Files
alknet/docs/architecture/decisions/018-vault-standalone-crate.md
glm-5.2 dd1ca1de70 docs(architecture): add alknet-vault spec, ADR-018, ADR-019, OQ-20/21/22
Spec the vault crate from its existing implementation. The vault is
stable (implementation exists); this spec documents what IS so the
implementation-sync agent can reconcile source drift.

New spec documents (crates/vault/):
- README.md — crate index, security constraints, public API
- mnemonic-derivation.md — BIP39, SLIP-0010, BIP-0032, derivation paths
- encryption.md — AES-256-GCM, EncryptedData, key versioning, salt
- service.md — VaultServiceHandle lifecycle, actor dispatch, cache
- protocol.md — VaultProtocol irpc messages, DerivedKey redaction

New ADRs:
- ADR-018: Vault as standalone crate (zero alknet deps; own types/errors)
- ADR-019: Vault assembly-layer-only access (CLI is sole caller)

New open questions:
- OQ-20: Salt/KDF Phase B (open, low priority — salt field reserved)
- OQ-21: Remote vault administration (deferred — needs ADR if ever needed)
- OQ-22: Key rotation mechanism (open, low priority — workflow not specced)

Spec-vs-source drift explicitly flagged (for the sync agent):
- rand::random() used for IVs instead of OsRng (security-critical)
- unwrap() on every RwLock acquisition (must use unwrap_or_else)
- ADR-038 / OQ-SVC-03 references in source comments are stale (old numbering)
- VaultServiceActor::spawn returns a non-functional second actor (source bug)
- KeyVersionMismatch error variant is defined but unused in v1
2026-06-19 09:23:47 +00:00

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Markdown

# ADR-018: Vault as Standalone Crate
## Status
Accepted
## Context
alknet-vault provides BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key
derivation, BIP-0032 secp256k1 derivation (feature-gated), and AES-256-GCM
encryption. It holds the master seed — the root of trust for all derived keys
and encrypted credentials in the alknet system.
The question is: what does alknet-vault depend on? The candidates:
1. **Depend on alknet-core** for shared types (errors, maybe Identity). This
pulls QUIC, quinn, iroh, rustls, and tokio runtime dependencies into the
vault's dependency tree.
2. **Stand alone** — zero alknet crate dependencies. The vault defines its own
types, its own error enum, its own irpc protocol. Other crates depend on
the vault; the vault depends on nothing in alknet.
This is a one-way door. Once the vault depends on alknet-core, reversing it
requires removing that dependency from every type, error conversion, and
test — and the longer it stays, the more entangled it becomes.
### Why standalone matters
The vault is used in contexts where QUIC networking does not exist:
- **CLI tools**: a key-derivation utility that derives an identity key from a
mnemonic without starting a network endpoint.
- **Test harnesses**: integration tests in other crates derive test keys
without spinning up a QUIC endpoint.
- **WASM key derivation**: a future WASM target that derives keys in a browser
(the BiStream trait in ADR-007 preserves this door at the transport layer;
the vault's independence preserves it at the secret layer).
- **Embedded assembly**: a binary that only needs the vault to decrypt a
config file at startup, with no networking at all.
If the vault depends on alknet-core, all of these contexts pull in quinn,
iroh, rustls, and tokio — none of which they need. The vault's job is
cryptographic derivation and encryption. It has no networking concern.
### What the vault provides without alknet-core
The vault defines its own types and traits:
- `Mnemonic`, `Seed` — BIP39 root material
- `ExtendedPrivKey` (Ed25519), `Secp256k1ExtendedPrivKey` (Ethereum) —
derived key material
- `DerivedKey`, `KeyType` — protocol-level key representation
- `EncryptedData`, `EncryptionKey` — AES-256-GCM blobs
- `VaultServiceHandle`, `VaultServiceActor` — runtime API
- `VaultProtocol` — irpc message enum (in-process dispatch)
- `VaultServiceError` — its own error enum (string-wrapped sub-errors; the
vault doesn't share an error type with alknet-core)
The `VaultProtocol` uses irpc directly (see ADR-005), not through alknet-call.
This is consistent: irpc is a lightweight framing library, not an alknet
crate. The vault's irpc usage is an in-process dispatch mechanism, not a
network-exposed service.
## Decision
**alknet-vault has zero alknet crate dependencies.** It depends only on
external crates (`bip39`, `ed25519-bip32`, `aes-gcm`, `sha2`, `hmac`,
`secp256k1`, `irpc`, `tokio` for the actor's sync primitives, `serde`,
`zeroize`, `thiserror`, `base64`, `rand`).
The vault does not depend on:
- `alknet-core` — no shared types, no `Identity`, no `AuthContext`
- `alknet-call` — no `OperationSpec`, no `OperationContext`, no call protocol
- `alknet-vault` does not implement `ProtocolHandler` — it has no ALPN (see
ADR-019)
Dependency flow is strictly one-directional:
```
alknet-vault (standalone)
alknet (CLI binary) — the only crate that depends on alknet-vault
```
No handler crate depends on alknet-vault directly. Handlers receive derived
material through capabilities injected by the assembly layer (ADR-014). The
CLI binary is the sole integration point (ADR-008, ADR-019).
### Type independence
The vault defines its own types and does not share types with alknet-core:
- `VaultServiceError` is the vault's error enum. It is `Serialize`/`Deserialize`
(for irpc dispatch) and wraps sub-errors as strings. It does not implement
`From` for alknet-core error types — the CLI binary converts at the
assembly boundary.
- `DerivedKey` is the vault's key representation. It is not shared with
alknet-core's `Identity` type. The CLI binary extracts the bytes it needs
(private key for signing, public key for TLS identity) and constructs the
alknet-core types at the assembly layer.
- `EncryptedData` is the vault's encrypted blob format. It is shared with
`alknet-storage` (a future crate) by type-level agreement, not by a crate
dependency — both crates must agree on the serialization format (see
[encryption.md](../crates/vault/encryption.md)).
## Consequences
**Positive:**
- The vault compiles and runs without QUIC, quinn, iroh, rustls, or a tokio
runtime (the `VaultServiceHandle` works with just `std::sync::RwLock`; the
actor uses `tokio::sync::mpsc` but that's a lightweight dependency).
- CLI tools, test harnesses, and future WASM targets can use the vault for key
derivation without pulling in networking crates.
- The vault's API surface is stable — changes to alknet-core types don't
force a vault recompile, and changes to vault types don't force a
handler recompile (the CLI is the only consumer).
- No circular dependency risk. The dependency graph is a strict DAG.
- The vault can be published and used independently of alknet — it's a
general-purpose local key vault, not an alknet-specific component.
**Negative:**
- The vault cannot share types with alknet-core. If a type wants to be shared
(e.g., a future `Fingerprint` type), it must live in alknet-core and the
vault must define its own equivalent, or a new shared crate must be
created. This is a feature, not a bug — it forces explicit boundaries.
- The CLI binary must convert between vault types and alknet-core types at
the assembly boundary. This is a small amount of glue code (extract bytes
from `DerivedKey`, construct alknet-core types). See ADR-019.
- The vault's `VaultServiceError` is separate from alknet-core's
`HandlerError`. The CLI binary maps vault errors to handler errors or
startup failures. This is expected — the vault is a library, not a
handler.
## Assumptions
1. **The vault's API is consumed by one component (the CLI binary) in the
alknet system.** If a future use case requires multiple crates to depend
on the vault directly, the dependency flow still holds — they depend on
the vault, the vault depends on nothing. The standalone property is
preserved.
2. **Shared types between the vault and other crates are agreed by type-level
compatibility, not by a crate dependency.** `EncryptedData` is the example:
both the vault and `alknet-storage` (future) must agree on the
serialization format. This is documented in the type's spec, not enforced
by the type system across crates.
3. **The vault's error type does not need to integrate with alknet-core's
error handling.** The vault returns `VaultServiceError`; the CLI binary
handles it at the assembly boundary. If a future use case requires
propagating vault errors through alknet-core's error types, the CLI
converts at the boundary.
## References
- ADR-003: Crate decomposition (alknet-vault is standalone)
- ADR-005: irpc as call protocol foundation (vault uses irpc directly)
- ADR-008: Vault integration point (CLI-embedded, assembly-layer only)
- ADR-014: Secret material flow and capability injection
- ADR-019: Vault assembly-layer-only access
- [crates/vault/README.md](../crates/vault/README.md)
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/`