Critical findings resolved: - C1: Site routing is global (per-listener TOML, global runtime lookup) - C2: X-Forwarded-For replaces (not appends) — edge proxy model (ADR-021) - C3: Hop-by-hop header handling rules specified (proxy.md) - C4: ACME failure behavior defined (tls.md) - C5: Startup sequence with fail-fast semantics (operations.md) - C6: Per-listener Router instances with shared global state (overview.md) - C7: Rate limiter adopts new params on next request, no state clear (operations.md) Warnings resolved: - W1: Admin socket wire protocol specified - W2: Host header port stripped, hostnames only in config - W3: HTTP redirect URL construction with port handling - W4: /health on HTTPS matches regardless of Host header - W5: Static config changes logged as warning during reload - W6: Reload operations serialized via Mutex - W7: http_port validation rules added (9 new rules total) - W8: upstream format validation (host:port required, no scheme) - W9: TLS error handling table (SNI, version, cipher failures) - W10: IPv6 rate limited per /64 prefix - W11: Graceful shutdown sequence specified (6 steps) - W12: Error response bodies: minimal plain text, no version disclosure - W13: upstream_scheme HTTPS uses system CA store - W14: allow_wildcard_bind is OR between config and CLI - W15: ADR-010 Phase 2 list updated (timeouts moved to Phase 1) - W17: LoggingConfig static/restart note added Suggestions applied: - S2: ConnectInfo propagation note - S3: Case-insensitive host matching (RFC 7230) - S5: Response streaming behavior (chunk-by-chunk) - S6: Token bucket nodelay semantics - S7: File watching explicitly out of scope - S8: All paths forwarded without filtering - S9: shutdown_timeout_secs referenced in shutdown description - S11: Consolidated defaults table in config.md
261 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
261 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
---
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status: draft
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last_updated: 2026-06-11
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---
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# Proxy Handler
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## What It Is
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The proxy handler is the core component that receives an incoming HTTP request
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on the TLS-terminated connection, applies middleware (rate limiting, header
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injection, body size limits), and forwards it to the upstream service.
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## Why It Exists
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This component replaces nginx's `proxy_pass` directive. For our use case —
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one upstream per domain across multiple domains, no load balancing, no HTTP/2
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proxying — a custom handler is simpler and more maintainable than a
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general-purpose proxy library (ADR-002, ADR-010).
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## Architecture
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```
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Incoming HTTPS request
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ axum Router │
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│ (Host-based) │─── /health → 200 OK
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│ │
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│ match Host │
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│ header on │
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│ incoming req │
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└───────┬─────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Rate Limiting │ ← tower middleware layer
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│ Middleware │
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└───────┬─────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Proxy Header │ ← custom middleware / handler
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│ Injection │
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│ │
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│ X-Real-IP │ ← connect_info remote_addr
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│ X-Forwarded-For │ ← append to existing or set
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│ X-Forwarded-Proto │ ← "https" (or "http" on port 80)
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│ Host │ ← original host header (already set)
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└───────┬─────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Body Size Limit │ ← DefaultBodyLimit(100 MB)
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│ Middleware │
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└───────┬─────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────┐
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│ Reverse Proxy │ ← hyper Client request forwarding
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│ Handler │
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│ │
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│ 1. Build upstream│
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│ URI from │
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│ original req │
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│ 2. Forward req │
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│ to upstream │
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│ 3. Stream │
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│ response back │
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└─────────────────┘
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```
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## Request Flow
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### 1. Host-Based Routing
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The axum router uses a `Host` extractor to match incoming requests to site
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definitions from `DynamicConfig`. Sites are defined per-listener in the TOML
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configuration for organizational purposes, but at runtime they are collected
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into a single global routing table. The proxy looks up the `Host` header in
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this global table and either proxies to the upstream or returns 404.
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Host matching is **case-insensitive** per RFC 7230 §2.7.3. The `Host` header
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is normalized to lowercase before matching. Site `host` values in
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configuration are normalized to lowercase during validation.
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The `Host` header port component (e.g., `git.alk.dev:443`) is stripped before
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matching. Site `host` values must not include ports.
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The proxy does not filter or restrict paths. All paths and query strings on a
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known host are forwarded to the upstream without modification.
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The `/health` path is a special case: it matches regardless of the `Host`
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header and is evaluated before host-based routing. A `GET /health` request on
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any hostname returns `200 OK` with an empty body.
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### 2. Proxy Header Injection
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Headers are injected before forwarding. The proxy is an **edge proxy** — it
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sits directly in front of the internet with no trusted proxies upstream. This
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means the client IP from `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` is the real client IP, and
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existing `X-Forwarded-For` headers from the client cannot be trusted.
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| Header | Value Source | Notes |
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|--------|-------------|-------|
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| `Host` | Original request `Host` header | Preserved as-is |
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| `X-Real-IP` | `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` remote IP | Set to client's IP address |
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| `X-Forwarded-For` | `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` remote IP | **Replaced**, not appended. The proxy is the edge proxy — there are no trusted proxies upstream, so existing `X-Forwarded-For` values from the client cannot be trusted. |
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| `X-Forwarded-Proto` | Determined by which listener port received the request | `https` for requests on the listener's `https_port`, `http` for requests on the listener's `http_port` |
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**ConnectInfo propagation**: `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` is populated by
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extracting `TcpStream::peer_addr()` before wrapping the connection in
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`TlsStream`. Each listener provides this information to its axum Router via
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`axum::ServiceExt::into_make_service_with_connect_info::<SocketAddr>()`.
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### 3. Request Forwarding
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The proxy handler constructs a new request to the upstream:
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1. Build the upstream URI using the site's `upstream_scheme` and `upstream`
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address, preserving the original path and query string
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2. Copy the request method, headers, and body from the original
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3. Inject proxy headers (X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto)
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4. Send the request via a shared hyper Client instance
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5. Stream the response back to the client (chunk-by-chunk, not buffered)
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If the client disconnects while the upstream is still sending, the upstream
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connection is closed and the event is logged at `debug` level. If the
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upstream disconnects mid-stream, the client receives whatever data was
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already sent and the connection is closed.
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The hyper Client is created once at startup and shared via axum's `State`. It
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must be configured with (see ADR-017 for rationale):
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- Connection pooling (hyper default behavior)
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- HTTP/1.1 only for upstream connections (HTTP/2 proxying is out of scope)
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- No redirect following (proxies should not follow redirects)
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Per-site timeout overrides are available via `upstream_connect_timeout_secs`
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and `upstream_request_timeout_secs` in `SiteConfig` (see ADR-015). When not
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specified, defaults of 5s connect and 60s request are used.
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### 4. Header Handling
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The proxy must handle request and response headers correctly to avoid security
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issues and protocol violations.
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**Headers removed before forwarding (hop-by-hop headers per RFC 2616 §13.5.1):**
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- `Connection`
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- `Keep-Alive`
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- `Proxy-Authorization`
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- `Proxy-Authenticate`
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- `TE`
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- `Trailers`
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- `Transfer-Encoding`
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- `Upgrade`
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These headers are connection-specific and must not be forwarded to the
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upstream. Removing `Proxy-Authorization` and `Proxy-Authenticate` prevents
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credential leakage.
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**Headers added or modified:**
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See the Proxy Header Injection section above for the full list of proxy headers
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(X-Real-IP, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Proto, Host).
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**Headers NOT added in Phase 1:**
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- `Via`: Not added. The proxy is an edge proxy and `Via` is primarily for
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tracking proxy chains. Can be added in Phase 2 if needed.
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**Response headers:**
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Upstream response headers are forwarded as-is to the client, with the following
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exceptions:
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- Hop-by-hop headers listed above are removed
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- The proxy does not add a `Server` header to responses
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### 5. Error Handling
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All error responses use plain text bodies with no proxy version or identity
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information. No upstream error details are included. Response format:
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- Content-Type: `text/plain; charset=utf-8`
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- Body: Brief status text matching the HTTP status (e.g., `Bad Gateway` for 502)
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| Upstream Condition | Response | Body | Notes |
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|-------------------|----------|------|-------|
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| Upstream reachable | Stream response as-is | (upstream body) | Headers, status, body all forwarded |
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| Upstream unreachable | 502 Bad Gateway | `Bad Gateway` | Logged at `warn` level |
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| Upstream timeout | 504 Gateway Timeout | `Gateway Timeout` | Logged at `warn` level |
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| Request body too large | 413 Payload Too Large | `Payload Too Large` | From `DefaultBodyLimit` middleware |
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| Rate limit exceeded | 429 Too Many Requests | `Too Many Requests` | Logged at `info` level |
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| Unknown Host header | 404 Not Found | `Not Found` | No matching site definition |
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| Missing Host header | 400 Bad Request | `Bad Request` | Required for routing |
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### 6. HTTP → HTTPS Redirect
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A separate HTTP listener on port 80 (per listener) handles redirect. It reads
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the `Host` header from the incoming request and returns a 301 Permanent Redirect
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to the HTTPS equivalent URL.
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The redirect URL is constructed as:
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`https://{host}:{https_port}/{path}?{query}`
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Where:
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- `{host}` is the hostname portion of the `Host` header (port stripped)
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- `{https_port}` is the listener's `https_port`, omitted if it's 443
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- `{path}` and `{query}` are preserved from the original request
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If the incoming request has no `Host` header, the proxy returns `400 Bad
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Request`.
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Each listener has its own HTTP redirect on its own bind address.
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## Upstream Connection
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The upstream connection scheme defaults to `http://` since the proxy and backend
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services typically run on the same host (e.g., `127.0.0.1:3000`). The
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`upstream_scheme` field in each site's configuration allows specifying `https://`
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for upstreams that require TLS (e.g., separate hosts or secure internal services).
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For the initial deployment, upstream connections use plain HTTP (e.g.,
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`git.alk.dev` → `127.0.0.1:3000`, `alk.dev` → `127.0.0.1:8080`) since TLS
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between the proxy and backend services on loopback is unnecessary.
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When `upstream_scheme` is `"https"`, the proxy validates the upstream's TLS
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certificate using the system's native TLS root certificates (via `rustls` root
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cert store). Certificate validation failures result in a 502 Bad Gateway
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response. No certificate pinning or custom CA support is provided in Phase 1.
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## Body Size Limit
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axum's `DefaultBodyLimit` layer sets the maximum request body size. The default
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of 100 MB (104,857,600 bytes) matches our current nginx configuration and
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accommodates Gitea's push operations with large pack files (see ADR-018). In
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Phase 1, the body limit is a global setting; Phase 2 may add per-site body
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limits.
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## Design Decisions
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All design decisions are documented as ADRs in [decisions/](decisions/).
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| ADR | Decision | Summary |
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|-----|----------|---------|
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| [002](decisions/002-custom-proxy-handler.md) | Custom proxy handler | One upstream per domain — simpler than a general proxy library |
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| [007](decisions/007-custom-log-format.md) | Custom structured log format | key=value pairs with RATE_LIMIT prefix for fail2ban |
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| [010](decisions/010-multi-site-phase1.md) | Multi-site in Phase 1 | Multiple domains from initial release |
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| [015](decisions/015-per-site-timeouts.md) | Per-site upstream timeouts with defaults | 5s connect / 60s request defaults, per-site overrides |
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| [017](decisions/017-upstream-connection-defaults.md) | Upstream connection defaults | HTTP/1.1, no redirects, connection pooling |
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| [018](decisions/018-body-size-limit.md) | Request body size limit | 100 MB default matching nginx, Gitea push compatibility |
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| [021](decisions/021-x-forwarded-for-edge-proxy.md) | X-Forwarded-For edge proxy model | Replace, don't append — proxy is the edge, no trusted upstream proxies |
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## Open Questions
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Open questions are tracked in [open-questions.md](open-questions.md). Key
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questions affecting this document:
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- ~~**OQ-06**: Should upstream timeouts be configurable per-site?~~ (resolved —
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ADR-015: per-site timeout overrides with defaults) |