
fn sign(&self, message: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, rustls::Error> {
Ok(self.key.sign(message).to_bytes().to_vec())
}
fn scheme(&self) -> rustls::SignatureScheme {
rustls::SignatureScheme::ED25519
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::protocol::connection::CallConnection;
use crate::protocol::wire::ResponseEnvelope;
use crate::registry::registration::{
make_handler, Handler, HandlerKind, HandlerRegistration, OperationProvenance,
};
use crate::registry::spec::{AccessControl, OperationSpec, OperationType, Visibility};
use alknet_core::auth::Identity;
use alknet_core::types::{Capabilities, MockConnection};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::Mutex as StdMutex;
struct StubConnection {
alpn: &'static [u8],
addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
closed: StdMutex<Option<(u32, String)>>,
}
impl MockConnection for StubConnection {
fn remote_alpn(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.alpn
}
fn remote_addr(&self) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
self.addr
}
fn close(&self, code: u32, reason: &str) {
*self.closed.lock().unwrap() = Some((code, reason.to_string()));
}
}
fn stub_connection() -> Connection {
Connection::from_mock(Arc::new(StubConnection {
alpn: b"alknet/call",
addr: Some(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 4321)),
closed: StdMutex::new(None),
}))
}
fn external_spec(name: &str) -> OperationSpec {
OperationSpec::new(
name,
OperationType::Query,
Visibility::External,
serde_json::json!({}),
serde_json::json!({}),
vec![],
AccessControl::default(),
)
}
fn caps_inspect_handler() -> Handler {
make_handler(|_input, context| async move {
let has_google = context.capabilities.get("google").is_some();
ResponseEnvelope::ok(
context.request_id,
serde_json::json!({ "has_google_capability": has_google }),
)
})
}
struct NoopIdentityProvider;
impl alknet_core::auth::IdentityProvider for NoopIdentityProvider {
fn resolve_from_fingerprint(&self, _fp: &str) -> Option<Identity> {
None
}
fn resolve_from_token(&self, _token: &alknet_core::auth::AuthToken) -> Option<Identity> {
None
}
}
fn registry_with_caps() -> Arc<OperationRegistry> {
let mut registry = OperationRegistry::new();
registry
.register(HandlerRegistration::new(
external_spec("pub/run"),
HandlerKind::Once(caps_inspect_handler()),
OperationProvenance::Local,
None,
None,
Capabilities::new().with_api_key("google", "pub-key".to_string()),
))
.unwrap();
Arc::new(registry)
}
fn dispatcher(registry: &Arc<OperationRegistry>) -> Dispatcher {
Dispatcher::new(Arc::clone(registry), Arc::new(NoopIdentityProvider))
}
async fn dispatch(d: &Dispatcher, conn: &Arc<CallConnection>, op: &str) -> ResponseEnvelope {
d.dispatch_requested(
conn,
"req-test".to_string(),
serde_json::json!({ "operationId": op, "input": {} }),
)
.await
}
#[test]
fn call_credentials_builder_methods() {
let creds = CallCredentials::new().with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
fingerprint: "SHA256:abc".to_string(),
});
assert_eq!(
creds.remote_identity.as_ref().unwrap().fingerprint,
"SHA256:abc"
);
assert!(creds.tls_identity.is_none());
assert!(creds.auth_token.is_none());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn external_op_dispatches_and_populates_capabilities() {
let registry = registry_with_caps();
let d = dispatcher(&registry);
let conn = Arc::new(CallConnection::new(stub_connection()));
let response = dispatch(&d, &conn, "pub/run").await;
let out = response.result.expect("ok");
assert_eq!(
out["has_google_capability"],
serde_json::json!(true),
"an External op's call must populate capabilities for the handler"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unknown_op_returns_not_found() {
let registry = Arc::new(OperationRegistry::new());
let d = dispatcher(&registry);
let conn = Arc::new(CallConnection::new(stub_connection()));
let response = dispatch(&d, &conn, "no/such").await;
match response.result {
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.code, "NOT_FOUND"),
other => panic!("expected NOT_FOUND, got {other:?}"),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn spawn_dispatch_returns_live_call_connection() {
let registry = registry_with_caps();
let client = CallClient::new(Arc::clone(&registry), Arc::new(NoopIdentityProvider));
let conn = client.spawn_dispatch(stub_connection());
assert_eq!(
conn.connection()
.expect("quic connection present")
.remote_alpn(),
b"alknet/call"
);
std::mem::drop(conn);
}
#[test]
fn call_client_is_send_sync() {
fn assert_send_sync<T: Send + Sync>() {}
assert_send_sync::<CallClient>();
assert_send_sync::<CallCredentials>();
assert_send_sync::<RemoteIdentity>();
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn build_ed25519_spki_der(raw_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let spki = rustls::sign::public_key_to_spki(&rustls::pki_types::alg_id::ED25519, raw_key);
spki.to_vec()
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn build_x509_cert_der() -> rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static> {
let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().expect("key gen");
let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::default();
let cert = params.self_signed(&key_pair).expect("self-signed cert");
cert.der().clone()
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn aws_lc_rs_provider() -> Arc<rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider> {
Arc::new(rustls::crypto::aws_lc_rs::default_provider())
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
fn verify_pin(
verifier: &FingerprintPinVerifier,
cert_der: rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'_>,
) -> Result<rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerified, rustls::Error> {
use rustls::client::danger::ServerCertVerifier;
let server_name: rustls::pki_types::ServerName<'static> =
"alknet".try_into().expect("server name");
verifier.verify_server_cert(
&cert_der,
&[],
&server_name,
&[],
rustls::pki_types::UnixTime::now(),
)
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_matches_correct_ed25519_fingerprint() {
let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
let fingerprint =
alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(&spki_der).expect("fingerprint");
let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
fingerprint,
aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
);
let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki_der);
let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert);
assert!(
result.is_ok(),
"FingerprintPinVerifier must accept a cert whose fingerprint matches the pin"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_rejects_wrong_ed25519_fingerprint() {
let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let raw_key = sk.public().to_bytes();
let spki_der = build_ed25519_spki_der(&raw_key);
let other_sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let other_fp = format!("ed25519:{}", hex::encode(other_sk.public().to_bytes()));
let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
other_fp,
aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
);
let cert = rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(spki_der);
let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert);
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"FingerprintPinVerifier must reject a cert whose fingerprint does not match the pin"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_matches_correct_sha256_fingerprint() {
let cert_der = build_x509_cert_der();
let fingerprint = alknet_core::fingerprint::fingerprint_from_cert_der(cert_der.as_ref())
.expect("fingerprint");
let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
fingerprint,
aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
);
let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert_der);
assert!(
result.is_ok(),
"FingerprintPinVerifier must accept an X.509 cert whose SHA256 fingerprint matches"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn fingerprint_pin_verifier_rejects_wrong_sha256_fingerprint() {
let cert_der = build_x509_cert_der();
let verifier = FingerprintPinVerifier::new(
"SHA256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string(),
aws_lc_rs_provider().signature_verification_algorithms,
);
let result = verify_pin(&verifier, cert_der);
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"FingerprintPinVerifier must reject an X.509 cert whose SHA256 does not match"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn select_server_verifier_returns_ca_verifier_for_none() {
let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
let remote_identity: Option<RemoteIdentity> = None;
let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &remote_identity);
assert!(
verifier.is_ok(),
"select_server_verifier must succeed for None (CA path)"
);
let debug = format!("{:?}", verifier.unwrap());
assert!(
debug.contains("WebPkiServerVerifier"),
"None must select WebPkiServerVerifier (CA verification), got: {debug}"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn select_server_verifier_returns_fingerprint_pin_for_some() {
let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
let remote_identity = Some(RemoteIdentity {
fingerprint: "ed25519:abc".to_string(),
});
let verifier = select_server_verifier(&provider, &remote_identity);
assert!(
verifier.is_ok(),
"select_server_verifier must succeed for Some (fingerprint pin path)"
);
let debug = format!("{:?}", verifier.unwrap());
assert!(
debug.contains("FingerprintPinVerifier"),
"Some must select FingerprintPinVerifier, got: {debug}"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn build_client_auth_presents_ed25519_raw_key_without_error() {
let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let tls_identity = Some(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk));
let resolver = build_client_auth(&provider, &tls_identity);
assert!(
resolver.is_ok(),
"build_client_auth must build a resolver for a RawKey identity"
);
let resolver = resolver.unwrap();
assert!(
resolver.only_raw_public_keys(),
"RawKey client auth resolver must present raw public keys (RFC 7250)"
);
assert!(
resolver.has_certs(),
"RawKey client auth resolver must report it has a cert to present"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn build_client_auth_none_resolves_to_no_client_cert() {
let provider = aws_lc_rs_provider();
let tls_identity: Option<alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity> = None;
let resolver = build_client_auth(&provider, &tls_identity)
.expect("build_client_auth must succeed for None");
assert!(
!resolver.has_certs(),
"NoClientCertResolver must report no certs (no client cert presented)"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn build_quinn_client_config_with_raw_key_identity_builds_without_error() {
let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let credentials = CallCredentials::new()
.with_tls_identity(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk))
.with_remote_identity(RemoteIdentity {
fingerprint: "ed25519:deadbeef".to_string(),
});
let config = build_quinn_client_config(&credentials, b"alknet/call");
assert!(
config.is_ok(),
"build_quinn_client_config must build with a RawKey identity + pinned fingerprint"
);
}
#[cfg(feature = "quinn")]
#[test]
fn build_quinn_client_config_with_no_remote_identity_builds_without_error() {
let sk = alknet_core::config::Ed25519SecretKey::generate();
let credentials =
CallCredentials::new().with_tls_identity(alknet_core::config::TlsIdentity::RawKey(sk));
let config = build_quinn_client_config(&credentials, b"alknet/call");
assert!(
config.is_ok(),
"build_quinn_client_config must build for the None + CA-verification path"
);
}
#[test]
fn remote_identity_none_is_load_bearing_not_defaulted() {
let creds = CallCredentials::new();
assert!(
creds.remote_identity.is_none(),
"CallCredentials::new() must keep remote_identity as None (the load-bearing \
public-X.509-endpoint state), not default it to a placeholder"
);
}
}