Rebrand alknet-vault -> alkvault

Rename the crate from alknet-vault to alkvault across source and docs:
- Cargo.toml: package name and lib name (alknet_vault -> alkvault)
- src/ doc comments and doc-test use statements
- tests/ use statements and one string literal

Convert references to non-vault alknet ADRs (003, 005, 008, 010, 014,
064) that were broken local links into @alkdev/alknet: cross-repo
references, matching the alktype sibling pattern. Local ADR/OQ
references are now proper links. Rewrote monorepo path references
(crates/alknet-vault/src/...) to the flat layout (src/...). Fixed
sdd_process.md package name (@alkdev/storage -> @alkdev/alkvault).

ADR/OQ renumbering is deferred to a subsequent pass per the alknet-
origin numbering convention. Generic prose 'vault' and type names
(VaultServiceHandle, VaultServiceError, etc.) are unchanged.

Build, 108 tests, and clippy all pass clean.
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glm-5.2 committed 2026-08-02 09:25:43 +00:00
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@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ dependencies = [
]
[[package]]
name = "alknet-vault"
name = "alkvault"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
+2 -2
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
[package]
name = "alknet-vault"
name = "alkvault"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description = "Local key vault: BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD
repository = "https://git.alk.dev/alkdev/alkvault"
[lib]
name = "alknet_vault"
name = "alkvault"
[features]
default = []
+34 -8
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ status: stable
last_updated: 2026-06-23
---
# alknet-vault
# alkvault
Local key vault: BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key
derivation, BIP-0032 secp256k1 derivation (feature-gated), and AES-256-GCM
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ and encrypted credentials in the alknet system.
## What This Crate Is
alknet-vault is a **standalone crate** with zero alknet crate dependencies
alkvault is a **standalone crate** with zero alknet crate dependencies
(ADR-018) and zero RPC framework dependencies (ADR-025). It provides the
cryptographic primitives and runtime API for managing the root of trust.
The CLI binary (the `alknet` crate) is the sole component that talks to the
@@ -39,10 +39,6 @@ seed and derived private keys never cross the network.
| ADR | Title | Relevance |
|-----|-------|-----------|
| [003](decisions/003-crate-decomposition.md) | Crate Decomposition | alknet-vault's standalone position |
| [008](decisions/008-secret-service-integration.md) | Vault Integration Point | CLI-embedded, capability source |
| [010](decisions/010-alpn-router-and-endpoint.md) | ALPN Router and Endpoint | Ed25519 as default curve for TLS raw key identity |
| [014](decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md) | Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection | Capabilities carry vault-derived material |
| [018](decisions/018-vault-standalone-crate.md) | Vault as Standalone Crate | Zero alknet crate dependencies |
| [019](decisions/019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md) | Vault Assembly-Layer-Only Access | The assembly layer is the sole caller |
| [020](decisions/020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md) | HD Derivation for Encryption Keys | SLIP-0010 derivation, not PBKDF2; salt unused in v2 |
@@ -50,6 +46,19 @@ seed and derived private keys never cross the network.
| [025](decisions/025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md) | Vault Local-Only Dispatch | Dropped irpc; direct method calls; local-only by construction |
| [026](decisions/026-vault-key-model-hd-derivation.md) | Vault Key Model — HD Derivation | HD derivation from BIP39 seed; `74'` coin type; AES-256-GCM |
### Related ADRs in the parent `@alkdev/alknet` repo
These ADRs are not copied here (they are not vault-specific), but the
vault's design depends on them. They live in the parent `@alkdev/alknet`
workspace.
| ADR | Title | Relevance |
|-----|-------|-----------|
| `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/003-crate-decomposition.md` | Crate Decomposition | alkvault's standalone position |
| `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/008-secret-service-integration.md` | Vault Integration Point | CLI-embedded, capability source |
| `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/010-alpn-router-and-endpoint.md` | ALPN Router and Endpoint | Ed25519 as default curve for TLS raw key identity |
| `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md` | Secret Material Flow and Capability Injection | Capabilities carry vault-derived material |
## Relevant Open Questions
| OQ | Title | Status | Relevance |
@@ -119,7 +128,7 @@ pub use mnemonic::{Language, Mnemonic, Seed};
pub use derivation::{DerivationError, ExtendedPrivKey, PATHS};
// Derivation helpers (derive_path_from_seed, parse_derivation_path,
// device_path, encryption_path_for_version) are accessible as
// alknet_vault::derivation::* — not re-exported at crate root to avoid
// alkvault::derivation::* — not re-exported at crate root to avoid
// clutter, but fully public.
// Encryption
@@ -141,4 +150,21 @@ The `secp256k1` feature flag gates Ethereum (BIP-0032) derivation:
```rust
#[cfg(feature = "secp256k1")]
pub mod ethereum;
```
```
## References
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/003-crate-decomposition.md` —
crate decomposition (alkvault's standalone position)
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/008-secret-service-integration.md` —
vault integration point (CLI-embedded, capability source)
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/010-alpn-router-and-endpoint.md` —
ALPN router and endpoint (Ed25519 as default curve for TLS raw key identity)
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/architecture/decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md` —
secret material flow and capability injection (capabilities carry
vault-derived material)
> **Note**: Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/alknet: ...`) point to the
> parent `@alkdev/alknet` workspace where this crate originated. The
> artifacts are preserved there as historical context; they are not part
> of this standalone repo.
@@ -6,12 +6,12 @@ Accepted
## Context
alknet-vault provides BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key
alkvault provides BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key
derivation, BIP-0032 secp256k1 derivation (feature-gated), and AES-256-GCM
encryption. It holds the master seed — the root of trust for all derived keys
and encrypted credentials in the alknet system.
The question is: what does alknet-vault depend on? The candidates:
The question is: what does alkvault depend on? The candidates:
1. **Depend on alknet-core** for shared types (errors, maybe Identity). This
pulls QUIC, quinn, iroh, rustls, and tokio runtime dependencies into the
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ wraps the vault (see ADR-025, OQ-021).
## Decision
**alknet-vault has zero alknet crate dependencies.** It depends only on
**alkvault has zero alknet crate dependencies.** It depends only on
external crates (`bip39`, `ed25519-bip32`, `aes-gcm`, `sha2`, `hmac`,
`secp256k1`, `serde`, `zeroize`, `thiserror`, `base64`, `rand`). ADR-025
dropped `irpc`, `irpc-derive`, `postcard`, and `tokio` — the vault no longer
@@ -75,18 +75,18 @@ dependency.
The vault does not depend on:
- `alknet-core` — no shared types, no `Identity`, no `AuthContext`
- `alknet-call` — no `OperationSpec`, no `OperationContext`, no call protocol
- `alknet-vault` does not implement `ProtocolHandler` — it has no ALPN (see
- `alkvault` does not implement `ProtocolHandler` — it has no ALPN (see
ADR-019)
Dependency flow is strictly one-directional:
```
alknet-vault (standalone)
alkvault (standalone)
↑
alknet (CLI binary) — the only crate that depends on alknet-vault
alknet (CLI binary) — the only crate that depends on alkvault
```
No handler crate depends on alknet-vault directly. Handlers receive derived
No handler crate depends on alkvault directly. Handlers receive derived
material through capabilities injected by the assembly layer (ADR-014). The
CLI binary is the sole integration point (ADR-008, ADR-019).
@@ -200,14 +200,22 @@ makes the freeze explicit and enforceable by review.
## References
- ADR-003: Crate decomposition (alknet-vault is standalone)
- ADR-005: irpc as call protocol foundation (superseded by ADR-064 — irpc
was never integrated into alknet-call; the vault no longer uses irpc
either — see ADR-025)
- ADR-025: Vault local-only dispatch (dropped irpc from the vault; the
vault uses direct method calls, no actor, no remote capability)
- ADR-008: Vault integration point (CLI-embedded, assembly-layer only)
- ADR-014: Secret material flow and capability injection
- ADR-019: Vault assembly-layer-only access
- [crates/vault/README.md](../README.md)
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/`
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-003` — crate decomposition (alkvault is standalone)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-005` — irpc as call protocol foundation (superseded
by ADR-064 — irpc was never integrated into alknet-call; the vault no
longer uses irpc either — see ADR-025)
- [ADR-025](025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md) — vault local-only dispatch
(dropped irpc from the vault; the vault uses direct method calls, no
actor, no remote capability)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-008` — vault integration point (CLI-embedded,
assembly-layer only)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` — secret material flow and capability injection
- [ADR-019](019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md) — vault assembly-layer-only
access
- [README.md](../README.md)
- Implementation: `src/`
> Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/alknet: ...`) point to the parent
> `@alkdev/alknet` workspace where this crate originated. The artifacts
> are preserved there as historical context; they are not part of this
> standalone repo.
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Handlers never:
- Hold a `VaultServiceHandle` reference
- Call `derive_*`, `encrypt`, or `decrypt` directly
- Receive the master seed or mnemonic
- Import `alknet_vault` as a dependency
- Import `alkvault` as a dependency
Handlers receive secret material through `OperationContext.capabilities`
(ADR-014). The `Capabilities` type holds non-serializable, zeroized secret
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ that door; it simply does not open it.
(ADR-025) — no remote dispatch capability exists in the vault crate. If
remote vault access is needed in the future, it requires a separate
vault-server crate that depends on both alknet-core (for auth) and
alknet-vault (for the handle), with a heavily restricted mechanism
alkvault (for the handle), with a heavily restricted mechanism
(admin scope, mTLS-only, never expose the mnemonic over an
unauthenticated channel) and its own ADR.
@@ -160,10 +160,17 @@ that door; it simply does not open it.
## References
- ADR-003: Crate decomposition (alknet-vault is standalone)
- ADR-008: Vault integration point (CLI-embedded, capability source)
- ADR-014: Secret material flow and capability injection (the injection
mechanism this ADR relies on)
- ADR-018: Vault as standalone crate (the independence this ADR preserves)
- [crates/vault/service.md](../service.md)
- [crates/vault/README.md](../README.md)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-003` — crate decomposition (alkvault is standalone)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-008` — vault integration point (CLI-embedded,
capability source)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` — secret material flow and capability injection
(the injection mechanism this ADR relies on)
- [ADR-018](018-vault-standalone-crate.md) — vault as standalone crate
(the independence this ADR preserves)
- [service.md](../service.md)
- [README.md](../README.md)
> Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/alknet: ...`) point to the parent
> `@alkdev/alknet` workspace where this crate originated. The artifacts
> are preserved there as historical context; they are not part of this
> standalone repo.
@@ -220,11 +220,20 @@ not another version index. See OQ-22 (key rotation) and ADR-018
## References
- ADR-018: Vault as standalone crate
- ADR-019: Vault assembly-layer-only access
- [ADR-018](018-vault-standalone-crate.md) — vault as standalone crate
- [ADR-019](019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md) — vault assembly-layer-only
access
- [encryption.md](../encryption.md) — AES-256-GCM, EncryptedData
- [mnemonic-derivation.md](../mnemonic-derivation.md) — SLIP-0010, PATHS::ENCRYPTION
- OQ-20: Salt/KDF Phase B (resolved by this ADR)
- OQ-22: Key rotation mechanism (still open — this ADR defines v2 but not the rotation workflow)
- TypeScript predecessor: `/workspace/@alkdev/storage/src/graphs/crypto.ts`
- TypeScript secret graph: `/workspace/@alkdev/storage/src/graphs/modules/secret-graph.ts`
- [OQ-20](../questions/020-salt-kdf-and-encryption-key-derivation-method.md) —
Salt/KDF Phase B (resolved by this ADR)
- [OQ-22](../questions/022-key-rotation-mechanism.md) — key rotation
mechanism (still open — this ADR defines v2 but not the rotation
workflow)
- TypeScript predecessor: `@alkdev/storage: src/graphs/crypto.ts`
- TypeScript secret graph: `@alkdev/storage: src/graphs/modules/secret-graph.ts`
> Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/...: ...`) point to other packages in
> the `@alkdev` org where this crate originated. The artifacts are
> preserved there as historical context; they are not part of this
> standalone repo.
@@ -244,9 +244,10 @@ are expected.
## References
- ADR-020: HD derivation for encryption keys (this ADR builds on the
version-indexed path scheme)
- OQ-22: Key rotation mechanism (resolved by this ADR)
- [ADR-020](020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md) — HD derivation for
encryption keys (this ADR builds on the version-indexed path scheme)
- [OQ-22](../questions/022-key-rotation-mechanism.md) — key rotation
mechanism (resolved by this ADR)
- [encryption.md](../encryption.md) — AES-256-GCM, EncryptedData
- [service.md](../service.md) — encrypt, decrypt, rotate methods
- [mnemonic-derivation.md](../mnemonic-derivation.md) —
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Accepted
## Context
alknet-vault uses irpc for its internal dispatch. The `VaultProtocol` enum is
alkvault uses irpc for its internal dispatch. The `VaultProtocol` enum is
annotated with `#[rpc_requests(message = VaultMessage, no_spans)]`, which
generates a `Service` trait impl (for in-process mpsc dispatch) and a
`RemoteService` trait impl (for remote QUIC dispatch). The vault's
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ which exists only to make `RemoteService` work, which is the footgun.
## Decision
### 1. alknet-vault drops irpc entirely
### 1. alkvault drops irpc entirely
The vault's dispatch is direct method calls on `VaultServiceHandle`. No
`VaultProtocol` enum, no `VaultMessage`, no `VaultServiceActor`, no mpsc
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ The vault crate has no remote dispatch capability. There is no
`RemoteService` trait, no remote handler, no wire format for vault messages.
Enabling remote vault access is not a flag flip or a server-setup change —
it requires *building a separate crate* that depends on both alknet-core
(for auth) and alknet-vault (for the handle) and adds the remote transport
(for auth) and alkvault (for the handle) and adds the remote transport
+ auth-wrapping handler. That is a visible architectural act that shows up
in code review, not a runtime config flip on a macro that was already
generating the remote code.
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ defines the wire representation.
The vault-server-crate question (review #002 C7) is decided: *if* remote
vault access is ever needed, it is a separate crate that depends on both
alknet-core (for `IdentityProvider`, scopes, auth-wrapping) and
alknet-vault (for `VaultServiceHandle`). The vault crate itself remains
alkvault (for `VaultServiceHandle`). The vault crate itself remains
local-only. This is a decision not to create the crate now, and not to
preclude it. It is the path of least commitment, and it matches ADR-018's
standalone-vault principle.
@@ -311,26 +311,35 @@ version of ADR-018's intent.
## References
- ADR-005: irpc as call protocol foundation (this ADR amends the vault
reference in ADR-005's Decision and Consequences; ~~irpc remains the
foundation for alknet-*call*, just not for alknet-*vault*~~ — **this
claim is itself superseded by [ADR-064](064-irpc-never-integrated-hand-rolled-framing.md)**,
which records that irpc was never integrated into alknet-call either;
neither the vault nor the call protocol uses irpc)
- ADR-008: Vault integration point (the vault is a capability source
accessed at assembly time — this ADR makes that the *only* mode)
- ADR-014: Secret material flow and capability injection (`DerivedKey`
never appears in call protocol payloads — the redacting `Serialize`
is defense-in-depth for logging, not for wire transport)
- ADR-018: Vault as standalone crate (this ADR strengthens the
standalone principle: zero alknet crate dependencies *and* zero RPC
framework dependencies)
- ADR-019: Vault assembly-layer-only access (this ADR makes the vault
local-only, not just assembly-layer-only-for-direct-calls)
- OQ-21: Remote vault administration (resolved by this ADR — not a vault
crate feature; if needed, a separate crate with its own ADR)
- docs/reviews/002-pre-implementation-architecture-sanity-check.md
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-005` — irpc as call protocol foundation (this ADR
amends the vault reference in ADR-005's Decision and Consequences;
~~irpc remains the foundation for alknet-*call*, just not for
alkvault~~ — **this claim is itself superseded by
`@alkdev/alknet: ADR-064`**, which records that irpc was never
integrated into alknet-call either; neither the vault nor the call
protocol uses irpc)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-008` — vault integration point (the vault is a
capability source accessed at assembly time — this ADR makes that the
*only* mode)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` — secret material flow and capability injection
(`DerivedKey` never appears in call protocol payloads — the redacting
`Serialize` is defense-in-depth for logging, not for wire transport)
- [ADR-018](018-vault-standalone-crate.md) — vault as standalone crate
(this ADR strengthens the standalone principle: zero alknet crate
dependencies *and* zero RPC framework dependencies)
- [ADR-019](019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md) — vault assembly-layer-only
access (this ADR makes the vault local-only, not just
assembly-layer-only-for-direct-calls)
- [OQ-21](../questions/021-remote-vault-administration.md) — remote vault
administration (resolved by this ADR — not a vault crate feature; if
needed, a separate crate with its own ADR)
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/reviews/002-pre-implementation-architecture-sanity-check.md`
(findings C7, C8, W8 — resolved or dissolved by this ADR)
- irpc design patterns: `docs/research/references/iroh/irpc/09-design-patterns-and-examples.md`
- `@alkdev/alknet: docs/research/references/iroh/irpc/09-design-patterns-and-examples.md`
(Pattern 3: `no_rpc` flag — this ADR goes further by dropping irpc
entirely, since the actor pattern is also unnecessary)
entirely, since the actor pattern is also unnecessary)
> Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/alknet: ...`) point to the parent
> `@alkdev/alknet` workspace where this crate originated. The artifacts
> are preserved there as historical context; they are not part of this
> standalone repo.
@@ -165,15 +165,16 @@ and the v1→v2 migration from PBKDF2.
## References
- ADR-020: HD derivation for encryption keys (a special case of this ADR —
covers the encryption key at `m/74'/2'/0'/0'` and the v1→v2 migration
from PBKDF2)
- ADR-010: ALPN router and endpoint (Ed25519 as the default curve for TLS
raw key identity — the identity key at `m/74'/0'/0'/0'`)
- ADR-018: Vault as standalone crate (the vault defines its own key types
and derivation paths)
- ADR-025: Vault local-only dispatch (the vault is local-only; the seed
never crosses the network)
- [ADR-020](020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md) — HD derivation for
encryption keys (a special case of this ADR — covers the encryption key
at `m/74'/2'/0'/0'` and the v1→v2 migration from PBKDF2)
- `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-010` — ALPN router and endpoint (Ed25519 as the
default curve for TLS raw key identity — the identity key at
`m/74'/0'/0'/0'`)
- [ADR-018](018-vault-standalone-crate.md) — vault as standalone crate
(the vault defines its own key types and derivation paths)
- [ADR-025](025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md) — vault local-only dispatch
(the vault is local-only; the seed never crosses the network)
- [mnemonic-derivation.md](../mnemonic-derivation.md) —
BIP39, SLIP-0010, BIP-0032, derivation paths, PATHS module
- [encryption.md](../encryption.md) — AES-256-GCM,
@@ -182,4 +183,9 @@ and the v1→v2 migration from PBKDF2.
- SLIP-0044: Registered coin types for BIP-0032 / SLIP-0010 (`74'` is
unallocated)
- BIP-0032: Hierarchical deterministic wallets (secp256k1)
- BIP-39: Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys
- BIP-39: Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys
> Cross-repo references (`@alkdev/alknet: ...`) point to the parent
> `@alkdev/alknet` workspace where this crate originated. The artifacts
> are preserved there as historical context; they are not part of this
> standalone repo.
+3 -3
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@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ These are security-critical implementation requirements.
- [NIST SP 800-38D](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf) —
AES-GCM specification
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/src/encryption.rs`
- Tests: `crates/alknet-vault/tests/test_vectors.rs`,
`crates/alknet-vault/src/encryption.rs` (unit tests)
- Implementation: `src/encryption.rs`
- Tests: `tests/test_vectors.rs`,
`src/encryption.rs` (unit tests)
- [service.md](service.md) — how the vault caches the encryption key
+3 -3
View File
@@ -317,6 +317,6 @@ See [open-questions.md](open-questions.md) for full details.
secp256k1 HD derivation
- [SLIP-0044](https://github.com/satoshilabs/slips/blob/master/slip-0044.md) —
registered coin types (74' is unallocated)
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/src/mnemonic.rs`,
`crates/alknet-vault/src/derivation.rs`, `crates/alknet-vault/src/ethereum.rs`
- Test vectors: `crates/alknet-vault/tests/test_vectors.rs`
- Implementation: `src/mnemonic.rs`,
`src/derivation.rs`, `src/ethereum.rs`
- Test vectors: `tests/test_vectors.rs`
+1 -1
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@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Door type is separate from whether a decision is made. A two-way door is a decis
## By Theme
### alknet-vault
### alkvault
All vault open questions are **resolved** — the vault is a stable crate
with implementation complete and verified.
+6 -6
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@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ where a long-lived node exposes a restricted vault API to ephemeral
workers), it requires a **separate vault-server crate** that:
1. Depends on both alknet-core (for `IdentityProvider`, scopes,
auth-wrapping) and alknet-vault (for `VaultServiceHandle`).
auth-wrapping) and alkvault (for `VaultServiceHandle`).
2. Defines its own threat model, access policy, and operation filtering
(`Unlock`/`Lock` must be local-only; other operations may be
remote-capable depending on the policy).
@@ -224,9 +224,9 @@ the network at call time.
| Vault is standalone | [ADR-018](decisions/018-vault-standalone-crate.md) | Zero alknet crate dependencies |
| Vault is local-only | [ADR-025](decisions/025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md) | Direct method calls, no irpc, no remote dispatch capability |
| HD derivation (not stored keys) | — | One seed, many keys, no key storage |
| `DerivedKey` is move-only | [ADR-014](decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md) | Prevents accidental duplication of secret material |
| JSON redacts private key (always) | [ADR-014](decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md) | Defense-in-depth for logging accidents |
| No vault operations on call protocol | [ADR-008](decisions/008-secret-service-integration.md), [ADR-014](decisions/014-secret-material-flow-and-capability-injection.md) | Master seed never crosses the network |
| `DerivedKey` is move-only | `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` | Prevents accidental duplication of secret material |
| JSON redacts private key (always) | `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` | Defense-in-depth for logging accidents |
| No vault operations on call protocol | `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-008`, `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014` | Master seed never crosses the network |
| No remote dispatch in vault crate | [ADR-025](decisions/025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md) | Remote access requires a separate vault-server crate with its own ADR |
## Open Questions
@@ -236,8 +236,8 @@ ADR-025 and [open-questions.md](open-questions.md).
## References
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/src/protocol.rs`
- Tests: `crates/alknet-vault/src/protocol.rs` (unit tests for redaction
- Implementation: `src/protocol.rs`
- Tests: `src/protocol.rs` (unit tests for redaction
and zeroize behavior)
- [service.md](service.md) — `VaultServiceHandle` runtime API
- [mnemonic-derivation.md](mnemonic-derivation.md) — what `KeyType` means
@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
- **Door type**: One-way (key derivation method), two-way (salt field usage)
- **Priority**: high
- **Resolution**: The vault uses SLIP-0010 HD derivation from the BIP39 seed at path `m/74'/2'/0'/0'` to produce the AES-256-GCM encryption key — not PBKDF2. The `salt` field in `EncryptedData` is unused for key derivation (kept for wire-format compatibility with the TS predecessor). The TypeScript `@alkdev/storage` crypto module used PBKDF2 with a password + salt; data encrypted by that method (key_version=1) cannot be decrypted by the vault and must be migrated via one-time re-encryption to key_version=2. See ADR-020 for the full rationale and migration path.
- **Cross-references**: ADR-020, [encryption.md](../encryption.md)
- **Cross-references**: [ADR-020](../decisions/020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md), [encryption.md](../encryption.md)
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
- **Priority**: medium
- **Resolution**: Remote vault access is **not a feature of the vault crate**. ADR-025 dropped irpc from the vault, making the vault local-only by construction — no `RemoteService` trait, no wire format for vault messages, no default-insecure remote handler. The vault's API is `VaultServiceHandle` (direct method calls), nothing else.
If remote vault access is ever needed (e.g., the machine→worker pattern), it requires a **separate vault-server crate** that depends on both alknet-core (for `IdentityProvider`, scopes, auth-wrapping) and alknet-vault (for `VaultServiceHandle`). That crate would define its own threat model, access policy, operation filtering (Unlock/Lock local-only), and wire format — and requires its own ADR. This is a deliberate addition, not a flag flip on a default that was already loaded.
If remote vault access is ever needed (e.g., the machine→worker pattern), it requires a **separate vault-server crate** that depends on both alknet-core (for `IdentityProvider`, scopes, auth-wrapping) and alkvault (for `VaultServiceHandle`). That crate would define its own threat model, access policy, operation filtering (Unlock/Lock local-only), and wire format — and requires its own ADR. This is a deliberate addition, not a flag flip on a default that was already loaded.
The pre-ADR-025 deferral framed remote access as "non-breaking" (the wire format was additive). That framing was misleading: once workers build dependencies on the remote vault API, disabling it breaks them — the door is operationally one-way even if the wire format is additive. ADR-025 inverts the default: the vault is local-only by construction, and remote access requires building something new, not removing a default.
Per-node vaults are the recommended pattern for multi-node deployments: each node has its own vault and mnemonic; credentials are encrypted *for* the receiving node's public key, not decrypted centrally. This is end-to-end encryption between nodes, matching ADR-008's "capability source" model.
- **Cross-references**: ADR-005, ADR-008, ADR-014, ADR-018, ADR-019, ADR-025, [protocol.md](../protocol.md), [service.md](../service.md)
- **Cross-references**: `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-005`, `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-008`, `@alkdev/alknet: ADR-014`, [ADR-018](../decisions/018-vault-standalone-crate.md), [ADR-019](../decisions/019-vault-assembly-layer-only.md), [ADR-025](../decisions/025-vault-local-only-dispatch.md), [protocol.md](../protocol.md), [service.md](../service.md)
@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
- **Door type**: One-way (path scheme), two-way (rotation policy)
- **Priority**: medium
- **Resolution**: Key rotation uses version-indexed derivation paths. Each key version maps to a distinct SLIP-0010 path: `m/74'/2'/0'/{version-2}'`. v2 (current) is at `m/74'/2'/0'/0'`; v3 is at `m/74'/2'/0'/1'`; etc. The `decrypt` method derives the key at the path indicated by `encrypted.key_version` (not always at `PATHS::ENCRYPTION`). The `rotate` method decrypts with the old version's key and re-encrypts with the new version's key — no new mnemonic needed. The assembly layer or a migration tool iterates stored blobs and calls `rotate` on each; the vault does not self-rotate. Partial rotation is safe (old keys remain derivable). See ADR-021.
- **Cross-references**: ADR-020, ADR-021, [encryption.md](../encryption.md), [service.md](../service.md)
- **Cross-references**: [ADR-020](../decisions/020-hd-derivation-for-encryption-keys.md), [ADR-021](../decisions/021-key-rotation-via-version-indexed-paths.md), [encryption.md](../encryption.md), [service.md](../service.md)
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@@ -376,10 +376,10 @@ don't miss them.
## References
- Implementation: `crates/alknet-vault/src/service.rs`,
`crates/alknet-vault/src/cache.rs`
- Tests: `crates/alknet-vault/tests/service_tests.rs`,
`crates/alknet-vault/src/service.rs` (unit tests),
`crates/alknet-vault/src/cache.rs` (unit tests)
- Implementation: `src/service.rs`,
`src/cache.rs`
- Tests: `tests/service_tests.rs`,
`src/service.rs` (unit tests),
`src/cache.rs` (unit tests)
- [protocol.md](protocol.md) — `DerivedKey` and `KeyType`
- [encryption.md](encryption.md) — `encrypt` / `decrypt` cryptographic details
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
## Overview
This document defines the SDD process for the @alkdev/storage package. It
This document defines the SDD process for the @alkdev/alkvault package. It
leverages:
- **OpenCode CLI** as the agent execution environment
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@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ impl ExtendedPrivKey {
/// # Example
///
/// ```
/// use alknet_vault::derivation::{derive_path_from_seed, PATHS};
/// use alknet_vault::mnemonic::Mnemonic;
/// use alkvault::derivation::{derive_path_from_seed, PATHS};
/// use alkvault::mnemonic::Mnemonic;
///
/// let mnemonic = Mnemonic::generate(24).unwrap();
/// let seed = mnemonic.to_seed(None);
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@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ fn derive_child(
/// # Example
///
/// ```ignore
/// use alknet_vault::ethereum::derive_secp256k1_path;
/// use alknet_vault::derivation::PATHS;
/// use alkvault::ethereum::derive_secp256k1_path;
/// use alkvault::derivation::PATHS;
///
/// let key = derive_secp256k1_path(seed, PATHS::ETHEREUM).unwrap();
/// assert_eq!(key.private_key().len(), 32);
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
//! # alknet-vault
//! # alkvault
//!
//! Local key vault: BIP39 mnemonic generation, SLIP-0010 Ed25519 HD key derivation,
//! AES-256-GCM encryption for securing provider keys, credentials, and identity material.
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
//!
//! ## Crate Independence
//!
//! alknet-vault does **not** depend on alknet-core or any other alknet crate. It is
//! alkvault does **not** depend on alknet-core or any other alknet crate. It is
//! fully independent and usable in contexts where QUIC networking doesn't exist (CLI
//! tools, test harnesses, WASM key derivation).
//!
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@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
//! These tests verify that SLIP-0010 derivation produces correct results
//! against known test vectors and that path constants produce expected key types.
use alknet_vault::derivation::PATHS;
use alknet_vault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
use alkvault::derivation::PATHS;
use alkvault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
#[test]
fn test_identity_key_derivation() {
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ fn test_identity_key_derivation() {
let _phrase = service.unlock_new(24).unwrap();
let key = service.derive_ed25519(PATHS::IDENTITY).unwrap();
assert_eq!(key.key_type, alknet_vault::protocol::KeyType::Ed25519);
assert_eq!(key.key_type, alkvault::protocol::KeyType::Ed25519);
assert!(!key.private_key.is_empty());
assert!(!key.public_key.is_empty());
}
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ fn test_encryption_key_derivation() {
service.unlock_new(24).unwrap();
let key = service.derive_encryption_key(PATHS::ENCRYPTION).unwrap();
assert_eq!(key.key_type, alknet_vault::protocol::KeyType::Aes256Gcm);
assert_eq!(key.key_type, alkvault::protocol::KeyType::Aes256Gcm);
}
#[test]
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@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
//! These tests verify round-trip encryption, key version handling,
//! and wire format compatibility.
use alknet_vault::encryption::CURRENT_KEY_VERSION;
use alknet_vault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
use alkvault::encryption::CURRENT_KEY_VERSION;
use alkvault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
#[test]
fn test_encrypt_decrypt_round_trip_via_service() {
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ fn test_encrypted_data_serialization() {
assert!(json.contains("data"));
// Verify round-trip through JSON
let deserialized: alknet_vault::encryption::EncryptedData =
let deserialized: alkvault::encryption::EncryptedData =
serde_json::from_str(&json).unwrap();
assert_eq!(deserialized, encrypted);
}
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@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
//! These tests verify the unlock/lock lifecycle, error conditions,
//! and that the vault correctly manages state transitions.
use alknet_vault::derivation::PATHS;
use alknet_vault::service::{VaultServiceError, VaultServiceHandle};
use alkvault::derivation::PATHS;
use alkvault::service::{VaultServiceError, VaultServiceHandle};
#[test]
fn test_full_lifecycle() {
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@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@
//! byte-for-byte matching against SLIP-0010 raw hex, since the crate's internal
//! representation handles clamping differently.
use alknet_vault::derivation::{derive_path_from_seed, PATHS};
use alknet_vault::mnemonic::{Language, Mnemonic};
use alknet_vault::protocol::KeyType;
use alkvault::derivation::{derive_path_from_seed, PATHS};
use alkvault::mnemonic::{Language, Mnemonic};
use alkvault::protocol::KeyType;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// BIP39 Test Vectors
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ fn test_aes256gcm_known_key_encrypt_decrypt() {
];
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
let plaintext = b"hello, alknet vault!";
let plaintext = b"hello, alkvault!";
// Encrypt with known key and nonce
let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_ref()).unwrap();
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ fn test_alknet_encryption_path_regression() {
/// direct derivation (integration test).
#[test]
fn test_service_derive_matches_direct_derivation() {
use alknet_vault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
use alkvault::service::VaultServiceHandle;
let service = VaultServiceHandle::new();
let phrase = service.unlock_new(24).unwrap();