glm-5.1
13b0991fb8
Resolved all 11 open questions based on project guidance: Transport: - OQ-01/OQ-07: ACME/Let's Encrypt with domain + IP paths (ADR-008) - OQ-02: Default to n0 relay, --iroh-relay override (ADR-009) - OQ-05: Transport chaining supported natively (ADR-010) Client: - OQ-06: Programmatic-first API, no ~/.ssh/config (ADR-011) Server: - OQ-04: Ed25519 + OpenSSH cert-authority, no password auth (ADR-012) - OQ-08: fail2ban-friendly logging + built-in rate limiting (ADR-013) TUN: - OQ-03/OQ-09: Deferred entirely, recommend tun2proxy (ADR-014) - tun-shim.md marked deprecated NAPI: - OQ-10: Expose both connect() and serve() (ADR-016) - OQ-11: Use napi-rs for FFI bridge (ADR-015) Additional ADRs created during review: - ADR-006: No logging of tunnel destinations (was phantom reference) - ADR-017: Stealth mode protocol multiplexing - ADR-018: Control channel for pubsub over SSH Fixed: ADR-002 status → Superseded, ADR-007 title typo, WRAUTH_SERVER typo, ADR-005 stale wraith-tun refs, undefined ACL feature removed from server.md, --proxy semantic difference documented.
39 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-013: Fail2ban-Friendly Server Logging
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## Status
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Accepted
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## Context
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The server needs to handle abuse on public-facing deployments. Our production infrastructure uses fail2ban on Linux (documented in `/workspace/system/dev1/fail2ban.md`) with nftables and systemd journal backend. fail2ban needs structured, parseable logs to identify abusive IP addresses.
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However, fail2ban is Linux-specific. On other platforms (macOS, Windows, BSD), users need a different approach to reject abusive connections. The server should provide enough logging for fail2ban on Linux and enough built-in protection for other platforms.
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## Decision
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The server logs connection and authentication events at `INFO` level with structured fields, and provides a configurable connection rate limiter as a built-in defense.
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**Logging** (for fail2ban integration on Linux):
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- Log auth attempts: `level=INFO, msg="auth attempt", remote_addr=<ip>, user=<user>, key_fingerprint=<sha256>, result=<accept|reject>`
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- Log new connections: `level=INFO, msg="connection opened", remote_addr=<ip>, transport=<tcp|tls|iroh>`
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- Log disconnections: `level=INFO, msg="connection closed", remote_addr=<ip>, duration=<secs>`
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- Do NOT log: channel open targets, DNS resolutions, bytes transferred
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This matches what fail2ban needs: source IP + failure indicator. Our existing fail2ban setup filters on similar fields for SSH and nginx.
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**Built-in rate limiting** (for all platforms):
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- `--max-connections-per-ip <n>` (default: 0 = unlimited) — reject new connections from an IP that already has N active connections
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- `--max-auth-attempts <n>` (default: 10) — disconnect after N failed auth attempts from one connection
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- Rate limiting happens at the SSH layer, before channels are opened
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This ensures that even without fail2ban, the server rejects obviously abusive connections.
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## Consequences
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- **Positive**: fail2ban can parse wraith logs the same way it parses SSH and nginx logs on our production systems.
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- **Positive**: Built-in rate limiting provides protection on platforms without fail2ban.
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- **Positive**: No privacy-sensitive data in logs (no tunnel destinations).
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- **Negative**: Slightly more code in the server for connection tracking per IP.
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- **Negative**: Users with custom fail2ban filters need to write regex for wraith's log format (documented examples provided).
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## References
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- [server.md](../server.md)
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- [OQ-08](../open-questions.md) — resolved by this ADR
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- Production fail2ban setup: `/workspace/system/dev1/fail2ban.md` |