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alkssh/docs/research/vision.md
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glm-5.3-flash 31207057ff docs(research): phase 0 closed — pocs.md refreshed, reverse-runner pattern extracted
- pocs.md: marked complete; corrected the stale 0.5x-era accept-defaults
  hypothesis wording (0.64.1: only auth_publickey_offered defaults to
  accept), stage D recorded as ran-in-full, completion gate updated with
  per-question resolution status
- added client-side scope section: no dedicated POC needed (client API
  exercised throughout POC-1/POC-3) + the acceptor-default fact (russh
  client accept-and-drop for unhandled forwarded opens is ours to fix)
- new reverse-runner.md: alkminer pattern extraction (concepts only,
  never code) — hub-dials-runner surface inventory, both tunnel legs,
  the OAI-proxy secret-hygiene shape, and the client-direction lessons
  (keepalive defaults, reconnect-restore, acceptor disposition)
- vision.md: scope-question resolution addendum + whitespace typo fix
2026-10-26 06:09:38 +00:00

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Markdown

# Vision
Status: Draft (phase 0 research).
## What this is
alkssh is the alk family's SSH adapter: a thin wrapper around russh
terminating the vanilla-ssh wire and bridging to/from alkcall channels
(family ADR-003). It is the alkhttp-style adapter for the SSH protocol
— the vanilla-ssh front door for vanilla clients, and the family's
vanilla-ssh client where a family app dials an upstream SSH server.
The substance almost entirely exists in the family. What alkssh adds is
the glue + the mapping:
- vanilla ssh (ssh(1), git(1), sftp clients) connect to an alkssh
endpoint as they would to any sshd;
- each SSH channel type is mapped onto a family protocol half
(see `mapping-table.md`);
- identity arrives the same way it does everywhere else in the family:
a verified SSH public key's fingerprint resolved through alkcall's
`IdentityProvider` (see `auth-bridge.md`).
The alkforge-relevant property is **exclusion**: an alkforge ssh
endpoint built with only the `git` feature is structurally incapable of
serving a shell, tunnels, or socks. Every mapping is a cargo feature;
unfeatured channel opens decline fail-closed (family ADR-003 decision
3). This is why alkssh leads alkforge's phase 0 — the adapter is glue,
not protocol invention.
## Guiding principles
1. **russh owns the SSH wire.** No SSH framing is authored in-family
(family ADR-003 decision 1). KEX, cipher negotiation, channel
multiplexing, and userauth state machines come from russh; third-
party-upstream posture applies (file asks upstream; never silently
absorb a workaround).
2. **A door, not a backend.** alkssh speaks family-protocol types only
at the mapped seams. It carries no deployment policy: a downstream
app (alkforge) embeds it, enables features, and brings identity/ACL
configuration.
3. **Fail-closed everything.** The feature graph, the auth-method
disposition, and the channel-request disposition all default to a
clean decline. Nothing is advertised that isn't served; nothing is
half-served. Every decline path is contract territory and is
tested.
4. **One seam per mapping.** Each family protocol already exposes a
generic duplex-stream or `Connection` serving entry
(`mapping-table.md`); a russh channel's read/write halves plug in at
exactly one point per mapping. No channel-type knowledge flows
upstream into the protocol crates.
5. **Identity is the family's, not SSH's.** SSH user names, `~/.ssh/`
conventions, and password auth are not the alk family's identity
model. A verified key's fingerprint → `Identity` via alkcall's
`IdentityProvider` is the only resolution path; secrets an alkssh
*client* holds come from alkvault-backed sources — vault-encrypted
at rest, treated as bearer-token-class secret material — never env
vars (family ADR-002 decision 5). The vault is a secret store on
this path, not a key generator or key custodian.
## Non-goals
- **Authoring SSH protocol machinery** — no in-family framing, cipher,
or KEX code, ever (russh upstream decides what SSH is).
- **Being an sshd.** No local user accounts, no `authorized_keys` file
semantics of the OpenSSH variety, no PAM-shaped anything. Deployment
posture belongs to the embedding app.
- **Serving sftp** — deferred to alkfs (family ADR-002); the subsystem
decline is the placeholder contract.
- **A binary / CLI.** Downstream apps embed the crate; there is no
`alkssh` executable in this crate.
- **Password / keyboard-interactive auth for clients.** The family
identity model has no password concept; these methods decline
server-side (see `auth-bridge.md`) and exist client-side only as
non-goals until a consuming use case arrives.
## Scope questions phase 0 must answer
These frame the research docs; each is a candidate open question for
phase 1's `open-questions.md`:
1. **The `alk/ssh` ALPN's topology role** — alkcall ADR-004 reserves
`alk/ssh` → `SshAdapter`, ADR-034's channels table gives it
stream_types `[0, 1]` ("SSH multiplexes internally, including its
own control"), and ADR-009 sketches a browser-WASM route where the
ALPN transports an SSH stream to an `SshAdapter`. But family ADR-003
describes alkssh terminating vanilla SSH at an edge. Whether
`alk/ssh` carries raw vanilla-SSH bytes between alkssh instances
(a relay leg), serves the browser route, or both — and how that
interacts with ADR-042's "the hub never runs a handler for
`alk/ssh`" relay ruling — is unresolved (see `mapping-table.md`
§topology).
2. **russh pin** — version, crypto-backend feature, and the
RC-pinned transitive dependency situation (see `russh.md`).
3. **Feature names + graph** — the `session`/`tunnel`/`dynamic-forward`/`git`/`sftp` naming and their independence
(no feature implies another; flat until architecture says otherwise).
4. **Auth dispositions** — which russh auth methods the server
implements vs declines; the exact `auth_publickey` → fingerprint →
identity contract; client-side vault-backed at-rest key handling
(see `auth-bridge.md`).
5. **The mapping table details** — per channel type and per request,
the family seam, the parameter mapping, and the decline contract
(see `mapping-table.md`); POC validation per `pocs.md`.
Resolution status (post-POC): question 4 is answered by
POC-1/POC-2 evidence, question 5 by POC-3 (three mapping-row
corrections recorded), and question 2's *facts* are verified (the pin
decision itself is phase 1 ADR territory). Questions 1 (the `alk/ssh`
topology) and 3 (feature naming) are phase 1 decisions, carried as
seeded OQs / ADR territory per `pocs.md` §Sequencing and gates. A
client-direction consumer pattern (hub-dials-runner) is extracted in
`reverse-runner.md` and shapes the phase 1 client surface.
## References
- family ADR-003 (`/workspace/@alkdev/alkfamily/docs/architecture/decisions/003-alkssh-russh-adapter.md`)
- family ADR-002 (alkforge; why the exclusion property matters)
- family open-questions OQ-08 (partially resolved; remaining scope is
this repo's phase 0)
- `russh.md`, `auth-bridge.md`, `mapping-table.md`, `pocs.md` in this
directory