Files
alknet/tasks/call/review-completion.md
glm-5.2 2649e068e5 docs(arch): call-completion — ADR-028 peer-scoped filtering + client-and-adapters spec + tasks
Resolves the four gap-analysis decisions (DC-1..4) blocking the alknet-call
client/adapter surface specced in ADR-017:

- ADR-028 (new): locks the one-way door for DC-1 — CallClient registry is
  default-deny (remote_safe: bool on HandlerRegistration, default false across
  all provenance); share-global is an explicit trusted-peer opt-in; filtering
  is a dispatch-time read over the single Layer-0 registry, not a copy.
- client-and-adapters.md (new spec): operationally fills the gap ADR-017 left
  to implementation — CallClient, from_call, from_jsonschema, OperationAdapter
  trait, adapter location map, no-env-vars invariant, exchange-of-operations
  pattern. Keeps call-protocol.md and operation-registry.md under the
  700-line split threshold.
- ADR-017 amended: records DC-2/3/4 v1 defaults (auto-on-reconnect,
  error-on-collision, Result error type) and points DC-1 at ADR-028.
- OQ-25..28 (new): two-way-door remainders (remote_safe shape, AdapterError
  variants, re-import trigger, namespace collision) with v1 defaults recorded.
- Index/cross-ref updates across READMEs and the two existing call specs.

Tasks: 6 task files under tasks/call/ decomposing the completion work along
the gap-analysis priority order — remote-safe-marking (one-way door, first)
→ call-client (phase-risk) → from-call → operation-adapter-trait →
from-jsonschema (parallel with call-client) → review-completion. Graph
validated with taskgraph; parallelism designed in (from-jsonschema runs
concurrent with call-client/from-call once the trait lands).
2026-06-26 12:25:13 +00:00

9.4 KiB

id, name, status, depends_on, scope, risk, impact, level
id name status depends_on scope risk impact level
call/review-completion Review alknet-call client/adapter completion for spec conformance (ADR-017, ADR-028) and no-env-vars invariant pending
call/client/from-call
call/client/operation-adapter-trait
call/client/from-jsonschema
broad low phase review

Description

Review the alknet-call client/adapter completion (the gap ADR-017 left to implementation, now specced in client-and-adapters.md) for spec conformance, security-constraint conformance, and pattern consistency. This is the quality checkpoint at the end of the call-completion batch — the work that unblocks every downstream consumer (runner, container service, bilateral exchange, NAPI, agent cross-node dispatch).

Review Checklist

  1. CallClient conformance (client-and-adapters.md §CallClient):

    • CallClient struct with registry, identity_provider, trusted_peer
    • new() constructs default-deny (trusted_peer: false)
    • trusted_peer() constructs trusted-peer mode (explicit opt-in)
    • connect() opens QUIC on ALPN alknet/call, returns CallConnection
    • Dispatch loop is shared with CallAdapter (refactored, not duplicated — ADR-017 §1)
    • Connection symmetry (ADR-017 §2): both sides call each other after establishment
    • Credentials from Capabilities, not env vars (ADR-014, no-env-vars invariant)
  2. Peer-scoped filtering conformance (ADR-028):

    • Default-deny: op with remote_safe == false returns NOT_FOUND to remote peer
    • Default-deny: OperationContext.capabilities populated only for remote-safe ops
    • Trusted-peer mode: all External ops dispatch regardless of remote_safe
    • services/list hides non-remote-safe ops in default mode (ADR-028 Assumption 2)
    • services/list lists all External ops in trusted-peer mode
    • Dispatch-time read over single Layer-0 registry (not a copy — ADR-028 §5)
    • remote_safe defaults false across all provenance (ADR-028 §4)
  3. from_call conformance (client-and-adapters.md §from_call):

    • Calls services/list then services/schema for each op
    • Constructs HandlerRegistration with provenance: FromCall
    • Forwarding handler sends call.requested via CallConnection
    • Subscription forwarding yields until completed/aborted
    • composition_authority: None, scoped_env: None (leaf — ADR-022)
    • remote_safe: false on FromCall leaves
    • Namespace collision = error (DC-3/OQ-28), not silent overwrite
    • Re-import on connection establishment (DC-2/OQ-27, v1 default)
    • Cross-node abort via parent_request_id (ADR-016 §6)
  4. OperationAdapter trait conformance (client-and-adapters.md §OperationAdapter):

    • async fn import(&self) -> Result<Vec<HandlerRegistration>, AdapterError>
    • Trait is #[async_trait] (async — ADR-017 §5, locked)
    • AdapterError is #[non_exhaustive] + thiserror::Error
    • Variants: DiscoveryFailed, SchemaParse, Transport, Unauthorized, Conflict
    • Trait lives in alknet-call (where the types live), not alknet-http
  5. from_jsonschema conformance (client-and-adapters.md §from_jsonschema):

    • provenance: FromJsonSchema, no real handler (placeholder errors if invoked)
    • composition_authority: None, scoped_env: None, empty capabilities
    • remote_safe: false (provenance default, ADR-028 §4)
    • Implements OperationAdapter, no .await in import (pure parse)
    • Malformed schema → AdapterError::SchemaParse
  6. Adapter location map conformance (client-and-adapters.md §Adapter Location Map):

    • OperationAdapter trait + from_call + from_jsonschema + CallClient in alknet-call
    • No HTTP client / HTTP server deps in alknet-call (stays lean)
    • from_openapi/from_mcp/to_openapi/to_mcp NOT in alknet-call (deferred to alknet-http)
    • MCP stdio not built (security position, not a feature gap)
  7. No-env-vars invariant (client-and-adapters.md §No-Env-Vars Invariant):

    • Credential path: vault → assembly → Capabilities → HandlerRegistration.capabilities → OperationContext.capabilities → handler
    • No handler reads outbound credentials from any source other than OperationContext.capabilities
    • No std::env::var reads in the credential path
    • The invariant is enforced by the dispatch path (build_root_context), not runtime convention
  8. ADR conformance (completion-specific):

    • ADR-017 §1: shared dispatch loop, CallClient own registry (now peer-scoped per ADR-028)
    • ADR-017 §2: connection direction independent of call direction
    • ADR-017 §3: from_call flow (services/list + services/schema), FromCallConfig prefix/filter
    • ADR-017 §5: async trait, bundles not (spec,handler) pairs, to_* are projections not impls
    • ADR-017 §6: cross-node abort cascade through from_call handler
    • ADR-017 §7: credentials from capabilities (TLS identity, auth token, remote identity)
    • ADR-028: default-deny, remote_safe bool, trusted-peer opt-in, dispatch-time read, services/list hide
  9. Security constraints (completion-specific):

    • Default-deny filtering: remote peer can't trigger capability exposure for non-remote-safe ops
    • Trusted-peer opt-in is explicit, never default
    • Capabilities non-serializable, never cross the wire (ADR-014)
    • from_call trust is transitive (remote node's code runs) — recorded in spec, not enforced beyond scoped env
    • FromCall/FromJsonSchema leaves have no composition authority (can't escalate)
  10. Test coverage:

    • Integration test: two-node call (CallClient ↔ CallAdapter, both call each other)
    • Integration test: default-deny op → NOT_FOUND to remote peer
    • Integration test: remote_safe op dispatches to remote peer
    • Integration test: trusted-peer mode exposes all External ops
    • Integration test: services/list hides non-remote-safe in default mode
    • Integration test: from_call populates Layer 2 overlay, forwarding works
    • Integration test: subscription forwarding streams remote events
    • Integration test: namespace collision returns error
    • Integration test: cross-node abort cascades through from_call handler
    • Unit tests: AdapterError variants, OperationAdapter trait compiles
  11. Spec drift check: verify client-and-adapters.md still matches the implementation after the completion (no spec/impl drift introduced during implementation). In particular: the CallClient struct sketch, the CallCredentials sketch, the FromCallConfig fields, the AdapterError variants, and the remote_safe field on HandlerRegistration.

Acceptance Criteria

  • CallClient matches client-and-adapters.md (struct, new/trusted_peer, connect, shared loop)
  • Peer-scoped filtering matches ADR-028 (default-deny, trusted-peer, services/list hide)
  • from_call matches client-and-adapters.md (flow, FromCallConfig, provenance, None fields)
  • OperationAdapter trait + AdapterError match client-and-adapters.md (async, non_exhaustive, variants)
  • from_jsonschema matches client-and-adapters.md (provenance, placeholder handler, no I/O)
  • Adapter location map respected (no HTTP deps in alknet-call; from_openapi/mcp not built here)
  • No-env-vars invariant holds (credentials from Capabilities, no env-var reads)
  • ADRs 017 + 028 conformed to (plus 014/015/016/022/023/024 where touched)
  • Default-deny security constraint enforced (no capability exposure for non-remote-safe)
  • Integration tests cover two-node call, default-deny, trusted-peer, from_call, abort cascade
  • No spec/impl drift in client-and-adapters.md (or drift documented + spec amended)
  • cargo fmt --check -p alknet-call passes
  • cargo clippy -p alknet-call --all-targets passes with no warnings
  • All tests pass

References

  • docs/architecture/crates/call/client-and-adapters.md — the spec being reviewed against
  • docs/architecture/crates/call/README.md — crate index (now lists client-and-adapters.md)
  • docs/architecture/decisions/017-call-protocol-client-and-adapter-contract.md — ADR-017 (amended)
  • docs/architecture/decisions/028-callclient-peer-scoped-registry-filtering.md — ADR-028
  • docs/architecture/open-questions.md — OQ-25..28 (two-way-door remainders — verify defaults match spec)
  • docs/research/alknet-call-completion/gap-analysis.md — DC-1..4, the decisions this batch resolved
  • tasks/call/registry/remote-safe-marking.md
  • tasks/call/client/call-client.md
  • tasks/call/client/from-call.md
  • tasks/call/client/operation-adapter-trait.md
  • tasks/call/client/from-jsonschema.md

Notes

This review closes the call-completion batch. The load-bearing security invariant is ADR-028's default-deny: a remote peer's call must not trigger dispatch that populates OperationContext.capabilities from the local registration bundle unless the op is explicitly remote-safe. Verify this with a test that asserts a non-remote-safe op's call does NOT populate capabilities (not just that it returns NOT_FOUND — the security argument is about capability exposure, not just call denial). The no-env-vars invariant (ADR-014) is the dispatch-side corollary: no handler reads credentials from any source other than OperationContext.capabilities. The shared dispatch loop (ADR-017 §1) is the architectural commitment that keeps CallClient from becoming a parallel protocol implementation — verify the loop is genuinely shared (refactored out of CallAdapter), not copy-pasted. If deviations are found, document and fix before considering the call-completion batch done. This unblocks every downstream consumer, so spec/impl drift here propagates.