SSE payload contract (non-JSON frames carry {data, event}; JSON frames
surface as themselves), the placeholder routing rule (placeholder keys
never double-emit as query; structural path values are INVALID_INPUT),
and the literal-percent trade-off (% in values always encoded; % in
assembly-supplied template text survives — the assembly owns the
upstream-semantics choice, per the ADR-066 trust boundary).
Module doc gains three sections: the FWD-18 routing rule (placeholder
keys never double-emit as query; structural path values are
INVALID_INPUT), the FWD-19 percent trade-off (% in values always
encoded; % in assembly-supplied template/base text survives verbatim —
documented instead of rejected, per the ADR-066 assembly trust
boundary), and the FWD-17 streaming payload contract. FWD-19 behavior
pinned by a wire-level template test.
The routing half of FWD-18 was already in place (placeholder keys skip
query routing before value-shape inspection); this pins it with a test
and decides the structural-value outcome: an object/array value under a
placeholder key now fails with INVALID_INPUT instead of splicing the
minified JSON into the path segment. Scalars (string/number/bool/null)
render as before.
Option (b) of the FWD-17 decision: payloads decode as JSON when valid
(number stays number, quoted string stays string); non-JSON payloads
surface as {"data": <raw>, "event": <name|null>} instead of
silently degrading to a JSON string. The parser captures the frame's
event: field (WHATWG last-wins) and resets all pending state on every
blank-line dispatch, so an event:-only frame (no data) cannot leak its
name into a later frame. JSON frames surface as themselves even under
a named event; the implicit 'message' default never wraps a payload.
Verification: cargo test (33 forward tests incl. 4 new FWD-17
contract/parser pins), clippy, fmt.
Review 002 GW-15 [major]: /publish lost both claimed memory bounds in
the GW-06 streaming rewrite. Unauthenticated POST /publish with chunked
'a'-forever (no newline) grew the heap with the upload until OOM, and
each poll re-scanned the whole buffer (O(n^2) on top).
- BufferedLines: cap the unterminated tail against
MAX_PUBLISH_LINE_BYTES immediately after every chunk read (checked
before yielding, even with no \n seen) and re-check on the
trailing-EOF mem::take path; a breach aborts the whole reader
(pending lines included) with the same terminal INVALID_INPUT
LineCap error. Complete lines keep the baseline at-cap semantics.
- Whole gateway router: explicit request-body-limit layer
(GATEWAY_BODY_LIMIT = 2 MiB + 64 KiB framing headroom). A raw-Body
handler never consults axum's DefaultBodyLimit (that is an extension
extractors read), so /publish had no whole-body cap at all. The layer
pre-rejects oversized declared Content-Length and wraps chunked
uploads in a counting stream; both answer plain-text 413. It
deliberately sits above the per-line cap so a single over-cap line
still surfaces the semantic line-cap error. Upstream body read
failures are not flagged as limit-exceeded (disconnects are not 413).
- New wire tests: streamed never-newline over-cap rejections (both the
streamed multi-chunk and trailing-EOF shapes), 413 on chunked
over-limit uploads, 413 on oversized declared Content-Length, cap
breach batched with complete lines, at-cap line still round-trips,
declared-length over-limit pre-rejection.
Module status mapping note (GW-16 tracks the drift): hand-rolled
pre-dispatch rejections use 400/INVALID_INPUT while mid-stream chunk
errors map 422 through gateway::error; normalizing is GW-16, not GW-15.
Verification: cargo test 305+5 pass, cargo test --all-features pass,
cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings pass (--all-features too),
cargo fmt --check pass.
- path-item-level `parameters` parse into PathItem and merge into every
operation's input schema; operation-level entries override shared
name+in duplicates (last-insert wins)
- success sweep accepts `2XX` after concrete 2XX keys and before
`default` (SSE detection + output schema; concrete outranks wildcard)
- `4XX`/`5XX` error keys project to their class representative status
(`HTTP_400`/`HTTP_500`) instead of dropping silently; `default`
still drops loudly (no implied range)
- top-level `webhooks` fails import naming the feature (inbound
callbacks are outside the single-endpoint outbound adapter model)
- unbound-placeholder error names the parameter-merge state so the
diagnosis no longer dead-ends
Verification: cargo test (174 lib tests), cargo fmt
Mirrors the WS-13 progress semantics onto the axum upgrade path with
three integration tests over the real HttpAdapter surface (also the
COV-11b dark-knob gate — with_ws_idle_timeout had no test caller):
the forever-dribble client is evicted with 1001 despite arriving
messages; a productive session round-trips calls across many windows
without eviction; the None knob never evicts a dribbling client.
The router-wide bearer_auth_middleware route_layer wraps every route
registered before the call (axum 0.8 RouteManager semantics, verified
against the vendored axum 0.8.9 source), so it double-wrapped the WS
upgrade route (own ws_bearer_auth layer) and the /mcp nest (own inner
bearer layer) — the token resolved twice per request on both, and the
SRV-10 comment claimed the opposite.
Restructure build_router: /mcp is merged and the WS upgrade route is
registered after the router-wide route_layer, so each keeps exactly one
auth layer. The WS MethodRouter now carries the decoy 405 fallback
explicitly (MethodRouter::route_layer wraps method endpoints, not the
fallback), preserving the SRV-07 decoy shape for wrong-method probes on
/alk/channels. Comments state axum's actual route_layer semantics.
Tests: a counting IdentityProvider pins one resolution per WS upgrade
request and per /mcp initialize (verified to fail with left: 2/3 under
the pre-fix ordering); the 401 enforcement and the WS-path decoy 405
are pinned.
Verification: cargo test (304), cargo test --all-features (376 + 5
integration suites), clippy -D warnings (default + all-features),
cargo fmt --check, cargo doc --no-deps
Decides the WS-13 legitimate-silence question as option (b): 60s of no
chunk progress is an intentional eviction line even for silent
subscriptions; no WS ping/pong keepalive is added because a keepalive
can only rescue app-silence by re-arming the deadline, which reopens
the dribble hole the knob exists to seal. Documented in the byte_adapter
module doc, on DEFAULT_WS_IDLE_TIMEOUT, on the unchanged
HttpAdapter::with_ws_idle_timeout knob, and in websocket.md (new
'Idle-read timeout' section, including the FWD-15 SSE-keepalive
layering note). Deployment posture for long-lived silent sessions:
with_ws_idle_timeout(None) + WsSessions abort + write-side caps.
The WS-01 idle timer reset on WS message arrival, so the forever-dribble
stall (declare a chunk, deliver its payload one byte per message) reset
the deadline forever while the demux stayed parked on the partial chunk;
conversely the reset-on-message rule was the only thing slow-but-alive
sessions survived on.
Semantics: the deadline now resets on demux progress — bytes actually
forwarded into read_tx that complete inbound chunks (the frames the
demux routes), tracked byte-for-byte in line with alkcall's parse walk
(8-byte header -> payload skip). Message arrival without a completed
chunk resets nothing, so the dribble hits the deadline; every completed
chunk (even one per message, slowly) re-arms the window.
Tests (tungstenite path): the forever-dribble eviction with 1001 despite
arriving messages; a productive-progress session that survives across
many windows; the knob-disabled (None) arm; the stall and text/cap arms
unchanged.
http-adapters.md: forwarding-handler step 5 documents the time/bytes
split for Sub forwards (stream client without the total request
timeout, total streamed-bytes cap, read timeout as the staleness
guard); the HTTP Client section documents the two derived clients
(request vs stream), the reqwest 0.13 per-request-override limitation
that forces the derived-client design, and that only the total timeout
differs between them.
http-server.md: the per-endpoint dispatch deadline paragraph now covers
the outbound half — unbounded time, bounded bytes on both the gateway
and the forwarding side (ADR-049/021 note: unbounded time by design for
subscriptions, bounded bytes per subscription).
Verified: cargo doc --no-deps clean, full suite green.
FWD-15: forward_stream now sends through SharedHttpClient::stream_client
— a client derived from the same config with the total request timeout
removed and connect + read timeouts retained. reqwest 0.13's per-request
override can lengthen a client-level total timeout but never clear it
(request-scoped None falls back to the client default), so the derived
client is the only correct mechanism. Both clients rebuild-and-swap
together atomically (FWD-12). A healthy >30s subscription survives; the
read timeout stays as the staleness guard, matching the gateway's
deadline: None dispatch contract (alkcall ADR-021).
FWD-14: the streaming branch enforces a total streamed-bytes cap per
subscription (HttpClientConfig::stream_total_byte_cap, default 1 GiB),
accumulated across every chunk fed to the SSE parser; exceeding it
terminates with a single terminal HTTP_413 error envelope. The SSE
line-cap check moved before extend_from_slice so the reassembly buffer
can never exceed the cap. Removing the total timeout without this cap
would open an unbounded-memory window, so both land together.
Wire tests: keepalive trickle past a scaled total-timeout deadline keeps
delivering; over-cap stream terminates with exactly one terminal error;
parser boundary tests for pre-extend cap checks.
Verified: cargo test (302+5), --all-features (373+41), clippy
--all-targets -D warnings (default + all-features), fmt --check,
doc --no-deps clean.
method_not_allowed_fallback(decoy_method_not_allowed) was registered on
the default router before the extras merge; axum applies the 405
fallback only to MethodRouters present at call time, so wrong-method
probes on extra routes returned axum's bare 405 (no body, no
Server: nginx) — the exact stealth probe SRV-07 neutralized for the
default surface.
Re-apply the fallback after the extras merge (idempotent for routers
the earlier call covered — axum 0.8.9 replaces only Fallback::Default).
Tests pin both shapes: decoy 405 on an extra route, and no regression
of the default-surface 405 after the merge.
Verification: cargo test, cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings,
cargo fmt --check
Replace rmcp's unbounded Peer::list_all_tools with a bounded walk over
list_tools: hard cap of 100 pages (MCP_MAX_TOOLS_LIST_PAGES) plus a 60 s
overall deadline (MCP_TOOLS_LIST_DEADLINE). Tripping either budget fails
loudly with AdapterError::DiscoveryFailed naming pages fetched and tools
accumulated — no silent truncation, no partial registration (import
fails closed, as before). A slow or hung page is cut off by a per-page
tokio timeout sized to the remaining budget.
Bounds are documented in the module doc. Integration test added: a
cycling-cursor server (next_cursor always Some("a")) terminates with
the clean budget error inside an outer 10 s guard; the existing 3-page
pagination test is unchanged and passes.
Verification: cargo test (304 pass), cargo test --features mcp,
cargo test --all-features (412 pass), clippy -D warnings both default
and --all-features --all-targets, cargo fmt --check, cargo doc --no-deps.
- build_error_schemas: default/wildcard response keys dropped with a
warn instead of emitting a dead HTTP_0 ErrorDefinition — /search
never advertises a code that can't match (the runtime mapper already
synthesizes HTTP_<actual> for unmapped statuses)
- check_parameter_style: non-default style/explode parameter forms
(spaceDelimited, pipeDelimited, deepObject, form+explode:false,
simple+explode:true) fail import with a feature-naming SchemaParse;
wire-equivalent defaults (form, simple) import unchanged — no more
silent "[1,2]" array mis-serialization
- servers overrides rejected at import at all three levels (document,
path, operation) — the adapter pins one base_url at assembly time
- trace-only paths: skip is now logged (warn naming path + methods),
documented-as-inert instead of silent
- detect_op_type + build_output_schema sweep 2XX/default keys for
text/event-stream — a default-declared SSE stream classifies as Sub
instead of returning one giant text body
Tests: 11 new (error-drop, style rejections + default accept, servers
3-level rejections + baseline, trace skip, SSE default/2XX detection).
Verified: cargo test (299), --all-features (370 + suites), clippy
--all-targets -D warnings (default + all-features), fmt --check.
Tasks: review-001-openapi-loud-degradation
- new gateway::schema_cache — PublishSchemaCache: compile the op's
publish_schema once per registration (value-keyed invalidation for
hot reload), cache compile failures (logged once at error level,
never retried per request)
- /publish compile failure is now fail-closed: the chunk stream
terminates with INTERNAL (500), the error text stays in the log
(no schema internals on the wire) — the per-request warn-and-skip
unvalidated ingest path is removed
- schema resolution is lazy (first chunk poll, after invoke_sink's
404/403/422 pre-checks — GW-11 order preserved) and keyed by schema
value, so re-registration/hot reload is picked up (test)
- NdjsonChunkStream: first Err item is terminal (done + stream end),
mirroring the wire pump's send(Err) + break — Ok chunks can never
follow an error on the HTTP path either (found by spy-handler test)
Verified: cargo test (308), cargo test --all-features, clippy
--all-targets -D warnings (default + all-features), fmt --check.
Tasks: review-001-publish-schema-validation-robust
Found in the sweep of completed review-001 remediation:
- /publish schema validation fails open on compile error + recompiles
per request (remediation-introduced, routes.rs:254-268)
- OAI-06 loud-degradation unblocked and still open (HTTP_0 marker)
- HY-06 ExponentialBackoff in public API + COV-02 mTLS success path
both unblocked post client-config rework
- HY-02/04/11 publish-prep docs gate (104 missing-docs warnings
re-measured)
Also flagged, not tasked here: WS-12 (alkcall demux 4 GiB discard
alloc) was never actually filed in alkcall's consumer-findings-ledger —
only CF-001 is there. File it when next touching alkcall.
taskgraph: validate clean (42), no cycles
Record the v1 cut for browser-opened data channels over WS (review-001
WS-03): the design (ADR-067) stands; only the wiring is deferred.
- open-questions.md: add OQ-05 (deferred(scope: v1 cut)) with gap
detail and deferred scope
- ADR-067: dated status amendment + v1-cut note at the data-channel
step; References point to OQ-05
- ADR-048: dated reconciliation note — overlay bidirectionality is
decided design, not a v1 implementation commitment
- websocket.md: status notes on §"Data channels for browsers" and
upgrade step 7
- task review-001-ws-data-channel-decision: completed, Summary filled
Verification: taskgraph validate (38 tasks OK); cargo doc --no-deps
(pre-existing warnings only).
- build_request takes the op's input_schema and rejects undeclared
input keys (INVALID_INPUT) before any outbound request is built;
explicit `additionalProperties: true` opts into catch-all input;
non-object inputs rejected (OAI-02)
- in: header parameters are stamped `wire: header` in the generated
input schema and sent as upstream request headers, not query params;
in: cookie fails import with a clear error (OAI-03)
- a spec parameter named `body` is rejected at import unconditionally
(OAI-07)
- FromJsonSchema::new returns Result and validates method/path template/
base_url at construction; registered visibility forced to Internal
like from_openapi; module doc corrected (OAI-09)
Verified: cargo test, cargo test --all-features, clippy (both feature
sets, -D warnings), cargo fmt --check